Volume 73 — New York Supplement

<p>1. Malicious Prosecution—Arrest— Civil Dispute—Abuse of Process.</p> <p>The employment of criminal process to force the payment of debts and compel the settlement of civil disputes cannot be tolerated.</p> <p>2. Same—Secondary Evidence.</p> <p>Where, in a suit for damages for the arrest of plaintiffs for the purpose of extorting money, defendants sought to justify on the ground that the arrest was properly made on a valid criminal charge, it was error to permit them to state what the complaint charged, it being the best evidence.</p>

Action by Emanuel Jacobus against the American Mineral Water Machine Company and others. From an order denying the appointment of a receiver and for an injunction pendente lite, the plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from trial term, New York county.</p> <p>Action by John A. McCluskey as administrator of the estate of Charles McCluskey, deceased, against the Metropolitan Street Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.</p>

Action by George Washer against Warren J. Slater. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from trial term, Monroe county.</p> <p>Action by Jacob H. Myers against George C. Buel and others. From a judgment in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Preliminary Injunction—Discretion op Court—Review.</p> <p>. In a suit to restrain the discharged employes of an express company from using copies which they had made of its lists of patrons, whereby they sought to divert the company’s patronage and injure its business, the court, on appeal, will not interfere with the discretion of the special term in granting an injunction pendente lite.</p>

Action by Mary C. Fitts and others against Bertha E. Becker. Judgment for plaintiffs. Motion by defendant to vacate an order adjudging her guilty of contempt, and fining her in the sum of $1,200.

<p>Appeal from special term, Chenango county.</p> <p>Action by Lydia A. Deagan against Harry Weeks. From an interlocutory judgment overruling a demurrer to a counterclaim set up in defendant’s answer, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Action by May Thorne Brantingham against Eunice E. Huff individually and as executrix of Joseph Thorne, deceased, and others. From a final judgment of the special term of the supreme court in favor of plaintiff, defendant Huff appeals.

<p>1. Municipal Ordinances—Legislative Authority—Subsequent Legislative Approval.</p> <p>An ordinance or by-law enacted by a municipal corporation in pursuance of legislative authority, which is expressly recognized and approved by a subsequent legislative enactment, has the force and effect of a state statute.</p> <p>3. Same—Void Ordinance—Actions Under.</p> <p>Gloversville city ordinances, enacted pursuant to Laws 1890, c. 55, constituting the city charter, established the boundaries of fire limits, prohibited the erection of wooden structures within such boundaries, provided for the granting of permits to repair buildings therein, declared-buildings erected contrary to such ordinances nuisances to be abated, and provided for changing or suspending such ordinances either by unanimous consent or upon the adoption of such proposal after two- • weeks’ consideration. Laws 1899, c. 275, revising the municipal charter, recognized the established fire limits and the ordinances relative thereto. An ordinance granting permission to a person to remove a wooden building from one part of the fire limits to another was enacted in a manner contrary to the rule governing the suspension of the ordinances relating to fire protection. Held, that the permission was of no effect.</p> <p>3. Same—Permission to Repair—Removal.</p> <p>A resolution of a city council permitting a person to repair a wooden building within the fire limits does not' authorize the removal of the-building to another place within the limits, where the ordinance relating to fire limits prohibits the “erection or placing” of wooden buildings within the fire district.</p> <p>4. Nuisance—Specific Statutory Declaration—Judicial Determination.</p> <p>A declaration of a city ordinance that a particular thing is a common, nuisance does not make it so, but the question of its being a common nuisance is for judicial determination.</p> <p>5. Same—Legislative Determination—Police Power.</p> <p>Where ordinances of a municipality, enacted within its police powers and under legislative authority, establish fire limits, prohibit the erectian of wooden structures therein, and declare the erection of such structures within the limits to be public nuisances, structures coming within the class described are in fact nuisances without judicial determination; and hence the officers of the municipality are authorized to destroy a structure which is within the designated class without showing that it was in fact a nuisance.</p> <p>Houghton, J., dissenting.</p>

