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73 Mass. 167

Hildreth v. Marshall

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided October 15, 1856

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1856-10-15

<p>The St. of 1852, c. 294, § 1, which shortened from four to two years the period of limitation of actions by creditors against the executor or administrator of their debtor, does not apply to actions against executors or administrators who gave bond before it took effect.</p> <p>It is no bar to an action against an administrator, on a debt of his intestate, that he gave due notice of his appointment, and had no notice within a year thereafter of demands against the estate which would authorize him. to represent it insolvent, and applied, in payment of the debts of the deceased, all the personal property, and a sufficient portion of the real estate, sold by license of the judge of probate, to pay the debts then ascertained, and that the heirs at the same time sold all the residue of the real estate, and the defendant rendered his final account, which was allowed by the judge of probate.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently June 1948

1 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1856-10-15

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Thomas, J.

¶1Two questions are raised upon the agreed statement of facts; the first, whether the claim in suit was barred by the statute of limitations; the second, whether the facts stated sustain the plea of plene administravit.

¶21. When the defendant filed his bond, as administrator of the estate of Simeon M. Marshall, the provisions of the Rev. Sts. c. 66, § 3, were in force, by which suits against executors and administrators were limited to four years from the giving of the bond. The St. of 1852, c. 294, § 1, provided that where, by the *169provisions of the Rev. Sts. c. 66, the right of action is limited to four years from the date of the bond, such right of action shall be hereafter limited to the space of two years from such time.

¶3This court, in King v. Tirrell, 2 Gray, 331, held that the statute of 1852 was not retroactive, and did not apply to actions against executors and administrators who had given bonds before the statute took effect.

¶4The St. of 1855, c. 283, provides that the St. of 1852, c. 294, § 1, shall not apply or be construed to apply to any right of action which had accrued or existed against the deceased person, his executor or administrator, prior to the passage of said act.

¶5This action is upon a promissory note given by the defendant’s intestate 'm the 11th of September 1850, payable on demand. The cause of action on that day existed or accrued against the intestate. The defendant’s bond was given before the St. of 1852 took effect. It is therefore within the rule of King v. Tirrell.

¶6The action is also within the saving clause of the St. of 1855, c. 283. Whether upon this ground alone the action could be maintained, it is not necessary to decide; one good ground for a decision being sufficient.

¶72. The agreed statement of facts shows conclusively that the estate had not been fully administered, that there was yet real estate of the deceased to the value of a thousand dollars ; and such real estate, the personal being insufficient, was applicable to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Rev. Sts. c. 65, §§ 8, 9. Sections 11-14 of c. 66 apply to cases where the whole of the estate and effects have been exhausted in the payment of debts; that is, obviously, when the whole estate by law applicable to that purpose has been exhausted.

¶8The result must be Judgment for the plaintiff.

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