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73 Ala. 3

Reynolds v. State

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided December 15, 1882

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1882-12-15

<p> Indictment for Violation of local Prohibitory Law. </p> <p>•1. Local prohibitory law construed; what act not prohibited. — Under tlie provisions of tbe statute, approved February 26th, 1881 (Pampli. Acts, 1880 — 1, -p. 171), making it unlawful for an}' person “ to make, sell, or otherwise dispose of any spirituous or malt liquors, or other intoxicating drinks,” within the counties of Dale and Henry, in this State, a conviction can not be had on proof that the defendant, at his own residence, in one of the counties named in the statute, gave to another two or more drinks of spirituous liquor.</p>

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The words of a statute are to he understood in their popular signification, when nothing appears to the contrary. Mayor, etc. [of City of Wetumpka] v. Winter, 29 Ala. 651 ; Thurman v. State, 18 Ala. 276 ; Favers v. Glass, 22 Ala. 621 . To dispose of, in popular sense, when used in reference to property, means to part with the right to, or ownership of it; in other words, a change of property. If this does not take place, is would scarcely be said the property is disposed of. That would not be the popular sense in which those words are employed. Taking a glass of spirits or wine with a friend or visitor, in one’s own residence, is one of the forms in which hospitality not infrequently shows itself. We are not dealing with the morality, or hurtfulness of the custom. That is not a judicial question. We are endeavoring to arrive at the intention of the law-making power. In this (possibly injurious) act of hospitality, we apprehend no one would entertain the thought of a change of property, or ownership — that he was thereby ‘disposing of’ the article thus used and consumed. Quite as appropriate would it be to affirm that the host had disposed of the viands his friend consumed, while enjoying a hospitable dinner with him. “We would not be understood as affirming that no disposition can be made, under the statute we are construing, except by bargain and sale. A gift, consummated by delivery, works as complete a change of property or ownership, as does a sale on valuable considerat”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Smith v. State

Relies on Mayor of Wetumpka v. Winter · Favers v. Glass · Thurman v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1882-12-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently April 1987

11 state decisions

3018821890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

STONE, J.

¶2The words of a statute are to be understood in their popular signification, when nothing appears to the contrary. — Mayor, etc. v. Winter, 29 Ala. 651; Thurman v. The State, 18 Ala. 276 ; Favers v. Glass, 22 Ala. 621. To. dispose of, in popular sense, when used in reference to property, means to part with the right to, or ownership of it; in other words, a change of property. If this does not take place, it would scarcely be said the property is disposed of. That would not be the popular sense in which those words are employed. Taking a glass of spirits or wine with a friend or visitor, in one’s own residence, is one of the forms in which hospitality not infrequently shows itself. We are not dealing with the morality, or hurtfulness of the custom. That is .not a judicial question. We are endeavoring to arrive at the intention of the law-making power. In this (possibly injurious) act of hospitality, we apprehend no one would entertain the thought of a change of property, or ownership — that he was thereby “ disposing of ’’ the article thus used and consumed. Quite as appropriate would it be to affirm that the host had disposed of the viands his friend consumed, while enjoying a hospitable dinner with him.

¶3We would not be understood as affirming that no disposition can be made, under the statute we are construing, except by bargain and sale. A gift, consummated by delivery, -works as complete a change of property or ownership, as does a sale on valuable consideration. What we declare is, that the act, shown in the evidence in this cause, was not a disposing of the liquor, within the contemplation of the legislature.

¶4During the same session of the legislature at which the statute in question was enacted, several other statutes of kindred character received the approval of that body. In some of them we find the same words, “sell, or otherwise dispose of.” Sometimes the language is more express, and inhibits the “ giving away” of intoxicating liquors. We do not know that this variance in phraseology changes the meaning, or imposes the duty of a changed interpretation. That question is not now before ns.

¶5Reversed.and remanded, that the circuit court may dispose of the case in accordance with these views.

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