<p><f Change of Venue—Convenience of Witnesses.</p> <p>Defendant filed a complaint in C. county, charging plaintiff, who resided in T. county, with grand larceny by false representations. Plaintiff thereupon brought an action in T. county for malicious prosecution. Defendant’s affidavits for change of venue to C. county named 17 witnesses residing there, alleged to be necessary to his case; plaintiff’s counter affidavits named 25 witnesses residing in T. county; many named on each side being unnecessary. Plaintiff filed a stipulation relieving defendant from the necessity of calling a number of the witnesses named by him. So far as shown by the record, the evidence relating to the truthfulness of the representations was best obtainable from witnesses in T. county. Held error to grant the change of venue, the truthfulness of the representation being the important question.</p>

<p>Willsv-Undue Influence—Evidence.</p> <p>Where a will was contested on the ground that it was procured by undue influence of one of the legatees, held, that the declarations of such legatee as to his relations with the testatrix, and as to the condition of her mind at the time of the execution of the will, are not admissible, where there are legacies to other parties under the will, who would not be entitled to take as heirs if the will was set aside.</p>

<p>1. Partnership—Surviving Partner—Firm Liability—Witnesses — Competency.</p> <p>A surviving partner, who is liable on a firm note, is a “person interested” in the event in an action on the note, within Code Civ. Proc. § 829, prohibiting a person interested in the event, though not a party, from being examined as a witness in his own behalf or interest against the representative of a deceased person.</p> <p>2. Same—Limitations—Partial Payment.</p> <p>Where a partnership is closed and dissolved, one partner cannot bind the other by a partial payment on a firm note,, so as to take the debt out of the statute of limitations, without authority.</p> <p>3. Same—What Law Governs.</p> <p>Where a nonresident creditor of a film which had been dissolved sues the administrator of a deceased partner on the firm debt in New York, the statutes relating to limitations in New York govern.</p> <p>4. Same.</p> <p>Where the statute of limitations against a partner’s liability for a firm debt had been suspended by reason of his nonresidence, it cannot be contended, in an action thereon against the administrator of a deceased partner, that the surviving partner is a competent witness, being devoid of interest in the outcome of the suit, to testify against his deceased partner, on the ground that limitations had run.</p>

<p>Appeal from special term.</p> <p>Action by Edwin R. Bryant against Charles H. Turner and wife. From a judgment overruling a demurrer to the complaint, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from trial term, Albany county.</p> <p>Action by Petro Favo against the Remington Arms "Company. From a judgment for plaintiff and an order "denying a new trial, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Conversion—Joint Ownership—Indivisibility.</p> <p>Where defendants having an undivided half interest in cattle on plaintiff’s farm entered thereon, and, on the latter’s refusal to join in a division, by force took, drove away, and sold one-half of them, they were gnilty of conversion, the cattle not being by nature divisible so that they could be severed, and each take his share.</p> <p>2. Trespass to Property—Co-Tenancy—Action by One Co-Owner—Defect-of Parties—Waiver.</p> <p>In an action for trespass upon real estate the nonjoinder of a co-tenant is not a ground for dismissal, where the defect is waived by failing to object by answer or demurrer.</p> <p>8. Conversion—Joint Ownership—Damages.</p> <p>Where defendant, having an undivided half interest in cattle, drove away and sold one-half of them", the measure of damages is one-half of the value of those cattle so converted.</p> <p>4. Same—Theory of Finding—Evidence.</p> <p>In an action for conversion of cattle, where defendant claimed an .undivided half interest in them, a verdict for their full value cannot be sustained by plaintiff’s contention that there was evidence that she was the sole owner of the cattle, when such evidence was not submitted to the jury, and the court’s instruction permitted the recovery of full value, though she was only a half owner.</p> <p>5. Same—Joint Wrongdoers—Liability of.</p> <p>A person who, in assisting a co-owner in taking away cattle from the possession of the other co-owner, does nothing more than attempt to keep the cattle together, and takes no part in a sale of them, is not guilty as a joint wrongdoer.</p> <p>Chase, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>'Appeal from-special term, New York county.</p> <p>Action by Louis Ratzel against the New York News Publishing Company and another. From a judgment of the special term of the supreme court overruling a demurrer to the complaint (71 N. Y. Supp. 1074), defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from special term, New York county.</p> <p>Action by Margaret McCabe against the John Hancock Mutual Rife Insurance Company and another. From an interlocutory judgment overruling the demurrer of defendant Michael McCabe to the complaint, he appeals.</p>

Action by Johanna M. Copeland against the Metropolitan Street Railway Company. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals.

