Reddix v. Thigpen

¶4E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

¶5The State of Mississippi appeals the district court’s order granting habeas corpus relief to Willie N. Reddix, who was sentenced to die by a jury sitting in Harrison County, Mississippi. The district court held that the state had not proved either that Reddix had the criminal intent necessary for the state to find him guilty of murder, or that Reddix had the personal intent to kill necessary for the state to impose the death penalty. We affirm the district court’s holding regarding the death sentence imposed against Reddix, and reverse its holding that the state had not proved criminal intent to commit the substantive offense.

¶6I.

¶7On the morning of December 2, 1974, Willie Reddix and Larry Jones had Willie’s brother, J.D. Reddix, drive them to down*707town Biloxi, Mississippi. J.D. parked the car and the other two proceeded down the block to Art’s Levi Store. Pursuant to their plan, inside the store Willie Reddix attracted the attention of the proprietor, Arthur Weinburger, while Jones slipped up behind him and, as Reddix watched, brutally hit him over the head three or four times with a Stilson wrench, crushing his skull. Reddix and Jones robbed the cash register of its contents of about a hundred dollars plus some silver dollars, and stole several articles of clothing. They dragged the dying Weinburger into a small office away from the merchandise area of the store, placed the clothing in a foot locker, and with it fled the scene. A customer discovered Weinburger a few minutes later and summoned the police. An ambulance took Weinburger to a hospital, where he died about five hours later without regaining consciousness.

¶8In February of 1975 a grand jury in Harrison County, Mississippi, indicted Jones and the two Reddix brothers for the murder of Arthur Weinburger during the commission of the crime of robbery. The three were tried individually,1 and on March 14, 1975, a jury convicted Willie Reddix of felony murder. The court imposed the mandatory death sentence in effect at that time. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, however, reversed and remanded the case pursuant to its decision in Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242 (Miss.1976). See Reddix v. State, 342 So.2d 1306 (Miss.1977).

¶9On remand, a jury again convicted Reddix of murder and again sentenced him to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Reddix v. State, 381 So.2d 999 (Miss.1980). The United States Supreme Court denied Reddix’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Reddix v. Mississippi, 449 U.S. 986, 101 S.Ct. 408, 66 L.Ed.2d 251 (1980), and the Mississippi Supreme Court subsequently denied his Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis.

¶10In March of 1981 Reddix filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in a United States district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He presented several grounds for relief. The court granted Reddix leave to take discovery and granted an evidentiary hearing. The hearing, however, did not take place. Reddix filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the grounds that the jury had not found he had the requisite criminal intent to commit the offense of murder or the personal intent that would justify imposing the death penalty against him. The state filed a counter motion for summary judgment on the intent question as well as Reddix’s other claims.

¶11In a lengthy opinion addressing all of Reddix’s arguments, the district court denied Reddix’s petition on November 10, 1982. On December 7, Reddix filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The motion specifically raised the issues of the aborted evidentiary hearing, the state’s failure to respond to discovery requests, and the propriety of disposing of Reddix’s claims on a summary judgment motion. It also requested “such other and further relief as may be deemed proper.” In this motion for reconsideration, Reddix specifically raised the issue of intent under En-mund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982).

¶12The district court responded to Reddix’s Motion for Reconsideration by vacating its previous order in toto. Reddix v. Thigpen, 554 F.Supp. 1212 (S.D.Miss.1983). It granted Reddix habeas relief pursuant to En-mund, and also on the grounds that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to show that Reddix had the requisite criminal intent to commit the substantive offense of murder. The district court ordered Reddix *708to be set free because “he has been sufficiently punished for the crime of robbery which he committed on December 2, 1974.”

¶13Because of the faulty jury instruction given in this case, we are constrained to agree with the district court that Reddix’s petition should be granted, pursuant to En-mund, as to the imposition of the death penalty. We disagree, however, with the district court’s finding that the record does not contain evidence sufficient to convict Reddix of the substantive offense of murder, and with its decision to free Reddix from confinement.

¶14II.

¶15A.

¶16In Enmund v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment does not permit imposing the death penalty against “one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.” 102 S.Ct. at 3371. A Florida court had sentenced Enmund to die for a murder committed during the course of a robbery for which he drove the getaway car. While acknowledging that the evidence was sufficient to make Enmund a principal for purposes of finding him guilty of the substantive capital felony offense, the Court held that imposition of the death penalty against him was excessive and contrary to the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id.102 S.Ct. at 3372. Enmund recognizes that the death penalty is unique in its severity and irrevocability; consequently, before the state may impose it, the state must focus on the personal intent and culpability of the defendant himself, and not merely that of an accomplice. Id.102 S.Ct. at 3377. See also Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1005 n. 9 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing Mississippi Code § 97-3-19, the section under which Reddix was convicted).

