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← 728 FSUPP 1341 - Stone v. Mehlberg

Stone v. Mehlberg’s Empirical Analysis

1990

Citation profile

23
cited by 23 later decisions
2
states following
October 2013
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 3 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 23 later decisions — most recently October 2013

1 federal appellate · 3 district · 3 state decisions

100199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (§ 102 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1610 (§ 111 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (§ 125 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (§ 130 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (§ 131 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 78J (§ 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 18 U.S.C. § 894

Relies on Kentucky v. Graham · Joshua Deshaney, a Minor, by His Guardian Ad Litem, and Melody Deshaney,s v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, et al. · Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc. · Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority · Wrenn v. Capstone Medical Center

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[effective exercise of the right to rescind obviously depends upon the delivery of one copy of the rescission form to the creditor and the retention by the obligor of the other copy.” 728 F.Supp. at 1353 . This is incorrect. To effectuate rescission, a lender need not deliver a copy of the NRC to the creditor, but need only”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[t]he declared purpose of [the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) ] is "to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him [or her] and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.” Accordingly, TILA requires creditors to provide borrowers with clear and accurate disclosures of terms dealing with things like finance charges, annual percentage rates of interest, and the borrower's rights. See [15 U.S.C.] §§ 1631, 1632, 1635, 1638. Failure to satisfy TILA subjects a lender to criminal penalties for noncompliance, see § 1611, as well as to statu tory and actual damages traceable to a lender's failure to make the requisite disclosures, see § 1640. Section 1640(e) provides that an action for such damages "may be brought” within one year after a violation of TILA, but that a borrower may assert the right to damages "as a matter of defense by recoupment or set-off” in a collection action brought by the lender even after the one year is up. Going beyond these rights to damages, TILA also authorizes a borrower whose loan is secured with his "principal dwelling," and who has been denied the requisite disclosures, to rescind the loan transaction entirely "until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms req”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “15 U.S.C. § 1635 (a) states that obligors not informed of their rights are entitled to rescind “the transaction.” The statute does not say that obligors may rescind only that part of the transaction that creates a security interest, but not the underlying obligation evidenced by a negotiable note. In fact, 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (b) cleariy contemplates a return to the status quo ante and thus the extinguishment of the underlying obligation. The HDC doctrine is inconsistent with this remedial purpose. Cases holding that a TILA breach does not discharge liability on a note, such as Federal Deposit Ins. Co. v. Webb, 464 F.Supp. 520, 625 (E.D.Tenn.1978) do not discuss rescission, which is specifically excepted from the general rule that TILA does not affect such obligations. See 16 U.S.C. § 1610 (d). Moreover, to allow assignee HDC’s to assert their status to foil an otherwise meritorious rescission action would gut 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (c). Congress added this provision to TILA in 1980 to “eliminate ambiguity on the question of assignee liability for rescission by stating explicity [sic] that a consumer’s exercise of this right is effective against an assignee.” S.Rep. No. 96-368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 33, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 236, 268. Congress could have said that rescission rights are effective against assignees who are not HDC’s if it had chosen to do so. Instead, 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (c) applies to any assignee. To read the statute not to apply to any assignee r”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.