<p>1. Insurance—Contract to Procure—Parties—Assignment.</p> <p>Where a contract to procure insurance provides that all the terms and conditions shall be binding on all the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of all the parties, one who occupies such relationships to the agent to procure may enforce the contract.</p> <p>2. Same—Breach—Damages.</p> <p>Where one who has contracted to procure insurance obtains and tenders the policies, which are refused, he may recover the difference between what he had to pay and what defendant agreed to pay; and evidence that the rate subsequently increased is immaterial.</p> <p>3. Same.</p> <p>Where defendant refused to receive policies of insurance which plaintiff had contracted to furnish, evidence of the expense to defendant of maintaining an automatic' sprinkler and of causing it to be regularly inspected, had the insurance been perfected, is not admissible in reduction of plaintiff’s damages, when by the contract defendant agreed to keep such sprinkler in repair, and the plaintiff, though paying the costs of one month’s inspection, was not in fact liable therefor.</p>

Action by Christian Dancel and another, as administrators of Christian Dancel, against the Goodyear Shoe Company of Maine. From an order granting plaintiffs’ motion for judgment'on an amended answer as frivolous, and from judgment entered thereon, defendonf ofvn#»91 c

<p>1. Mortgages—Assignment—Consideration—Priorities.</p> <p>One who takes an assignment of a mortgage, the entire eonsideraation of which has not been advanced by the mortgagee, takes, except as to the amount actually advanced, subject to the intervening rights of a junior mortgage, and this though the assignor makes affidavit that the mortgage is a valid security and the assignee pays full value.</p> <p>2. Same—Future Advances.</p> <p>Where a mortgage is given to secure future advances, in the absence of a binding obligation to make the advances, the mortgagee does so at his peril after notice of the existence of a junior mortgage on the same property.</p> <p>3. Same—Evidence.</p> <p>The rule that declarations of the assignor of a mortgage are not admissible to impeach the mortgage in the hands of the assignee has no application to an examination respecting the original consideration of . the mortgage.</p>

<p>Controversy by Richard M. Scruggs against George W. Cotterill and others, submitted on agreed statement of facts. Judgment for plaintiff.</p>

. Application by James Kilduff, as assignee of a judgment recovered by Annie M. Hunter against the firm of Hunter, Cooper & Co., for the appointment of' a receiver. From an order denying the application, the applicant appeals.

<p>1. Street Railways—Injury at Crossing—Instructions—Imputed Negligence.</p> <p>In an action against a street car company for negligently injuring a child non sui juris in the custody of his father at the time of the accident, a charge that, if plaintiff could have crossed the street and avoided the car but for the carelessness of defendant’s driver and his impetuous driving, they must find for the plaintiff, was erroneous, because eliminating the question of the contributory negligence of the father.</p> <p>2. Same—Subsequent Instruction—Cure op Error.</p> <p>A subsequent instruction, at defendant’s request, that plaintiff could not recover if his father was negligent, did not cure the error.</p>

<p>Party Wall—Injunction—Lis Pendens—Notice.</p> <p>Under Code Civ. Proc. § 1670, providing that in an action to recover a judgment affecting the title to or the use of real property, the plaintiff may file a notice of the pendency of the action, such notice may be filed in an-action to restrain the building on and adding to the height of a party wall, and thereby causing it to settle.</p> <p>Patterson and McLaughlin, JJ., dissenting.</p>

Action by Matthew I. Fox against the Mahattan Railway Company. From a judgment for defendant, and from an order denying a new trial, plaintiff appeals.

