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← 729 F.3d 993 - Haro v. Sebelius

Haro v. Sebelius’s Empirical Analysis

729 F.3d 993 · 2013

Citation profile

3
cited by 3 later decisions
December 2013
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 1 district ·

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 42 U.S.C. § 1395F (§ 1814 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1395I (§ 1817 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1395Y (§ 1862 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 405 (§ 205 of the Social Security Act of 1935)

Relies on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife · Mathews v. Eldridge · Roe v. Wade · Friends of the Earth Incorporateds v. Laidlaw Environmental Services Inc

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Even if Haro’s letter and subsequent inaction did afford the Secretary an “opportunity to apply, interpret, or revise” the challenged policy, Haro failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court. To exhaust her administrative remedies, a beneficiary must proceed through the five levels of administrative review: (1) the initial determination; (2) redetermi-nation; (3) reconsideration of the rede-termination; (4) an ALJ hearing; and (5) review by the Medicare Appeals Council. 42 U.S.C. § 405 . Haro failed to press her claim beyond level two. Instead, less than a week after she mailed her reimbursement check to the Secretary, Haro filed suit — before any agency review of the up-front reimbursement policy. Haro claims that the government has waived the exhaustion requirement. But we can find no unambiguous waiver of this issue in the record, and therefore conclude that the issue is not waived. We conclude that the channeling requirement of § 405(g) was not met. Because channeling is a jurisdictional requirement, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the beneficiaries’ claim.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “But we conclude that the beneficiaries failed to satisfy the channeling requirement at the administrative level and therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.