Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 724 S.W.2d 440 - Chambers v. State

Chambers v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1987

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
9
states following
August 2000
most recently cited

32 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently August 2000 · most notably 128 Ill. 2d 1 - People v. Young (1989), 517 So. 2d 1346 - Lockett v. State (1987)

32 state decisions

190198719902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Batson v. Kentucky · Griffith v. Kentucky · Wagner v. State · Brooks v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “To establish such a case, [purposeful discrimination] the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race. * * * Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits “those to discriminate who are of a mind to dis criminate.” Finally, tHe defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empanelling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. * * # % * * Once the defendant makes a prima fa-cie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. Though this requirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory character of the historic challenge, we emphasize that the prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. But the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant’s prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant’s race on the assumption — or his intuitive judgment — that they would be partial to ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “A third juror was excused because she was a Jehovah's Witness which the prosecutor felt was a fringe religious group and her juror card indicated she was unmarried with two children. A fourth juror was excused because the prosecutor”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “and the space for number of children was unmarked, and his handwriting was not very legible. The explanation for excusing the second juror was that he had misspelled”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.