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728 So. 2d 827

Docket No. 99-0998.

Rix v. Jenne

Brian RIX, Petitioner, v. Ken JENNE, as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida and State of Florida, Respondents.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided March 30, 1999.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1999-03-30

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently April 2001

3 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[T]he court's authority to deny bond pending trial is circumscribed by the provisions of Florida Statute section 907.041. The legislature has specifically delineated and narrowly limited those circumstances under which bond may be denied. We have no difficulty divining the legislative intent to curtail the court's power to deny bail, except in certain instances, in light of the constitutionally guaranteed right to bail. To effectuate its express policy of assuring the detention of "those persons posing a threat to the safety of the community or the integrity of the judicial process," the legislature enacted a pretrial detention statute, which sets forth a comprehensive list of conditions that will qualify a defendant for detention without bail. By providing clear and reasonable guidelines for courts to follow in considering denial of this basic and fundamental right, the legislature may very well have been motivated by a desire to achieve uniformity and fairness in judicial determinations of bail entitlement, as well as to provide trial courts with a means of identifying persons whose criminal histories and patterns of behavior signal a danger to society.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Paul

“both parties concede that only the condition [for pretrial detention] in section 907.041(4)(b)4.b. applies. This subsection allows pretrial detention if the court finds that a person accused of committing a dangerous crime "poses a threat of harm to the community" and has a prior conviction "of a dangerous crime within the 10 years immediately preceding the date of his arrest for the crime presently charged."”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Paul

Relies on 654 So. 2d 573 - Merdian v. Cochran · 728 So. 2d 1167 - Paul v. Jenne · Houser v. Manning

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1999-03-30

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Steven J. Hammer of the Law Offices of Steven J. Hammer, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.

¶2Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rochelle L. Kirdy, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for respondents.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4Petitioner Brian Rix's bond on pending charges of battery on a law enforcement officer, possession of cocaine, and driving under the influence was revoked following his arrest for new criminal charges of possession of cocaine and driving under the influence. Rix filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to set a new bond following revocation of the initial bond. We agree and grant the writ. See Paul v. Jenne, 24 Fla.L. Weekly D581, 728 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Merdian v. Cochran, 654 So.2d 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

¶5This court in Paul outlined the applicable rules and statutes and continued to hold that the trial court's authority to deny bond pending trial is "circumscribed by the provisions of Florida Statute section 907.041." This court further held that such rule applies even in the face of the defendant's breach of a condition of bond involving new criminal charges. See Paul, 24 Fla.L. Weekly at D583, 728 So.2d at 1171.

¶6In short, the trial court may order pretrial detention upon the breach of a bond condition if it finds a substantial probability that the defendant poses a threat of harm to the community. Section 907.041(4)(b)(4) provides that the court can make such finding of "threat of harm" if it finds that the defendant is presently charged with a dangerous crime, that there is a substantial probability that the defendant committed such crime, that the factual circumstances of the crime indicate a disregard for the safety of the community, and that there are no conditions of release reasonably sufficient to protect the community from the risk of physical harm to persons. See § 907.041(4)(b)(4), Fla.Stat. (1997),

¶7In addition, subsection 4 provides that the court must find that at least one of the following conditions is also present:

*828 a. The defendant has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment.
b. The defendant has been convicted of a dangerous crime within the 10 years immediately preceding the date of his or her arrest for the crime presently charged.
c. The defendant is on probation, parole, or other release pending completion of sentence or on pretrial release for a dangerous crime at the time of the current arrest.

¶8See Paul, 24 Fla.L. Weekly at D581-82, 728 So.2d at 1168, 1999 WL 104585.

¶9We find that the state did not satisfy its burden of proving the requirements for pre-trial detention in accordance with section 907.041. Accordingly, we grant the writ and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this court's holdings in Paul. See also Merdian v. Cochran, 654 So.2d 573. As in Paul, we certify conflict with Houser v. Manning, 719 So.2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

¶10Clerk is directed to issue mandate concurrently with this opinion.

¶11GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., concur.

¶12GROSS, J., dissents without opinion

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