¶1dissenting.
¶2The majority denies the State’s motion for leave to file motion for rehearing. The instant decision is squarely at odds with the decision we recently handed down on April 1,1987 in Messer v. State, 729 S.W.2d *372694 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing). In Messerthe defendant on appeal in a sole point of error challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance recovered from the defendant was cocaine as alleged in the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. In his petition for discretionary review he contended that the Court of Appeals was in error and argued for the first time that the evidence upon .his plea of not guilty before the court was stipulated and that the stipulation was not in compliance with Article 1.15, Y.A.C.C.P. This Court agreed, finding that the trial judge had not approved in writing the defendant’s waiver of rights and his consent to stipulate as required by the mandatory provisions of Article 1.15, supra. Thus without a valid stipulation the evidence was insufficient.
¶3Messerwas decided on April 1, 1987 and the instant case (Humason) was decided on March 18, 1987. There in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part this writer pointed out that the instant record suffered from the defect in stipulated evidence in light of Article 1.15, supra, and concluded that the court need not have reached the search and seizure question. Today the majority, even after the intervention of Messer, continues to ignore the defect in the stipulated evidence, and leaves two cases on the books directly in conflict with each other.
¶4I dissent.