Case: 21-30446 Document: 00516823315 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/17/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
July 17, 2023
No. 21-30446
Lyle W. Cayce
____________
Clerk
Robert Parker,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
James M. LeBlanc, Secretary of Department of Public Safety and
Corrections,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:18-CV-1030
______________________________
Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:
Robert Parker filed a Section 1983 civil rights suit in Louisiana state
court against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
Secretary James LeBlanc. Among other claims, Parker argues that LeBlanc
violated his constitutional rights by misclassifying him as a sex offender and
thereby illegally extending his detention in prison for 337 days past his release
date. LeBlanc sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, but the district
court denied the motion. On this interlocutory appeal, we AFFIRM.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 21, 2016, Parker was arrested while on probation and
placed in the Orleans Parish Prison. On March 27, 2017, a Louisiana state
court sentenced Parker to two years of imprisonment for violating his
probation but awarded him credit for the months he served in the parish
prison. Three days later, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
Corrections (“DPSC”) assumed custody of Parker.
On May 4, 2017, a DPSC employee identified as “L. Cato”
determined that Parker had a “Must Serve” date of October 9, 2017. Parker
alleges he should have been released on that date. Sometime in September
2017, however, DPSC employee Brenda Acklin reviewed Parker’s file,
crossed out the October 9, 2017, date, then wrote above it an acronym for
“unapproved sex offender registry plan.” Under Louisiana law, the DPSC
must verify the legality of sex offenders’ post-release residences before they
can be released from prison. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:543.
During the course of his imprisonment at Richwood Correctional
Center, Parker submitted several inmate request forms. In his first two
requests, Parker asked to meet with Warden Ray Hanson about his release
date. He filed two other forms in an attempt to provide the DPSC with
addresses detailing where he could reside upon his release. Parker also
consistently disputed that he was a sex offender.
On August 24, 2018, a public defender, Aaron Zagory, who had
previously represented Parker, emailed the reentry program manager for the
DPSC probation and parole division. Zagory’s email stated that he did not
“believe Mr. Parker has a conviction that requires him to register as a sex
offender.” Zagory did note that Parker had been convicted in 1997 of
indecent behavior with a juvenile and unauthorized entry into an inhabited
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dwelling, but that Parker “was permitted to withdraw that plea and pleaded
guilty to a single amended count of simple burglary.”
Rebecca Ikner, the reentry program director for the DPSC probation
and parole division, responded that she was not involved in sex offender cases
or time computation. Ikner copied her supervisor on the reply, who
forwarded it to Charles Romero, the sex offender unit coordinator of the
DPSC’s probation and parole office in New Orleans. Twelve days later, on
September 5, 2018, Romero acknowledged the “honest mistake in the
investigation” and explained that it had been corrected. Romero stated that
“Mr. Parker can be released immediately (assuming there is nothing else
holding him there)” and noted that Romero had informed the DPSC that
Parker was not a sex offender. Parker was held an additional five days, until
September 10, 2018, when he was finally released from prison.
Parker filed a civil rights suit in Louisiana state court against the
DPSC, Secretary of the DPSC James LeBlanc, Ray Hanson, Brenda Acklin,
“Does 1-10,” and ABC Insurance Companies. Parker alleged that the
defendants violated his constitutional rights by detaining him past his release
date. He also claimed that the defendants committed similar violations
against other state inmates. LeBlanc and the other defendants removed the
case to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction, specifically the
claims Parker raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Parker filed a First Amended Complaint in April 2019. Hanson
moved to dismiss the claims against him based upon misjoinder. The district
court denied the motion but ordered Parker “to amend the operative
complaint to add specificity and cure any deficiencies therein.” Parker then
filed a Second Amended Complaint in November 2019.
LeBlanc, the DPSC, and Acklin filed a motion to dismiss Parker’s
claims against them. LeBlanc and Acklin argued that Parker failed to state a
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claim upon which relief could be granted because they were entitled to
qualified immunity. The district court again granted Parker leave to amend
his complaint after holding that Parker’s Second Amended Complaint lacked
sufficient detail and that Parker had not adequately alleged deliberate
indifference in “fail[ing] to allege, even on information and belief, that
LeBlanc was aware” of the deficiencies in the prison systems.