¶17The eighth amendment, then, allows the state to impose the death penalty only if it first proves that the defendant either participated directly in the killing or personally had an intent to commit murder. In the present case we cannot ascertain from the record whether the jury found that Reddix had a personal criminal intent to kill that allows him to be sentenced to die. This “level of uncertainty and unreliability [in] the fact-finding process ... cannot be tolerated in a capital case.” Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 643, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2392, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980); Clark v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 694 F.2d 75, 78 (5th Cir.1982). Consequently, we hold that the eighth amendment as interpreted by Enmund entitles Reddix to habeas corpus relief and requires the state to resentence him consistent with constitutional standards.

¶18The Mississippi statute under which Red-dix was convicted defines capital murder as a killing done “with or without any design to effect death,” by anyone engaged in the commission of certain crimes, one of which is robbery.2 Pursuant to its capital murder statute, then, the state could convict someone engaged in the crime of robbery of the substantive offense of capital murder without finding he had a personal intent to kill. This conclusion flows from the clear import of the words “with or without design.” The capital murder statute, however, does not require imposition of capital punishment,3 and the eighth amendment, as interpreted by Enmund, is not implicated as long as the sentence imposed is not capital punishment. As this court recognized in Skil-lern v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 839 (5th Cir.1983), *709Enmund does not affect the state’s definition of any substantive offense, even a capital offense. The state may omit specific intent as an element of a capital crime without transgressing the eighth amendment, and, consequently, may convict an accused of that capital offense without requiring the jury to find personal intent to kill. Enmund, however, will “bar a death penalty upon jury instructions that permitted its imposition based solely upon a cocon-spirator’s intent and act, and absent personal intent or contemplation of the accused that a killing take place.” Id. at 847 (emphasis in original). Thus, Reddix’s conviction of the substantive offense of murder is not infirm under the United States Constitution and can serve as no basis for habeas relief.

¶19B.

¶20At the close of the presentation of evidence in the guilt phase of Reddix’s trial, the state trial court instructed the jury regarding the law in Mississippi of accomplice responsibility, which allows any participant in the crime during which the killing occurs to be liable as a principal. Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1004 (5th Cir.1982); Alexander v. State, 250 So.2d 629 (Miss. 1971). Specifically, the court said:

The Court instructs the Jury that the killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be Capital Murder when done with any design to effect death by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of robbery. The Court therefore instructs the Jury that if you believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant, Willie N. Reddix, in company with another person ... did then and there rob the said Arthur Weinburger of said personal property, and while so engaged in this design, the said Willie N. Reddix, acting in concert with another, struck the said Arthur Weinburger and killed him with an instrument, to-wit: a wrench, with the formed purpose to effect his death and as a result of said blows to the head, the said Arthur Weinburger died, and said murder was without justification or in necessary self-defense, the Jury shall find the Defendant guilty of Capital Murder. (Emphasis added.)

¶21And further:

If you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Willie N. Reddix, was engaged in the criminal act of Robbery and that during the commission of the said Robbery the Defendant acting in concert with another did unlawfully, wilfully, fe-loniously and of their malice aforethought kill and murder Arthur Weinbur-ger, a living person, and that said killing was done not in necessary self-defense or otherwise justifiable, then you should find the accused guilty of Capital Murder. (Emphasis added.)

¶22A reasonable juror carefully heeding these instructions fairly could conclude that Jones’s intent to commit murder may be imputed to Reddix. That imputation is exactly what Enmund and the eighth amendment prohibit in death penalty cases. Consequently, the death sentence is infirm under the United States Constitution and cannot stand.

¶23Our holding in this case is consistent with prior decisions of this court. In Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999 (5th Cir.1982), we held that the jury instructions at the sentencing phase were unconstitutionally vague because they did not define or specify the aggravating or mitigating circumstances of the crime that the jury must consider in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. Id. at 1010-1011. Because we granted the petition on the grounds of vagueness, we did not reach the Enmund question, but noted, however, that Enmund might be implicated upon resentencing because the judge’s instructions on capital murder and aiding and abetting left unclear whether the jury convicted the defendant because they concluded that he had in fact pulled the trigger or solely because he was involved in the robbery. Id. at 1013.

