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73 Nev. 143

311 P.2d 735

Wilkinson v. Wilkinson

Nevada Supreme Court

Decided May 21, 1957

Nevada Supreme Court · decided 1957-05-21

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““(1) From a final judgment in an action or proceeding commenced in the court in which the judgment is rendered. “(2) From an order granting or refusing a new trial, or granting or refusing to grant or dissolving or refusing to dissolve an injunction, or appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver, or vacating or refusing to vacate an order appointing a receiver, or dissolving or refusing to dissolve an attachment, or changing or refusing to change the place of trial, and from any special order made after final judgment. “(3) From an interlocutory judgment, order or decree made or entered in actions to redeem real or personal property from a mortgage thereof or lien thereon, determining such right to redeem and directing an accounting, and from an interlocutory judgment in actions for partition which determines the rights and interests of the respective parties and directs partition, sale or division to be made. “(4) If an order granting or refusing to grant a motion to change the place of trial of an action or proceeding is not directly appealed from within thirty (30) days, there shall be no appeal therefrom on appeal from the judgment in the action or proceeding or otherwise, and on demand or motion of either party to an action or proceeding the court or judge making the order changing or refusing to change the place of trial of an action or proceeding shall make an order staying the trial of the action or proceeding until the time to appeal from such order, changing or re”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Casino Operations, Inc. v. Graham

“The mere fact that the order in point of time is made after a final judgment has been entered does not render it appealable. It must affect the rights of the parties growing out of final judgment.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Alvis v. State

Relies on Tardy v. Tarbell

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1957-05-21

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently December 2002

14 state decisions

40195719601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*144 OPINION

¶2 On Motion To Dismiss

Per Curiam:

¶3 This is an appeal from order of the trial court granting preliminary counsel fees.

¶4 In the action below a decree of divorce was granted to respondent wife in 1952 which decree also made provisions relative to custody of the minor children and the settlement of the property rights of the parties. On March 26, 1953, implementing that decree of divorce, an order was made by the trial court restraining the appellant husband from disposing of any of his property. On November 15, 1955 a motion was made by appellant husband to dissolve the restraining order upon the ground that the need for it no longer existed. Respondent wife then moved the court for allowances to permit her to defend against appellant’s motion. The court ordered the payment of $500 preliminary counsel fees. From that order this appeal is taken.

¶5 Respondent has moved to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that it is not an appealable determination under Rule 72(b) NRCP. That rule provides that an appeal may be taken from “any special order made after final judgment.” The question presented by the motion to dismiss is whether this appeal is from such an order.

¶6*145 The mere fact that the order in point of time is made after a final judgment has been entered does not render it appealable. It must affect the rights of the parties growing out of final judgment. Tardy v. Tarbell, 54 Nev. 342, 16 P.2d 656.

¶7 The order here bears no relation to the final judgment or to its operation or enforcement. It relates instead to the proceedings which remain pending, and in relation to those proceedings is ancillary and interlocutory to the same degree as an order for allowances pending final decree is ancillary and interlocutory to the principal action. The nature of this order, then, is not that of an order after final judgment but of an interlocutory order ancillary to pending proceedings.

¶8 Appeal dismissed.

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