<p>Suit on .agreed statement of facts by Albert A. Wilcox and another against the National Shoe & Leather Bank. Judgment for defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from special term, New York county.'</p> <p>Action by Charles H. Stone, as sole executor of the last will and testament of Augusta W. Stone, deceased, against Samuel A. Demarest, as executor of the last will and testament of Julia M. Travel, deceased, and others. From a judgment overruling a demurrer to the complaint, the defendant Demarest appeals.</p>

<p>1. Death prom Wrongful Act—Cause of Death.</p> <p>Four months after receiving an injury caused by falling downstairs a woman died of placentia previa. The attending physician testified there was a possibility that the fall produced the condition resulting in death, but refused to testify positively that it would. He had found no evidence of hemorrhages, which would naturally have been present had the fall" produced this condition. Another physician, on hypothetical case stated, testified the fall could have produced the condition, and he thought it did. HelOs, in an action for causing the death, that the evidence connecting the death with the injury was insufficient to go to the jury.</p> <p>■2. Dismissal on the Merits.</p> <p>Dismissal of complaint at close of plaintiff’s testimony for insufficiency of evidence to show a cause of action should not he upon the merits.</p>

Action by Marie Louisa Jaeger against John H. Koening, etc. There was judgment in favor of plaintiff, which on successive appeals was affirmed, with costs, and from a judgment of the general term of the New York City court reversing an order denying defendant’s motion to' set off a judgment in his favor (65 N. Y. Supp. 795) the defendant appealed to the appellate term of the supreme court, where the cause was reversed (67 N. Y. Supp. 172), and plaintiff appeals.

Action by Gerald F. Hart against William D. Chase and another. From an order denying a motion to vacate an order for the examination of one of the defendants, they appeal.

<p>1. Costs—Supplementary Proceedings to Collect Taxes—Original Proceedings—Appeal.</p> <p>Laws 1896, c. 90S, § 259, which authorizes the institution, by a county treasurer, of supplementary proceedings, as upon a judgment, to collect taxes, and which provides that costs may be allowed against the person examined, but “none shall be allowed in his favor,” only exempts the county treasurer from costs on an adverse ruling in the original proceedings, but does not apply to an unsuccessful appeal by him.</p> <p>2. Same—Appeals prom Orders.</p> <p>An appeal from an order dismissing supplementary proceedings instituted by a county treasurer under Laws 1896, c. 908, § 259, authorizing supplementary proceedings, as upon a judgment, to collect a tax, though such order is in the nature of, a final judgment in special proceedings, is heard and determined as appeals from orders, under Id. § 255, providing that an appeal from an order in proceedings under this article, of which section 259 is a part, shall be heard as appeals from orders, and hence the costs on the appeal are regulated by Code Civ. Proe. § 3239, governing costs upon appeals from orders, and not by section 3240, providing for costs on appeal in a special proceeding.</p>

<p>1. Pleading—Complaint—Mistake — Fraud—Rescission op Contract—Demurrer.</p> <p>Where, in an action to rescind a contract for the sale of stock and recover the purchase price, the complaint alleges mutual mistake, and also fraud on the part of defendant, but one cause of action is alleged.</p> <p>2. Same—Fraud—Allegations.</p> <p>In an action for the rescission of a contract of sale of stock, the complaint alleged that certain statements were made by defendants as true of their knowledge, that plaintiff relied thereon, and that by reason of the falsity of such statements the contract was fraudulent and void. Held that, there being no averment that defendants knew the statements to be false, fraud is not alleged.</p>

<p>Appeal from trial term, New York county.</p> <p>Action by Gerardine H. Hickok against Elizabeth M. Bunting and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from trial term, New York county.</p> <p>Action by the German-American Insurance Company of New York against the Standard Gaslight Company of the City-of New York. From a judgment of the trial term (70 N. Y. S. 384) in favor of •plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from special term, New York county.</p> <p>Action by Richard Clay Sibley against George Stuart Smith. From an order granting a motion to reduce bail, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Ac.tion by the Knickerbocker Trust Company against George M. Hard and others. From an interlocutory judgment overruling a demurrer to the complaint, the defendants appeal.

