Dominique v. Weld’s Empirical Analysis
73 F.3d 1156 · 1996
Citation profile
37 federal appellate · 22 district · 26 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 114 later decisions — most recently March 2019 · most notably Soto v. Flores (1997), Rosemary Feliciano v. State of Rhode Island (1998)
37 federal appellate · 22 district · 26 state decisions — followed in 11 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1367 · 28 U.S.C. § 46 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Morrissey v. Brewer · Sandin v. Conner · Hewitt v. Helms · Meachum v. Fano · Weaver v. Graham
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 114 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[W]e would open the door to finding an "atypical . . . restraint" whenever an inmate is moved from one situation to a significantly harsher one that is, nonetheless, a common-place aspect of prison existence. For example, a liberty interest could be claimed if an inmate were moved into less agreeable surroundings than his initial placement. Similarly, a' liberty interest might be claimed whenever authorities or the state legislature decided to eliminate or cut back work release programs or furloughs. Such changes, painful to those affected, could be regarded under plaintiffs argument as implicating liberty interests even though the prisoner was never placed in conditions going beyond the customary rigors of prison life. Such an outcome, we believe, would directly conflict with Sandin's teachings. Sandin's new standard was expressly adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court "to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment." [Sandin], 115 S. Ct. at 2299 . The Court plainly intended to eliminate the basis for federal due process claims stemming from internal transfers and status changes that do not result in "atypical hardship," i.e., hardship beyond the norms of ordinary prison life.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"It can be argued that the regulation increases the penalty because it subjects Dominique to a different and stricter prison regime: unless and until he successfully completes the prescribed treatment program and admits to a crime he continually has denied, he must remain confined at no less than a medium security facility and remain ineligible for privileges associated with lower security imprisonment. We conclude, however, that this change in the conditions determining the nature of his confinement while serving his sentence was an allowed alteration in the prevailing `legal regime' rather than an `increased penalty' for ex post facto purposes." Dominique, 73 F.3d at 1163 , quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 510 n. 6, 115 S.Ct. at 1603 n. 6.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“his transfer to a more secure facility subjected him to conditions no different from those ordinarily experienced by large numbers of other inmates serving their sentences in customary fashion”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.