727 So. 2d 1264 - State v. Brady’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

49 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The crack cocaine at issue was found under a chair in the home of James Vertner. Thus, the State was required to prove the Defendant had constructive possession of the cocaine. There are several factors to consider when determining whether the Defendant had constructive possession of the crack cocaine which are set out below. Knowledge The crack cocaine at issue was found under a chair in which Michael Paige had been sitting. Michael testified that the crack was in his possession, he placed it in the back of the chair, and the | ^Defendant knew nothing about it. There was, however, testimony by Trooper Horton and Detective Dunn that they believed the Defendant and Michael were part of a drug organization. However, Michael denied any participation in the organization and the Defendant was not asked if he was part of the organization. Relationship with the Person Found in Actual Possession Neither Michael nor the Defendant actually possessed the crack cocaine when it was discovered by police. There is no evidence of a relationship between Michael and the Defendant other than testimony by Trooper Horton and Detective Dunn that they believed the Defendant and Michael were part of a drug organization. Access to the Area Vertner, the homeowner, testified that when police entered his home, the Defendant was in the kitchen by the sink and the ice box and he sat down at that time. Vertner did not testify where the Defendant sat. Babers, who was also inside the home when the Defendant ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 140 So. 3d 911 - State ex rel. T.H.

2. “In State v. Rolen, 95-0347 (La.9/15/95), 662 So.2d 446 , the defendant was convicted of his second offense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, a violation of La. R.S. 14:98. At the time of Rolen's conviction, La. R.S. 14:98(F) provided an enhanced sentence for a second offense, provided that ten years had not elapsed from the commission of the previous offense. At the time of Rolen's first conviction, that statute provided for a five-year prescriptive period. Subsequent to the expiration of that five-year period following Rolen's conviction, La. R.S. 14:98(F) was amended to extend the prescriptive period to ten years. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the application of the ten-year period was not barred by the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Louisiana constitutions, nor was it otherwise fundamentally unfair. * * * In State v. Boykin, 29, 141 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/31/97), 688 So.2d 1250 , the court held that the applicability of the seven-year cleansing period of La. R.S. 15:529.1(C), as amended in 1994, was applicable to a 1987 felony conviction, even though the cleansing period at the time of the first conviction was five-years. The court applied the reasoning in Rolen, finding that the application of the extended cleansing period was not an ex post facto application of law, nor was it fundamentally unfair when applied to the defendant. In State v. Brinson, 97-1471 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/3/97) , 699 So.2d 510 , writ denied, 97-2452 (La.4/9/98), 717 So.2d 1137 ,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 782 So. 2d 662 - State v. Lewis

3. “In evaluating whether evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction, an appellate court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of act could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 588 So.2d 757 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991). However, the reviewing court may not disregard this duty simply because the record contains evidence that tends to support each fact necessary to constitute the crime. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La.1988). The reviewing court must consider the record as a whole since that is what a rational trier of fact would do. If rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier's view of all the evidence most favorable to the prosecution must be adopted. The fact finder's discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law. Mussall; Green; supra. "[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence." State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319 (La.1992) at 1324. In addition, when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, such evidence must consist of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 745 So. 2d 737 - State v. Booth