<p>1. Judgment — Conclusiveness against Corporation Merging Defendant-Company.</p> <p>A judgment obtained in an action commenced against a corporation after it had merged into another corporation is not binding on the latter, as at the time of suit commenced the first corporation had ceased to exist, and, though the debt on which the judgment is based may be valid against the consolidated company, it is entitled to its day in court.</p> <p>3. Corporations—Jurisdiction—Affidavit of Service.</p> <p>An affidavit of service of summons on a corporation to the effect that the person making the service knew the person served “to have been” the president of the corporation does not confer jurisdiction over the corporation, as the service must be made on one who “is” an officer of the corporation, and not on one who “has been.”</p>

<p>Judgment—Opening Default.</p> <p>The giving of leave by the appellate division to apply to the court below to open a default does not indicate that, in the opinion of the appellate division, the default ought to be opened.</p>

Action by Henry Gansberg, administrator, against Adelheid Sagemohl. From a judgment entered upon a decision of the court and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.

<p>1. Action—Foreign Corporation—Compliance with Statute—Order op Arrest.</p> <p>Where, in an action by a foreign corporation, the complaint does not allege that plaintiff has complied with the provision of Laws 1896, c. 008, § 181, or paid the license fee thereby required, the action cannot be maintained, and an order of arrest issued therein should be vacated.</p> <p>'2. Arrest—Order to Show Cause—Hearing op Application.</p> <p>Where a justice, who hears and grants an order for arrest, issues an order to show cause why the order of arrest should not be vacated, that the application was thereafter passed on by another justice does not affect its validity.</p>

<p>Appeal from special term, New York county.</p> <p>Action by John Volz against David Steiner. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from special term, New York county.</p> <p>Action by Harry P. Crowell against Herbert J. Truesdell. From: an interlocutory judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals..</p>

<p>Appeal from trial term, New York county.</p> <p>Action by Louis H. Lehmeyer against Moses H. Moses. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff,, defendant appeals.</p>

Action by Robert R. Sizer against the Hampton & Branchville Railroad & Lumber Company. From an order denying defendant’s motion to vacate an attachment on the papers on which it was granted, defendant appeals.

Action by Charles Johnson, by his guardian ad litem, against the Yellow Pine Company. From a judgment dismissing the complaint and from an order denying a new trial, plaintiff appeals.

Action by Henry R. C. Watson against the city of New York. From a judgment in favor of defendant (70 N. Y. Supp. 1033), plaintiff appeals. The action was brought under section 1638 of the Code of Civil Procedure to determine the title to real estate.

Action by Caroline Roosevelt Stieffel and others against Charles H. Tolhurst and others. From a judgment sustaining demurrers to •certain defenses contained in defendants’ answer, defendants appeal.

Proceeding by Herbert P. Biss ell, receiver, before the board of claims, for allowance of a claim against the state. From a judgment dismissing the claim, plaintiff appeals.

Action by Annie E. O’Sullivan, administratrix, against JosepBi A. Flynn and another, a copartnership. One of the defendants having died, the action was continued against the surviving partner.. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.

Action by John Laird against Henry Wittlcowski and another, ■on a bond secured by a mortgage, to recover a deficiency remaining after the sale of the mortgaged property. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and an order denying a new trial, the defend-. ants appeal. The action was brought to recover upon a bond accompanying a purchase-.money mortgage for $2,000.

Action by John S. Baird and others, as trustees of the will of John Baird, deceased, against Kate F. Allen and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs, and from an order denying a new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed. John C. Shaw, for appellants. William R. Wilder, for respondents.

<p>Action by John S. Allen against Frank X. Kelley, as administrator, etc.</p>

<p>Action by Lee S. Bair against Anton Hilbert. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed. George Ryall, for appellant. Joseph J. Robinson, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by Catharine Coffey against the New York Central & Hudson. River Railroad Company.</p>

<p>Action by the Central Presbyterian Church of Buffalo against Alice Palmer.</p>

<p>Action by Edward Curry against the New York and Queens County Railway Company.</p>

<p>Action by Frank P. Cooper, as trustee, etc., against James M. Heatberton, trustee, etc., and others.</p>

<p>Action by Horace H. Dibble against lie state of New York. From an order of the board of claims, plaintiff appeals. Motion to dismiss denied.</p>

<p>Action by Lotta S. M. Dobson and Alexandra Sherlock against Dr. B. J. Kay Medical Company.</p>

<p>Action by Joseph Dovfman, an infant, etc., against Frank Goldstein.</p>

In the matter of the application of Edward Finnerty for an order directing the board of registry of the First election district of the borough and county of Richmond to convene and strike from the registry of said district certain names.

