73 So. 3d 1162 - DOUBLE QUICK, INC. v. Moore’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “P-14 If you find that there was not an atmosphere of violence in the premises but you find that conditions existed on the premises that gave Diamondhead Resort, LLC actual/constructive notice that a violent crime would occur, you should find for the Plaintiff. D-3 Proximate cause is defined as the cause which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause has two separate and distinct concepts: 1) cause in fact: and 2) foreseeability. In this case, Diamond-head’s negligence is the cause in fact of Margaret Magers’[s] injury if, but for Diamondhead’s negligence, ... Mag-ers’[s] injury would not have occurred. Foreseeability means cause to anticipate a third party’s actions. Cause to anticipate an assault, such as in this case, may be established by: (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the third party’s violent nature, in [this] case Alfredo Mongoy Cruz, or (2) actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence existed on Diamond-head’s premises. Evidence supporting the existence of an atmosphere of violence ... on Diamondhead’s premises may include the overall pattern of criminal activity prior to the night of June 23, 2011 [,] and the early morning of June 24, 2011, as well as the frequency of criminal activity on Diamondhead’s premises. You are instructed that in order to establish that Diamondhead’s conduct was the proximate cause of ...”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Margaret Magers v. Diamondhead Resort, LLC · Cade v. Beard

2. “An invitee is a person who enters the premises of another in response to an express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual advantage. A licensee enters the premises for his own convenience, pleasure, or benefit pursuant to the license or implied permission. A trespasser enters the premises without license, invitation, or other right. Under Mississippi law, a property owner is not the insurer of an invitee’s safety. Rather, he owes a duty to the invitee to keep the premises reasonably safe and, when not reasonably safe, to warn only of hidden dangers not in plain and open view. Also, the duty owed to a licensee or trespasser is the same—not to willfully or wantonly injure such person.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Helene Benson v. Mack D. Rather · Debbie Jones v. Dragway Enterprises, Inc.