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73 Mich. 620

Wilson v. Wilson

Michigan Supreme Court

Decided February 1, 1889

Michigan Supreme Court · decided 1889-02-01

<p>Divorce — Death of party — Appeal.</p> <p>1. Where no relief is sought not dependent on divorce, there can Be no decree after death has separated the parties. Zoellner v. Zoellner, 46 Mich. 511.</p> <p>2. An appeal lies from every decree in chancery which purports to be final, and its illegality is a conclusive reason why it should be reversed.</p> <p>So held, where a decree of divorce was granted to a complainant after his death, with alimony to the defendant, which was reversed on appeal.</p>

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The bill and answer below were simple divorce proceedings, aimed at no relief not dependent on divorce. In such a case there can be no decree after death has separated the parties. The doctrine of relation does not apply in such a case. There must be living parties, or there can be no relationship to be divorced. Zoellner v. Zoellner, 46 Mich. 511 ( 9 N. W. 831 ). It follows that, as the parties were still husband and wife when the husband died, she has all the rights and conditions of any other widow. It is fallacious to claim that a decree apparently rendered during complainant’s life, and therefore apparently valid, cannot be appealed from. An appeal lies from every decree in chancery which purports to be final, and its illegality is a conclusive reason why it should be reversed, as this decree must be.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Heck v. Bailey

Relies on Zoellner v. Zoellner

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed as unlawfully rendered · Decided 1889-02-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently July 2000

11 state decisions — followed in 10 states

301889189019001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Campbell, J.

¶1In this case complainant filed a bill for *621divorce against defendant on the alleged ground of desertion. She filed an answer, denying any such cause of complaint, and made counter-charges, asking a divorce on her own behalf for his cruelty. The cause was submitted for decision, but complainant died before it was decided. The circuit court of Branch county nevertheless made a decree, and directed it to relate back to a period before his death; thereby granting a divorce in favor of complainant, and at the same time giving alimony to defendant. She appeals.

¶2The bill and answer below were simple divorce proceedings, aimed at no relief not dependent on divorce. In such a case there can be no decree after death has separated the parties. The doctrine of relation does not apply in such a case. There must be living parties, or there can be no relationship to be divorced. Zoellner v. Zoellner, 46 Mich. 511 (9 N. W. Rep. 831). It follows that, as the parties were still husband and wife when the husband died, she has all the rights and conditions of any other widow. It is fallacious to claim that a decree apparently rendered during complainant’s life, and therefore apparently valid, cannot be appealed from. An appeal lies from every decree in chancery which purports to be final, and its illegality is a conclusive reason why it should be reversed, as this decree must be.

¶3We think no cause existed for the decree, even if it had been timely rendered, and we should be disposed to make defendant an allowance if it were not for the difficulty of providing in this Court, under all the circumstances, for such relief. But, as the widow’s interest in her husband’s estate entitles her to allowances in the probate court as well as otherwise, the hardship is somewhat lessened. We cannot, after her husband’s death, consider her claim to divorce as an injured party, and *622must satisfy ourselves with merely reversing the decree as unlawfully rendered.

Champlin, Morse, and Long, JJ., concurred. Sherwood, C. J., did not sit.
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