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← 728 So. 2d 657 - State v. Sealy

728 So. 2d 657 - State v. Sealy’s Empirical Analysis

1999

Citation profile

4
cited by 4 later decisions
2
states following
September 2011
most recently cited

4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently September 2011

4 state decisions

20199920002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on United States v. Marion · Costello v. United States · United States v. Lovasco · Holt v. United States · Porzig v. Nolden

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"There is no statutory provision for a general grant of immunity from criminal prosecution under the laws of Alabama. Alabama is one of a number of states that do not have a general statute authorizing prosecuting attorneys to grant immunity from prosecution. Ex parte Graddick , 501 So.2d 444 (Ala. 1986); Ex parte Johnsey , 384 So.2d 1189 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 384 So.2d 1191 (Ala. 1980). However, prosecuting attorneys and judges are not forbidden from granting an accused immunity from prosecution for criminal offenses in exchange for truthful testimony as a state witness against others accused of crimes. Gipson v. State , 375 So.2d 504 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), aff'd, 375 So.2d 514 (Ala. 1979). `[G]rants of immunity play a vital role in the performance of the duties of prosecuting attorneys, and without this method of obtaining valuable testimony prosecuting attorneys would be severely hampered in their efforts to gain convictions.' Ex parte Graddick , 501 So.2d at 446 . Nonstatutory grants of immunity can be valid in Alabama if they follow the guidelines established in Ex parte Graddick , i.e., the grant of immunity must be signed *Page 1067 by the district attorney and approved by the trial judge."”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “"`There is no statutory provision for a general grant of immunity from criminal prosecution under the laws of Alabama. Alabama is one of a number of states that do not have a general statute authorizing prosecuting attorneys to grant immunity from prosecution. Ex parte Graddick, 501 So.2d 444 (Ala.1986); Ex parte Johnsey, 384 So.2d 1189 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 384 So.2d 1191 (Ala. 1980). However, prosecuting attorneys and judges are not forbidden from granting an accused immunity from prosecution for criminal offenses in exchange for truthful testimony as a state witness against others accused of crimes. Gipson v. State, 375 So.2d 504 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), aff'd, 375 So.2d 514 (Ala.1979). "[G]rants of immunity play a vital role in the performance of the duties of prosecuting attorneys, and without this method of obtaining valuable testimony prosecuting attorneys would be severely hampered in their efforts to gain convictions." Ex parte Graddick, 501 So.2d at 446. Nonstatutory grants of immunity can be valid in Alabama if they follow the guidelines established in Ex parte Graddick, i.e., the grant of immunity must be signed by the district attorney and approved by the trial judge.' " State v. Sealy, 728 So.2d 657 (Ala.Cr. App.1997) (emphasis added). See also State v. Seneca, 726 So.2d 748 (Ala.Cr. App.1998). Furthermore, a person may not be forced to accept a tendered grant of immunity and to waive her right against self-incrimination. Ex parte Graddick, 501 So.2d 444 (Ala.1”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““ ‘The law is well-settled that in order to establish a due process violation due to preindictment delay, a defendant must show “(1) that the delay caused actual prejudice to the conduct of his defense, and (2) that the delay was the product of deliberate action by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage.” United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1157-58 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Butler, 792 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Waites v. United States, 479 U.S. 933 , 107 S.Ct. 407 , 93 L.Ed.2d 359 (1986). See also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). “A defendant is charged with a heavier burden of proof in showing a prein-dictment delay due process violation than in showing a denial of his speedy trial rights.” Stoner.’ “State v. Prince, 581 So.2d [874] at 878 [ (Ala.Crim.App.1991) ], quoting Stoner v. State, 418 So.2d 171, 180 (Ala.Cr.App.1982).””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.