¶24Similarly, in Clark v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 694 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. *7101982), this court granted habeas relief to a petitioner because jury instructions substantially similar to those given at the guilt phase of Reddix’s trial impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in violation of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). Clark and his partner robbed a restaurant and, in the process, one or both of them shot the restaurant manager twice and stabbed him thirty times. The substantive law under which Clark was convicted, unlike Mississippi law, required the state to prove specific intent. Id. at 76-77. While acknowledging that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Clark committed robbery, and perhaps murder as well, this court held the jury instructions to be fatally defective because they did not instruct the jury to find “that a conspiracy to kill existed” or that absent that conspiracy “they could not attribute the murderous act of one conspirator to the other.” Id. at 76. Citing Enmund, the court noted that the instructions were contrary to the eighth amendment, but held they were unconstitutional under Sandstrom as well, so as to require granting habeas relief as to the substantive conviction.4Id. at 76-77.

¶25Conversely, we have refused to grant habeas relief when the petitioner argued that the jury had not found personal intent to kill if curative jury instructions given at the sentencing phase, or the manner in which the case was presented to the jury, clearly indicated that the jury necessarily concluded that the defendant had a personal intent to kill. In Skillern v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 839 (5th Cir.1983), we held that instructions given at the sentencing hearing and the jury’s response to special issues submitted to it left no doubt that the jury found Skillern had a personal intent to kill. Id. at 847-48. Similarly, in Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir.1982), a case involving only one perpetrator, the jury instructions made clear that felonious intent was a prerequisite to imposition of the death penalty. Because the crime had only one perpetrator, the intent found could not be anyone’s but the defendant’s. In Reddix’s case, however, involving three perpetrators, nothing that transpired at trial and nothing in the instructions given at his sentencing hearing clarifies the confusion left by the jury instructions given at the guilt phase of the trial.5

¶26In reversing Reddix’s death sentence, we do not hold that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Reddix had a personal criminal intent justifying the imposition of the death penalty. We hold only that because of the jury instructions, we cannot ascertain what the jury actually concluded from the evidence. Consequently, the state is free to hold another hearing to resen-*711tence Reddix. If the jury concludes that Reddix personally had the intent to kill Arthur Weinburger, it may reimpose the death penalty. Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d at 1083 (5th Cir.1982).

¶27III.

¶28The district court held that the record did not contain enough evidence on the issue of intent to convict Reddix of the substantive offense of murder. We do not agree. The state produced several witnesses who, if believed, established that Reddix entered and then departed Art’s Levi Store near the time the crime occurred. The state also produced the written confession of Reddix outlining the events occurring prior to, during, and after the robbery.6 The confession specifically referred to a “plan” that he and Larry Jones contrived for their criminal venture. The confession establishes that Reddix was fully involved in the commission of the felony of robbery when the murder occurred. Reddix’s confession also shows that he deliberately attracted Weinburger’s attention so that Jones could sneak behind him and bludgeon his skull with a wrench. Finally, it indicates that Reddix must have observed each blow of this murderous assault and said or did nothing to stop his accomplice in crime from the deadly assault. Certainly, under the law of accomplice liability and based on the evidence in this record, a reasonable jury could conclude that Reddix was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the substantive offense of murder during the commission of the crime of robbery. As explained previously, Enmund does not affect the substantive criminal law of accomplice liability. Consequently, we reverse the district court’s order insofar as it relates to Red-dix’s guilt or innocence of the substantive offense. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

¶29IV.

¶30The district court in its first order considered all of the arguments Reddix raised attacking the constitutionality of his conviction of the substantive offense. The court issued a detailed and lengthy opinion ad*712dressing each of them, and denied the relief requested. In granting habeas relief upon Motion for Reconsideration, however, the district court vacated its prior order in toto. We therefore remand this case to the district court for reentry of its first order, either in its original form or with such modifications as are appropriate in light of this opinion. We vacate the district court’s order granting Reddix’s writ of habeas corpus and direct it to issue an order granting the writ of habeas corpus unless, within a reasonable time, the State of Mississippi conducts another sentencing hearing in the manner provided by Mississippi law and not inconsistent with this opinion. The state, of course, also has the option of vacating Red-dix’s death sentence and imposing a sentence less than death in accordance with state laws.7

¶31Insofar as the district court’s order freed Reddix because he already had served enough time for the crime of robbery, the order clearly was not within the power of the district court. Reddix has not been accused or convicted of robbery. The state has the right to hold Reddix pending the outcome of resentencing proceedings.

¶32AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.