State v. Hill’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 266 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 269 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In propositions of law Nos. Ill and IV, Hill asserts he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and before the court of appeals. In proposition No. Ill, Hill complains because his counsel did not object at trial to the. verdict form or the prosecutorial misstatements, as discussed ■ in , propositions Nos. I and II.... Reversal of a conviction or sentence based on ineffective assistance requires meeting the two-prong standard of Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . Strickland requires: (a) deficient performance, “errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment”; and (b) prejudice, “errors ... so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 . Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 . However, Hill fails to demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice. Hill’s counsel reasonably decided not to object to the prosecutor’s brief, inaccurate comments. Objections “ ‘tend to disrupt the flow of a trial [and] are considered technical and bothersome[.]’ ” State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 38 , 630 N.E.2d 339 , 352. A decision not to interrupt because of such imprecise statements reflected “an objective standard of reasonable representation.” See State v. Bradley, at paragraph, two of the syllabus. Also, counsel could have believed the trial cou”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hill v. Mitchell · State v. Morris, Unpublished Decision (3-16-2005)

2. “In proposition of law No. X, Hill argues plain error because the trial court did not, sua sponte, instruct the jury to consider Hill’s cocaine intoxication in deciding either his guilt or the recommended penalty.... We reject [this] proposition ]. First, Hill failed to request any instruction as to the effect of intoxication. Thus, Hill waived all but plain error. State v. Underwood, [ 444 N.E.2d 1332 (Ohio 1983) ], at syllabus; Crim.R. 30(A), 52(B). The evidence of Hill’s guilt, as well as the evidence supporting the death penalty, negates any claim that “but for the error,” the trial result “clearly would have been otherwise.” State v. Underwood, syllabus. Second, we have traditionally recognized a trial judge's discretion as to whether to instruct a jury on intoxication as a defense. See State v. Fox (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 53 , 428 N.E.2d 410 ; Nichols v. State (1858), 8 Ohio St. 435 , paragraph two of the syllabus. As Nichols stated at 439, we will not impose a requirement for a trial judge to so instruct a jury, since “[ijntoxication is easily simulated” and “often voluntarily induced for the sole purpose of nerving a wicked heart[J” Moreover, the evidence does not reasonably raise the intoxication issue. “[Ijn-toxication is not raised as a defense to the element of purpose in a criminal prosecution merely because the evidence suggests reduced inhibitions, impaired judgment or blurred appreciation by the defendant of the consequences of his conduct.” State v. Hicks (1989)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hill v. Mitchell · State v. Eck, 08ap-675 (3-10-2009)

3. “fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of his trial.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Walters · State v. Haymon, Unpublished Decision (6-28-2006)