¶1specially concurring:
¶2The appellant contends that he was prejudiced by being tried with his codefendant, Hope, because their defenses were mutually antagonistic. The majority, relying on Wilhite v. State, 701 P.2d 774 (Okl.Cr.1985), states that the defenses were not truly antagonistic and did not require severance. Supra at 857. I must respectfully disagree.
¶3In Wilhite, neither defendant blamed the other. While the two defendant’s statements and testimony were inconsistent, neither accused the other of committing the crime. Here, both defendant’s denied responsibility for the shooting, arson and robbery. Each made statements and testified that the other was the guilty party. In addition, Judy Mealor, the codefendant’s roommate, testified that Hope told her that the appellant had killed Mr. Ellis. Their defenses were antagonistic. See Edmondson v. State, 515 P.2d 1158 (Okl.Cr.1973); and Murray v. State, 528 P.2d 739 (OkI.Cr.1974).
¶4In this case, however, the appellant’s pretrial motion for severance was based on the possible use at trial of codefendant’s accusatory pretrial statements and on being required to share peremptory challenges. When the State agreed not to introduce the statements or require the defendants to share challenges, the argument was rendered moot. The appellant’s further contention that his and his codefendant’s defenses were mutually antagonistic was not supported by affidavit or evidence alerting the trial court as to the perceived danger. Moreover, when antagonistic evidence was presented at trial, appellant failed to renew his motion or to move for a mistrial. Therefore, in such circumstances, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling appellant’s motion for severance. See Francis v. State, 555 P.2d 88 (Okl.Cr.1976). See also Hightower v. State, 672 P.2d 671 (Okl.Cr.1983).