<p>Action by Jacob Fingerman against the Bay State Clothing Company. From an order denying defendant’s motion to open its default at the trial of the case, it appeals. Reversed on terms. Morris H. Hay-man for appellant. Robert H. Roy, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by Walter Harrington against the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company.</p>

In the matter of the accounting of George E. Halloek, as one of the executors of the last will and testament of Jeremiah Petty, deceased.

<p>Action by Mary R. Hammond against Charles Nelson and others.</p>

<p>Ac-' tian by Rose Gordon against the Empire State Telephone & Telegraph Company.</p>

Action by Max Loewstein and others against the American Mineral Water Machine Company and others. From an order denying a motion for the appointment of a receiver and for an injunction pendente lite, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. E. Treadwell, for appellants. C. L. Kingsley, for respondents American Mineral Water Machine Co. and others. Leo G. Rosenblatt, for respondent Diamond Soda Water Mach. Co. B. Tuska, for respondent Rothschild and others.

<p>Action by Charles Lotherington against the Syracuse Rapid Transit Railway Company.</p>

<p>In the matter of the petition of John Ludlum, a citizen resident of the town of Yates, for an order for the removal of John Putnam Levy from his office as justice of the peace of the town of Yates.</p>

<p>Action by Christian J. Mahley against the German Bank of Buffalo, impleaded, etc.</p>

<p>Action by Jacob Marshall and another against Charles M. Friend and another.</p>

<p>Action by James A. McKenna against Charles A. Brown and John Fleming.</p>

<p>Action by Edward A. Morrison against the Metropolitan Elevated Railway Company and another. A. O. Townsend, for appellants. S. Dexter, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by Lena Miers against Samuel Miers. C. L. Hoffman, for appellant. A. Rosenthal, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by Edgar A. Tredwell against the city of New York. T. Connoly, for appellant. R. H. Wilson, for respondent.</p>

<p>Proceedings by the people of the state of New York against Donald Sinclair.</p>

<p>Motion for leave to go to the court of appeals. Granted. For the opinion of the appellate division, see 70 N. Y. Supp. 500. James M. Ward., for the motion. D. Willcox, opposed.</p>

Proceedings by the people of the state of New York, on the relation of John F. McIntyre, against Bird S. Ooler, comptroller, etc. G. W. Schumann, for appellant. J. M. Stearns, for respondent.

<p>Proceedings by the people of the state of New York, on the relation of the Levant Emery Company, against Erastus C. Knight, as comptroller of the state of New York.</p>

<p>Certiorari by the people of the state .of New York, on the relation of Louise North, against James D. Featheistonliaugh and others, members of and constituting the public improvement commission of the city of Co-hoes, and, another, to review their determination as to the nature of a street improvement and the proportion of the expense chargeable against abutting owners. Affirmed.</p>

<p>Action by Caroline Quade against Peter Bertsch and another.</p>

Suit by R. Hudnut’s Pharmacy against Joseph Tankard. From an older denying a motion for an injunction, complainant appeals. Affirmed. E. S. White, for appellant. S. Riker, Jr., for respondent.

<p>Action by the St. Regis Paper Company against the Santa Clara Lumber Company.</p>

<p>Action by James R. Russell against the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company.</p>

<p>Action by John Sparhawk, as trustee, in bankruptcy of Charles M. Stoever, bankrupt, against the Gillin Printing Company. From an order directing service by defendant of a bill of particulars, defendant appeals. Modified. J. Cochrane, for appellant. W. Greenough, for respondent.</p>

<p>Action by Hinman S. Taylor and another against William Daly.</p>

<p>Action by Jacob H. Weberlowsky against Ilirsch Raps. See 72 N. Y. Supp. 1134. Max 1-Iallheimer, for appellant Abraham B. Schleimer, for respondent</p>

<p>Action 'by William H. Vedder and others against Harvey Leamon.</p>