Parker filed a Third Amended Complaint in August 2020. In his
Third Amended Complaint, Parker cited three pieces of evidence to establish
LeBlanc’s knowledge of deficiencies in the way the DPSC calculated and
implemented release dates: (1) testimony by DPSC employees in unrelated
cases regarding problems with the over-detention and release of inmates; (2)
a 2018 newspaper opinion-editorial by Louisiana Attorney General Jeff
Landry regarding the same issue; and (3) a legislative audit report. These had
also been cited in his Second Amended Complaint. In his Third Amended
Complaint, however, Parker alleged for the first time on information and
belief that Defendant LeBlanc was aware of the deficiencies in the system and
the specific evidence cited in the complaint. LeBlanc again moved to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to cure the
main deficiency identified by the district court in its previous order —
namely, the lack of a pattern of similar constitutional violations.
The district court denied in part LeBlanc’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion
because Parker had “adequately pled that there were sufficiently similar prior
incidents in sufficient number and of which LeBlanc was aware to overcome
qualified immunity at this stage.” The court found that LeBlanc could not
“seriously dispute (1) that the prior incidents were sufficient in number and
(2) that LeBlanc did not have actual knowledge of them, particularly
considering the allegations on information and belief that he knew about the
Legislative Auditor’s report, Attorney General op-ed, and state court
testimony.” LeBlanc filed a timely notice of appeal.
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DISCUSSION
We have appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to
review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified
immunity when the resolution turns on an issue of law. See Orr v. Copeland,
844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016); Brown v. Miller,
519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir.
2008).
Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissals when a complaint fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). This court
reviews Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as
true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.”
Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 745 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “In an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified
immunity, we have jurisdiction to consider only whether a certain course of
conduct would, as a matter of law, be objectively unreasonable in light of
clearly established law.” Brown,
519 F.3d at 236 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). A claim has facial plausibility “where a plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Morris,
739 F.3d at 745
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
“To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States
and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” Pratt v. Harris Cnty., 822 F.3d 174, 180 (5th
Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
“Our precedent establishes that a jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are
timely released from prison.” Porter v. Epps,
659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir.
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2011). Quite recently, and addressing the liability of this same defendant, we
held that “it is without question that holding without legal notice a prisoner
for a month beyond the expiration of his sentence constitutes a denial of due
process.” Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 188 (5th Cir. 2022).
This analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we examine whether Parker
has sufficiently alleged supervisory liability against LeBlanc. Second, we
determine whether LeBlanc’s alleged conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right.
I. Has Parker sufficiently alleged supervisory liability?
“Section 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior
liability.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002). Nonetheless,
“[s]upervisory officials may be liable under § 1983 for their failure to adopt
policies if that failure causally results in a constitutional injury.” Crittindon,
37 F.4th at 186. “Liability only arises when the officials act, or fail to act,
with ‘deliberate indifference,’ a ‘disregard [for] a known or obvious
consequence of [their] action[s].’”
Id. (quoting Porter,
659 F.3d at 446)
(alterations in original). “[A] plaintiff must show either the supervisor
personally was involved in the constitutional violation or that there is a
sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the
constitutional violation.” Evett v. Deep E. Tex. Reg’l Narcotics Trafficking
Task Force,
330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
To show a causal connection between the wrongful conduct of a
supervisor and a constitutional violation, the plaintiff “must introduce
evidence that each Defendant had ‘actual or constructive notice’ that their
failure to adopt policies would result in constitutional violations.”
Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186 (quoting Porter,
659 F.3d at 447). “A pattern of
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily
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necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference.” Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Without notice
that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers
can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will
cause violations of constitutional rights.”
Id.
As noted, Parker’s Third Amended Complaint cited three pieces of
evidence to support his allegations that LeBlanc implemented deficient
policies evinced by a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees. See id. They are: (1) an October 2017 legislative audit report on
the Louisiana DPSC entitled “CFE Management of Offender Data:
Processes for Ensuring Accuracy Department of Corrections”; (2) a 2018
editorial by Senator John Kennedy and Attorney General Landry entitled,
“Criminal Justice Reform Actually Hurting Public Safety,” published in the
newspaper “The Advocate”; and (3) testimony by DPSC employees
admitting to rampant over-detention in a similar suit in Louisiana state court,
Chowns v. LeBlanc, La. 37th JDC 26-932. Parker also alleges on information
and belief that Defendant LeBlanc was aware of the three items we just
enumerated.
