State v. Russell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Automobiles are accorded less protection against warrantless searches due to their inherent mobility and a citizen's lesser expectation of privacy. State v. Bailey, 97-493 (La.App. 5th Cir. 11/12/97), 703 So.2d 1325, 1328 . The current standard for warrantless searches of automobiles under the Fourth Amendment was expressed in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that police officers who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed within may conduct a search of the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could require in a warrant. See also: California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 , 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991). The "automobile exception," to the warrant requirement is based upon the existence of probable cause to search and exigent circumstances. State v. Tatum, 466 So.2d at 31 . Probable cause to search an automobile exists when the total circumstances allow the conclusion that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular location. State v. Pittman, 95-382 (La.App. 5th Cir.10/1/96), 683 So.2d 748, 764 . For constitutional purposes, there is no difference between seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. State v. Tatum, 466 So.2d at 31 ; Sta”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 739 So. 2d 931 - State v. Curtis

2. “A. A defendant initially present for the commencement of trial shall not prevent the further progress of the trial, including the return of the verdict, and shall be considered to have waived his right to be present if his counsel is present or if the right to counsel has been waived and: (1) He voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced, whether or not he has been informed by the court of his obligation to be present during the trial[.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 798 So. 2d 1090 - State v. Graves