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← 725 SO2D 1245 - Rowe v. Schreiber

Rowe v. Schreiber’s Empirical Analysis

1999

Citation profile

11
cited by 11 later decisions
3
states following
February 2009
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 9 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Insurance · Bailey v. Tucker · 333 So. 2d 25 - Nardone v. Reynolds · Carmel v. Lunney · McCord v. Bailey

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Since it was addressed in some of the cases cited in the briefs and will arise on remand, we address another issue concerning the elements of a legal malpractice claim against a criminal defense attorney. We agree with the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that the better rule is to require a plaintiff, as part of the causation element of the cause of action, to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that he was innocent of the crimes charged in the underlying criminal proceeding. See Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 787-89 (1991). Such a rule comports with public policy concerns identified in various cases, which require that unless a plaintiff can establish his innocence of the underlying criminal charges, the law views the criminal conduct as the legal cause of damages, and not the attorney's malpractice. See, e.g., Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 497-498; Carmel, [ 518 N.Y.S.2d 605 ,] 511 N.E.2d at 1128 . In Glenn , the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts articulated the policy reasons behind the adoption of this rule in criminal legal malpractice cases: The underpinnings of common law tort liability, compensation and deterrence, do not support a rule that allows recovery to one who is guilty of the underlying criminal charge. A person who is guilty need not be compensated for what happened to him as a result of his former attorney's negligence. There is no reason to compensate such a person, rewarding him indirectly for his crime. The possibility that”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “had the issue been raised in the initial appeal, an evidentiary hearing or new trial would have been mandated by the appellate court and that as a result of Jorandby's negligence, [Rowe's] release from prison and ultimate invalidation of his convictions and sentences were delayed.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.