¶1 The defendant’s first exception is that his Honor
¶2 allowed Culpepper, a co-defendant, to introduce witnesses to prove his (Brite’s) declarations while in jail, which tended to exonerate Culpepper.
¶3 While these declarations are not evidence, either for or against Culpepper, being, as to him, res inter alias aota / and made by one not under oath, and subject to cross examination, yet they are clearly admissible against Brite, and it makes no difference whether they were called forth by the State, or by Culpepper, without objection, or rather with the sanction of the State.
¶4 Such appears to have been the view taken by the Court and followed by the jury, for both Culpepper and Brite were convicted, one of larceny, and the other of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen.
¶5 After the judgment of the Court sentencing the defendant Brite to the State’s prison for four years, he made the further exception that “ receiving stolen goods is by law a misdemean- or only, that misdemeanors are not infamous offences, that the Court can only sentence to the penitentiary for infamous of-fences, and that this was not a case < f much aggravation, nor was he a hardened offender, the testimony showing him to be a man of good character.” It is true that the receiving of stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, &c., is declared in Bat. Rev., chap. 32, sec. 55, to be a misdemeanor; but it is enacted by the same section that on conviction, “such receiver shall be punished as one convicted of larceny.” And the effect of sections 25 and 29 of the same chapter is to au-' *29 thorize the Court to punish the offence of larceny by confinement in the State’s prison, or county jail, for not less than four months nor more than ten years, in the discretion of the Court, according to the aggravation of the case, or 'the character of the offender.
¶6 In this Court the defendant’s counsel moves to arrest the judgment for that the indictment charges the goods stolen to-be the property of S. S. Fowler, whereas the full Christian name of Eowler should have been set forth.
¶7 How does it appear that the letters S. S., which are said by the counsel to be initials, is not the full name of baptism ? There is not the slightest intimation in the record that there was any .proof to the contrary, or that S. S. was not Eowler’s full Christian name.
¶8 But admitting S. S. to be merely initials, a third person may be described by any particulars which furnish sufficient identification ; and “ initials, it seems, are a sufficient designation of * the Christian name, and at all events cannot be excepted to after verdict.”. Whart. Cr. L., §255.
¶9 State v. Henderson, 68 N. C., 348, and authorities there cited.
¶10 Let it be certified thal there is no error.
¶11 Judgment affirmed.