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73 Ill. App. 601

Phoenix Insurance v. Hedrick

Appellate Court of Illinois

Decided March 1, 1898

Appellate Court of Illinois · decided 1898-03-01

<p>1. Pleading—Requisites of a Special Demurrer.—A special demurrer, like a plea in abatement, must be certain to a particular intent.</p> <p>2. Practice—Overruling a Demurrer—Harmless Error.—An error in overruling a demurrer to a replication to a plea in abatement is harmless if the plea in abatement is bad since in that ease the demurrer should have been carried back and sustained to the plea.</p> <p>3. Demurrer—On a Record Presenting a Plea in Abatement.—A demurrer on a record presenting a plea in abatement, searches the record back to such plea only, since the plea does not profess to answer the declaration, but goes only to the writ.</p> <p>4. Pleas in Abatement—Certainty Required.—A plea in abatement ought to be certain to every intent in particular.</p> <p>' 5. Defaults—Admissions by.—The entire cause of action, except the amount of damages as stated in the declaration, is admitted by a default.</p> <p>6. Excretions—Application of Section 61— Practice Act.—Section 61 of ■Chapter 110, Revised Statutes, entitled "Practice’ ’ allowing an exception to the final judgment, to be taken in trials by the court without a jury by consent of the parties has no application to a case where a defendant, having filed a demurrer, elects to stand by the same, and the court enters judgment by default and assesses the damages on evidence heard.</p> <p>7. Damages—■Assessment of After Default.—A proceeding to assess ■damages after a default is in no sense a trial, but more in the nature of a special proceeding. Under the early common law of this State the sher. ifi was authorized to execute the writ of inquiry anywhere in his county, and the proceeding need not be in a court at all. (The court presumes it may still be the law. Vallandingham v. Fellows, 1 Scam. 233.)</p> <p>8. Exceptions—Must be Taken to Assessment of Damages on Default.— When the demurrer of a defendant is overruled and he is ruled to plead, refuses to do so, but elects to stand by his demurrer, the court enters judgment by-default and proceeds to assess the damages, from which he prays an appeal, a motion is necessary to set aside the assessment, and if disallowed, an exception must be taken before the action of the court can be assigned as error.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently December 1898

1 state decisions

Relies on Holmes v. Chicago & Alton Railroad · Peoria & Oquawka Rail Road v. Neill · Ryan v. May

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · Decided 1898-03-01

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Mr. Justice Bigelow

¶1delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶2The first assignment of error questions the ruling of the court in overruling the demurrer.

¶3In the view we take of the pleadings it is unnecessary to pass upon that question, at least so far as the special demurrer is concerned; nevertheless a brief notice of one or more of the grounds of special demurrer may not be unprofitable.

¶4Take the first ground: “Said replications are all special and conclude with a verification.” This is only an argumentative way of saying they should conclude' to the country.

¶5Take the second ground: “Said replications do not traverse all the facts alleged in the plea.” This falls far short of stating what facts alleged in the plea are not traversed.

¶6The other grounds are of similar character. A special demurrer, like a plea in abatement, must be certain to a particular intent. 1 Chitty’s Pleadings (8 Am. Ed. from 6 Bond. Ed.), p. 666; Cover v. Armstrong, 66 Ill. 267; Holmes v. C. & A. R. R. Co., 94 Ill. 439; Iron Clad Dryer Co. v. Chicago Trust and Savings Bank, 50 Ill. App. 461.

¶7If it be conceded that the court erred in overruling the general demurrer to the replications, no harm was done appellant if its plea in abatement was bad, since in that case the demurrer should have been carried back and sustained to the plea. P. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Neill, 16 Ill. 270. A demurrer on a record presenting a plea in abatement searches the record back to such plea only, since the plea does not profess to answer the declaration, but goes only to the writ. Ryan v. May, 14 Ill. 50.

¶8Was appellant’s plea in abatement good? Such a plea ought to be certain to every intent in particular. Parsons v. Case, 45 111. 296. The plea, while admitting that some kind of proofs of loss were sent to appellant, does not state their contents, but avers that the proofs did not state and set out the title to the property. This allegation is equally consistent with each of the two theories, viz., either that the proofs were absolutely silent upon the subject of the title to the property or that, though attempting to set out title, they were so defective as not to be a compliance at all with the substantial requirements of the policy in that regard, and so the pleader says the title was not stated. If the latter is meant by the pleader, he is pleading a conclusion of law as applied to the proofs furnished by appellee. To have made his plea good he should have stated precisely and particularly what the proofs showed appellee to have stated in that regard, especially since appellant admits by his plea that proofs of some kind were furnished. To say that a certain document does not state such and such facts may be argumentative, but lacks that precision which is required in saying what facts the document does state. That this plea is an attempt to plead a conclusion of law into the record, is further evidenced by the fact that it avers that appellant wrote appellee that the proofs failed to show that he was sole and unconditional owner in fee of the property, a requirement not demanded by the policy as to .the proofs. He was only required to state his title, whatever it was, and that, we are of opinion, could be done by any equivalent terms to fulfill the title he represented himself, in the policy, to be possessed of. Technical nicety was not contracted for. We are of the opinion that the plea in abatement was bad and that the demurrer should have been carried back to the plea and sustained to it, but because that ' was not formally done is of no consequence; at least appellant has no reason to complain of it.

¶9The admission of improper evidence on behalf of appellee, as well as the rendering of the judgment in his favor, are assigned for error.

¶10From the view we take of the matter, the judgment by default was properly rendered, since appellant refused to plead to the declaration, and the record is not in condition to pass upon the errors assigned.

¶11The entire cause of action, as stated in the declaration, was admitted by the default, except the amount of damages.

¶12Section 61 of the Practice Act, allowing an exception to the final judgment, to be taken on trials by the court without a jury, and by consent of the parties, has, in our opinion, no application to a case like this. The proceeding to assess the damages was not with appellant’s consent, within the meaning of this section. Assessment of damages is in no sense a trial. It is more in the nature of a special proceeding. Under the early common law of this State (and we presume it may still be the law) the sheriff was authorized to execute the writ of inquiry anywhere in the county, and the proceeding need not be in a court at all. Vanlandingham v. Fellows, 1 Scam. 233.

¶13Notwithstanding the section of the statute above referred to, it is still necessary to make a motion to set aside the assessment, and if it is disallowed, to take an exception to the ruling of the court. Beam v. Laycock, 3 Bradw. 44, and cases there cited. No exception was in fact taken to the introduction of evidence on the assessment of damages.

¶14We have examined the evidence and find it not only relevant, but fully sufficient to support the judgment.

¶15As to the evidence introduced by appellee to prove title, that, also, we think, is sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the policy, but whether it is or not is immaterial, as the default admitted all the facts pleaded in the declaration, and its sufficiency has not been-challenged.

¶16Finding no error in the record requiring a reversal of the judgment, it is affirmed.

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