Patterson v. Austin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Members of the Jury, I charge you that a person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, caused the death of another human being. Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. Before you would be authorized to find the defendant guilty of the offense of murder, you must find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did with malice aforethought, either express or implied, cause the death of Larry W. Stevens, Sr. I charge you that if you find and believe that at any time prior to the date this indictment was returned into this court that the defendant did in the Coun ty of Richmond, State of Georgia, with malice aforethought kill and murder Larry W. Stevens, Sr., in the way and manner set forth in the indictment, then you would be authorized to find the defendant guilty of murder. Members of the Jury, I further charge you in that regard that malice in its legal sense is not necessarily ill will or hatred. It is the unlawful, deliberate intention to kill a human being without justification or mitigation or excuse, which intention must exist at the time of the killing. It is not necessary, however, that this unlawful, deliberate intention should exist ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 592 F. Supp. 228 - Stephens v. Kemp

2. “The statement “criminal intention may not be presumed" may well have been intended to instruct the jurors that they were not permitted to presume the absence of provocation or justification but that they could infer this conclusion from circumstantial evidence. Whatever the court’s motivation in giving the instruction, the jury could certainly have understood it this way. A reasonable juror trying to make sense of the juxtaposition of an instruction that “a person of sound mind and body is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts,” App. 8a-9a and an instruction that "[a] person will not be presumed to act with criminal intention,” App. 9a, may well have thought that the instructions related to different elements of the crime and were therefore not contradictory— that he could presume intent to kill but not the absence of justification or provocation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Lakes v. Ford

3. “A crime is a violation of a statute of this State in which there shall be a union of joint operation of act or omission to act, and intention or criminal negligence. A person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking or intention or criminal negligence. The acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person’s will, but the presumption may be rebutted. A person will not be presumed to act with criminal intention but the trier of facts, that is, the Jury, may find criminal intention upon a consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 613 F. Supp. 747 - Godfrey v. Francis