Claunch v. Whyte’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Manual delivery of a deed by the grant- or to the grantee with the understanding that it is not to become effective until the death of grantor is not such a delivery as will pass the title.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Matter of Estate of Ashe · Kelley v. Wheyland

2. “The property in question was the community property of the plaintiff and her deceased husband, William M. Claunch. Defendant Phyllis Whyte is the daughter of the deceased by a prior marriage. The plaintiff and the deceased were married in 1938. At that time Phyllis was thirteen years of age. Phyllis was married to defendant Stanley Whyte in 1946. In the spring of 1947 she and her husband took up residence on land owned by her father. The arrangement was that she and her husband would operate her father’s land and the land in question on a “fifty-fifty basis.” That is, the defendants as tenants would receive one-half of the crops and one-half of the proceeds of the livestock. Mr. Claunch died in April, 1948, and the defendants continued to operate the property thereafter on the same basis by agreement with the plaintiff. The Claunches apparently had some interest in oil lands in Texas and, after the death of Mr. Claunch, the plaintiff began planning a trip to Texas in the fall after the harvest. She was in poor health and suffering from a heart condition, which caused her to believe that she might not survive the trip. She testified that her feeling toward Phyllis was as for a daughter; that they had always been on intimate and friendly terms and that she “had all the love in the world for Phyllis.” On or about November 4,1948, she went to an attorney and had a quitclaim deed drawn, purporting to transfer this property to Phyllis. This deed she personally handed to Phyllis, st”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hunt v. Hunt

3. ““A fiduciary relationship does not depend upon some technical relation created by or defined in law, but it exists in cases where there has been a special confidence imposed in another who, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interest of one reposing the confidence. “ * * * the confidential relationship which is protected in equity is synonymous with fiduciary relationship, * * it exists whether the relationship is technically fiduciary or merely informal, whenever one trusts in and relies on the other, * * *.” Leaving the key to her home and the bill of sale to her cattle with Phyllis while she was in Texas, and instructions to sell marketable cattle and deposit her share while she was gone, were specific impositions of trust. The grantee stood in a confidential relationship to the grantor. Hence, the finding must be supported by “clear, satisfactory, convincing and unequivocal evidence” that the deed was delivered with the present intention on the part of the grantor to divest herself of the title and transfer it irrevocably to the grantee. Actual transfer of the possession of the subject of the gift is an important and often controlling factor in establishing the intent of the donor. Maynard v. Taylor, 85 Okl. 268 , 91 P.2d 649 ; Johnson v. Hilliard, 113 Colo. 548 , 160 P.2d 386 ; Yarbrough v. Bellamy, 197 Okl. 493 , 172 P.2d 801 ; In re Hamilton’s Estate, 26 Wash.2d 363 , 174 P.2d 301 ; Gulley v. Christian, 198 Okl. 167 ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hunt v. Hunt