LeBlanc argues that this complaint did not adequately allege the
requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees
“ordinarily necessary” under Connick to establish deliberate indifference for
purposes of failure to train. See 563 U.S. at 62. He contends that Parker’s
allegations “identify issues of an entirely different kind than the one that
allegedly caused Parker to spend too much time incarcerated.” Essentially,
LeBlanc insists that there is a meaningful distinction between Parker’s over-detention due to his alleged misclassification as a sex offender, as opposed to
over-detention due to miscalculations of his sentence or his status being
generally lost in the system.
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The district court “decline[d] to draw the line as finely as LeBlanc
advances and limit the types of problems involved solely to those instances
where individuals have been misclassified as sexual offenders.” The court
noted that the real problem alleged in the Legislative Audit report was the
Department “not knowing when [inmates’] proper release date was” and
that “inmate sentences have been ‘done wrong’” as stated in testimony from
Chowns v. LeBlanc. We agree with the district court’s assessment.
In a similar case about over-detention — against the same defendant
— the plaintiff also relied on a study to show a pattern of constitutional
violations and allege supervisory liability. See Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186–87.
We held that “a reasonable jury could find that Defendants knew of a
‘pattern of similar constitutional violations,’ such that their inaction
amounted to a disregard of an obvious risk.” Id. at 187. The court there
noted that LeBlanc was “in a position to adopt policies that would address
this delay” and that he could not “avoid the evidence that the study exposed
unlawful detentions of prisoners.”
Id. Much of the same is true here, though
unlike in Crittindon, this case is merely at the 12(b)(6) stage, rather than a
motion for summary judgment. See
id. at 185. What LeBlanc may have done
to comply with his supervisory obligations is not yet part of the record.
Further, Parker has not had the opportunity to conduct discovery. His
complaint alleges that
despite his release date being properly calculated on the jail forms, he
was not released for 337 days. For some unknown reason, when his
properly calculated release date arrived, he was not released despite
his numerous attempts to correct the issue. One possible reason for
the over-detention is mistakenly classifying him as a sex offender and
then failing to release him even after he provided the addresses
requested.
The allegations in the complaint are that there is a “pattern of over-detention” that renders Parker’s own case “neither unique nor even
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unusual.” The standard for deliberate indifference requires only a “pattern
of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees,” rather than an
exact duplication. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (emphasis added). Parker has
alleged that he was detained for 337 days past his release date and has cited
three pieces of evidence to support his allegations that LeBlanc was aware of
the deficiencies of implemented policies that routinely led to errors like the
one that violated his constitutional rights. See
id.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we accept “all well-pleaded facts as true
and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Morris,
739 F.3d at 745 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim has facial
plausibility when a plaintiff has pled “factual content” that allows us “to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We agree with Parker
that his complaint sufficiently alleges the requisite “pattern” of
constitutional violations by untrained employees to establish deliberate
indifference for purposes of failure to train. See Connick,
563 U.S. at 62. We
therefore hold that his complaint should proceed to the next stage of
litigation, i.e., tailored discovery. See Carswell v. Camp,
54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th
Cir. 2022).
II. Did LeBlanc allegedly violate a right that was “clearly established”
at the time of the alleged misconduct?
Qualified immunity involves answering two questions: (1) “whether
the officer violated a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the ‘right at
issue was “clearly established” at the time of [the] alleged misconduct.’” 1
_____________________
1 There is variance in this circuit’s caselaw when articulating the second part of the
analysis for qualified immunity. An objective-unreasonableness component, dating from
some of our older caselaw, is sometimes applied to require a finding that “the defendant’s
actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the
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Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (alterations in original)). To determine
whether a right is “clearly established,” we “first look[] to Supreme Court
precedent and then to our own.” Crittindon,
37 F.4th at 186 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). “Ultimately, the touchstone is fair warning: The law
can be clearly established despite notable factual distinctions between the
precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior
decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated
constitutional rights.”
