729 So. 2d 142 - State v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

47 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the person is armed, but the officer must be warranted in his belief that his safety or that of others is in danger.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Hughes · 770 So. 2d 29 - State v. Lipscomb

2. “[E]vidence discovered during a lawful investigatory frisk may be seized under the "plain feel" exception to the warrant requirement, as explained in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). However, just as the "plain view" doctrine requires that an object's incriminating character be immediately obvious when seen, the "plain feel" doctrine requires the tactile discovery of "an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent." Dickerson , at 375, 113 S.Ct. at 2137 , 124 L.Ed.2d at 346 . Thus, in State v. Parker, 622 So.2d 791 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 627 So.2d 660 (1993), the seizure of a matchbox containing cocaine detected during a pat-down search was found not to fall within the "plain feel" exception because there was no evidence that a matchbox's shape was identifiable as contraband. In contrast, in State v. Stevens, 95-501 (La.App. 5th Cir. 3/26/96)[; 672 So.2d 986 ], 672 So.2d 986 , the seizure of the drugs in a matchbox detected during a lawful pat-down was upheld because the officer testified that her prior experience indicated that most street-level crack dealers carried their drugs in a matchbox.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 770 So. 2d 29 - State v. Lipscomb · 749 So. 2d 767 - State v. Tyler

3. “* * * We recognize that the police have the right to ensure their own safety in an encounter with a suspected criminal. Under both our federal and state Constitutions, however, this right must be balanced against an individual citizen's right to be free from unreasonable searches. Although sometimes appearing to be a legal technicality, Article 215.1 B represents the legislature's attempt to maintain that balance by allowing an officer, who has lawfully stopped an individual, to perform a pat-down for weapons, but only if he "reasonably suspect [sic] that he is in danger." A police officer's duty to enforce and uphold the laws includes not only those statutes that define and prohibit criminal conduct, but also those which define and limit the government's intrusion into the lives of its citizens. Unless the plain language of Article 215.1 B is interpreted as authorizing an officer to frisk every pedestrian who is stopped pursuant to subsection A, the only way a court can determine if the officer reasonably suspected that he was in danger is to require him to express that suspicion, and explain upon what it is based. Eliminating the requirement for such articulation not only eviscerates this statute, but also opens the door for potential abuse by the rare officer who acts upon personal prejudices rather than actual observation and experience.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 770 So. 2d 29 - State v. Lipscomb · 769 So. 2d 28 - State v. Jones