¶1Among the claims of error raised in the defendant’s appeal from his convictions on charges of assault with intent to rape a child and indecent assault and battery on a person over the age of fourteen, the defendant contends that the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper. We agree and reverse the convictions.
¶2Background. At the time of the incident giving rise to the charges, the complainant was a fifteen year old high school student. The testimony at trial described the following events. The complainant made the defendant’s acquaintance while stand*825ing at a bus stop on her daily trip to school; the defendant would pull up to the bus stop in his car and make small talk with her. Eventually, the defendant suggested that she should skip school some day to “hang out” with him at a mall. She agreed to do so, and on the morning the two had set for their outing, the defendant picked her up in his car.
¶3The defense at trial was that the complainant had lied about the sexual assault, suggesting that, though the two had gone to the apartment and kissed, the complainant had done so willingly and that the alleged sexual assault never occurred. In support of that strategy, the defense sought to impeach the complainant’s credibility by pointing to inconsistencies between her trial testimony and prior statements she had made.
¶4In his closing argument, the prosecutor responded to the defendant’s challenge to the complainant’s credibility. Among other observations offered in support of the complainant’s credibility, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider why she would “come in almost four years later and say to a group of complete strangers, T was sexually assaulted. I had my period. I was wearing a pad.’ Why do that? What does she get from that? . . . What mo*826tive to lie or fabricate does [she] have?” Upon completion of the prosecutor’s closing, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s argument that the complainant had no motive to lie. The trial judge overruled the objection.
¶5Discussion. “A prosecutor may marshal the evidence in closing argument, and, in doing so, may urge the jury to believe the government witnesses and disbelieve those testifying for the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 587 (2005). “[T]here is no categorical prohibition against suggestion by a prosecutor that a prosecution witness has no motive to lie.” Commonwealth v. Helberg, ante 175, 179 (2008). “A prosecutor may not, however, suggest to the jury that a victim’s testimony is entitled to greater credibility merely by virtue of her willingness to come into court to testify.” Ibid. See Commonwealth v. Beaudry, supra at 586-587. See also Commonwealth v. Riberio, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 7, 10 (2000). Cf. Commonwealth v. Hollie, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 538, 540 (1999).
¶6The prosecutor’s argument in the present case committed precisely the error against which the court cautioned in Beaudry.
¶7 So ordered.
¶8The complainant first reported to school and attended her first class, so that her absence would not trigger a report to her mother.
¶9We reiterate the familiar refrain: “Advance preparation would eliminate from our consideration most aspects of closing arguments constantly being urged as improper.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 903 (1983), quoting from Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 557 (1977).
¶10Before trial, the defense moved in limine to preclude the Commonwealth from commenting on the complainant’s motive to lie. The trial judge reserved ruling on the defendant’s motion. Following the Commonwealth’s closing argument, the defendant objected to the Commonwealth’s argument on that basis, reminding the judge that she had reserved her ruling on the motion in limine. The judge overruled the objection, commenting that she did not find anything objectionable in the prosecutor’s closing. We reject the Commonwealth’s suggestion that the defendant’s claim of error is unpreserved because the defendant did not thereafter request a curative instruction. Contrast Commonwealth v. Beaudry, supra at 586-587 (objection to closing argument sustained, and curative instruction administered). We agree with the defendant *827that the judge’s standard instruction, to the effect that “arguments are not evidence,” was inadequate to neutralize the prejudicial effects of the prosecutor’s improper remarks. See Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 471 (1978), S.C., 381 Mass. 340 (1980); Commonwealth v. Fredette, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 264 (2002).
¶11Our view of the case obviates any need to address the defendant’s remaining claims of error, as they are unlikely to recur at any retrial. The defendant’s first claim concerns the admission of reports of the alleged assault that the complainant made to other persons. See Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217 (2005), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006). As to one such report, the Commonwealth concedes error in the admission of the first complaint over defense objection (because the first complaint witness was unavailable to testify), but contends that the error was harmless; as to the other two reports, the Commonwealth suggests that the absence of objection reflected a defense strategy to impeach the complainant with inconsistencies. The defendant’s remaining claim is directed to the exclusion of evidence that the complainant faced pending charges on an unrelated matter at the time of trial. Those charges have since been resolved.