Marr v. Marr’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““But we deem it clear that the director, who is also creditor, must, on taking legal proceedings for collection of his debt, relinquish his trust pro hac vice, not covertly, but openly, and with fair notice to his company. Whether such notice should be given-to the stockholders or to the directors may depend upon circumstances. If the company is equipped with other officers and directors who are actively representing the interests of the stockholders, it may well be that notice to such officers or directors would be deemed sufficient. But it is, as we think, inconsistent with the duty of a director (at least under circumstances such as are here presented) that he should assume an attitude antagonistic to his company, unless he sees to it that the interests of the stockholders, which he, by reason of his personal interest, is for the time disqualified from protecting, are in the charge of other officers and directors able and willing to- protect them, and to whom his notice may be given, or else sees to it that fair notice of his contemplated action is given to the stockholders, so that they may take measures to protect themselves.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Grunden v. German · 97 N.J. Eq. 230 - Gen. Invest. Co. v. Amer. Hide Leather Co.

2. “An important and perhaps controlling circumstance is that in the outcome the property sold for only half its value. We cannot agree with the learned vice-chancellor that it is a sufficient answer to this to say that the law court from which an execution issues can set the sale aside for inadequacy of price. He cites Palladino v. Hilpert, 72 N.J. Eq. (2 Buch. ) 270. In that case application was made to the court of chancery to restrain the sheriff from delivering the deed. In that juncture the application might have been made to the court out of which the execution had issued. After the delivery of the deed it is, of course, too late to do this. Where the law court sets aside a sale made under its process, it does so in the exercise of its equitable, not of its common, law powers. See Miller v. Barber, 73 N.J.L. (44 Vr. ) 38, and cases cited. But these equitable powers are only incidental to the control which the court has over its own process of execution, and do not survive after the writ is fully executed. After the deed has been delivered to the purchaser, any application to set it aside for inadequacy of price must necessarily be made to the court of chancery, which court, in the exercise of its independent equitable powers, may either set aside the deed or treat the grantee as a trustee for others to the extent that he has reaped an undue profit from the transaction at their expense.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 12 N.J. Super. 140 - Masi v. Mestice

3. “where [a director’s] interest is opposed to that of the company, [all dealings between him and the company] will be regarded with jealousy and suspicion and subjected to the closest scrutiny, and not sustained against the stockholders, unless they are consistent with the utmost good faith and fair dealing on the part of the director.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland