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← 725 F.2d 246 - Thomas v. Leeke

Thomas v. Leeke’s Empirical Analysis

725 F.2d 246 · 1984

Citation profile

31
cited by 31 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
3
states following
June 2025
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 31 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2025 · most notably State v. Jackson (1986), 138 Ill. 2d 218 - People v. Flowers (1990)

18 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

26019841990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on In the Matter of Samuel Winship · Wainwright v. Sykes · Mullaney v. Wilbur · Engle v. Isaac · Patterson v. New York

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “indeed, 'all circumstances of justification, excuse, or alleviation'--rested on the defendant.... This was the rule when the Fifth Amendment was adopted, and it was the American rule when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “The confusion is highlighted by the realization that the jury might have been left with a reasonable doubt, but no more than a reasonable doubt, as to whether Thomas had acted in self-defense. In that instance, neither side would have carried its burden of proof under the trial court’s instructions. The presence of a reasonable doubt would necessitate a conclusion that the prosecution had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The presence of no more than a reasonable doubt would necessitate a conclusion that the defendant had not carried her burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “A reasonable juror could have interpreted the charge literally as establishing two different burdens of proof. The first would require [Hyman] to come forward with proof beyond a reasonable doubt of justification or excuse. The second would put on the state the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt “malice whenever a deadly weapon is used.” Also a reasonable juror could have concluded that the burden is on the State to prove malice only when a deadly weapon is used, and not when malice is presumed from an unlawful act. [Mag.Rep.46].”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.