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Analyzing the first part of the test is not difficult here: the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
“Detention of a prisoner thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in
the absence of a facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation
of due process.” Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980). Parker
was detained 337 days past his release date. His pleading also adequately
alleged supervisory liability for LeBlanc. See infra.
The second part of the test is “whether the right at issue was clearly
established at the time of [the] alleged misconduct.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874
_____________________
violation.” See Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. That language is a vestige of older case law that
predates the Supreme Court’s current test adopted in Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001),
and Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223 (2009). See, e.g., Pfannstiel v. City of Marion,
918
F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1990). Another circuit has similar language in some of its
precedents but rejected it: “the test for qualified immunity has only two prongs — whether
the defendant violated a constitutional right and whether the right at issue was clearly
established; there is no separate ‘objective unreasonableness’ prong.” See Brown v. Lewis,
779 F.3d 401, 417 (6th Cir. 2015). We cannot precedentially resolve conflicting caselaw
today, but we mention one of our recent decisions that also opined there is no “standalone
‘objective reasonableness’ element to the Supreme Court’s two-pronged test for qualified
immunity.” See Baker v. Coburn,
68 F.4th 240, 251 n.10 (5th Cir. 2023).
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(quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original). LeBlanc
argues that the district court committed reversible error by not delineating
between the two parts of the test for qualified immunity in its ruling or citing
a case that would have put LeBlanc on notice that his conduct violated clearly
established law. As support, he cites our decision in Joseph on behalf of Estate
of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2020). In that case, on a motion
for summary judgment, the district court had denied qualified immunity to a
group of police officers in a failure to intervene claim.
Id. at 328. We
reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden to
demonstrate that the law was clearly established because the plaintiffs had
failed to “identify a single case to support the argument that any reasonable
officer would have known to intervene under these circumstances.”
Id. at
345. We explained that “[w]ith no briefing and no district-court analysis to
review, we cannot justify a denial of qualified immunity on the grounds that
clearly established law shows that every officer acted unconstitutionally in
this case.”
Id. at 346.
Parker counters that this case is distinguishable because, here, “[t]he
law is clear that a jailer like LeBlanc has a duty to ensure inmates are timely
released from prison,” citing Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. We agree. Unlike the
plaintiffs in Joseph, Parker identified cases in his district court briefing, as well
as in his briefing to this court, that addressed the clearly-established-law
prong of the qualified immunity analysis. In his complaint, Parker also stated
that “[a]ccording to black-letter law, jailors may not imprison inmates longer
than their sentences,” and that “[r]ecent Fifth Circuit precedent recognized
that ‘There is a Clearly Established Right to Timely Release from Prison,’”
again citing Porter,
659 F.3d at 445. We agree that there is sufficient clearly
established law regarding the constitutional right to a timely release from
prison and that Parker has sufficiently argued a violation of the right.
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Finally, as he does with the question of supervisory liability, LeBlanc
contends that defining the clearly established right as “timely release from
prison” is overbroad. We have already rejected that argument above in the
supervisory liability context, and we do so here as well. In Crittindon, we held
that the defendants had “‘fair warning’ that their failure to address this delay
would deny prisoners like Plaintiffs their immediate or near-immediate
release upon conviction” because the defendants knew of the delays in
prisoners’ timely releases. 37 F.4th at 188. Parker’s Third Amended
Complaint cured the deficiency of his Second Amended Complaint in that he
alleged on information and belief that LeBlanc was aware of DPSC
employees’ testimonies in Chowns v. LeBlanc regarding the regular pattern of
over-detentions, and that LeBlanc was aware of Attorney General Jeff
Landry’s op-ed and the Legislative Auditor report regarding the DPSC’s
problem in not knowing inmates’ proper release date. Parker’s complaint
sufficiently alleges that LeBlanc violated a right that was clearly established.
Construing these allegations in the light most favorable to Parker, we
agree they are sufficient to support the argument that LeBlanc had “‘fair
warning’ that [his] failure to address this delay would deny prisoners like
[Parker] their immediate or near-immediate release upon conviction.” See
Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 188.
We close with a reminder. This appeal is from the denial of a motion
to dismiss solely on the pleadings. LaBlanc’s defense is yet to be stated. It
remains to be seen what an evidentiary record will show as to LeBlanc’s
efforts to deal with the widespread problems in determining and enforcing
release dates.
AFFIRMED.
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