concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part">BAKER, Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join my colleagues and concur in the reversal of two of Miller’s three convictions for resisting law enforcement. However, I cannot agree with the conclusion that the trial court erred in convicting Miller of three counts of criminal recklessness.

I acknowledge that criminal recklessness is not an inherently lesser-included offense of attempted murder as our supreme court decided in Wilson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 466, 477 (Ind.1998). In my view, however, the circumstances presented here support “a conclusion that the recklessness offense was indeed a factually included offense of attempted murder. Specifically, the charging informations alleged that Miller shot “at and toward” three police officers. Record at 28. This court has observed that such conduct creates a substantial risk of bodily harm. See Carter v. State, 634 N.E.2d 830, 834 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (defendant’s act of shooting toward victims was sufficient to support criminal recklessness convictions). Moreover, it may also be said that Miller “disregarded the consequences of his actions” when he engaged in such conduct. While the trial court presumably could not determine that Miller had the requisite intent to commit murder in light of the evidence that was presented, it is apparent that Miller knew-or should have known that shooting toward the officers created a substantial risk of bodily harm to them. As a result, there lies the inference of a mens rea sufficient to support Miller’s convictions for criminal recklessness.

I would also note that while the majority points to Shoup v. State, 570 N.E.2d 1298 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied, for the proposition that the convictions must be vacated, the charging information in that case alleged an actual touching which constituted the offense of battery. There, we upheld the trial court’s refusal to tender an instruction on criminal recklessness because there was nothing in those charges indicating a disregard for the consequences on the part of the defendant. Id. at 1305. Inasmuch as Miller was charged with attempted murder, it is my view that the trial court could have found that Miller acted recklessly and held a disregard for the consequences even though the evidence failed to show that Miller intended to kill the officers. See Beeman v. State, 232 Ind. 683, 692, 115 N.E.2d 919, 923 (1953) (to be guilty of a reckless disregard for the safety of others, it is not necessary that one intend the harm which results from it). As a result, I would affirm Miller’s three convictions for criminal recklessness.

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