Grisar v. McDowell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 federal appellate · 23 district · 17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 129 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““But, further than this, from an early period in the history of the government it has been the practice of the President to order, from time to time, as the exigencies of the public service required, parcels of land. belonging to the United States to be reserved from sale and set apart for public uses. The authority of the President in this respect is recognized in numerous acts of Congress. Thus, in the Pre-emption Act of May 29, 1830, it is provided that the right of pre-emption contemplated by the act shall not ‘extend to any land which is reserved from sale by act of Congress, or by order of the President, or which may have been appropriated for any purpose whatever.’ Again, in the Pre-emption Act of September 4, 1841, ‘lands included in any reservation by any treaty, law, or proclamation of the President of the United States, or reserved for salines or for other purposes,’ are exempted from entry under the act. So by the act of March 8, 1853, providing for the survey of the public lands in California, and extending the pre-emption system to them, it is declared that all public lands in that state shall be subject to pre-emption, and offered at public sale, with certain specific exceptions, and among others ‘of lands appropriated under the authority of this act. or reserved by competent authority.’ The provisions in the acts of 1830 and 1841 show very clearly that by ‘competent authority’ is meant the authority of the President, and officers acting under his direction.””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States · United States v. Payne

2. ““By the laws of Mexico, which prevailed in California at the date of the conquest, pueblos or towns, when once established and officially recognized, were entitled for their benefit and the benefit of their inhabitants, to the use of lands, embracing the site of such pueblos or towns, and of adjoining lands within certain prescribed limits. This right, as we observed in Townsend v. Greeley, 5 Wall. 336 , appears to have been common to the cities and towns of Spain from an early period in her history, and was recognized in the laws and ordinances for the settlement and government of her colonies on this continent. The same general system of laws for the establishment and government of pueblos, and the assignment to them of lands that prevailed under Spain, was continued in Mexico, with but little variation, after her separation from th© mother country. These Isiws provided for the assignment to the pueblos, for their use and the use of their inhabitants, of land not exceeding in extent four square leagues. Such assignment was to be made by the public authorities of the government upon the original establishment of the pueblo, or afterwards upon the petition of its officers or inhabitants: and the land was to be measured off in a square or prolonged form, according to the nature and condition of the country. All lands within the general limits stated, which have previously become private property, or were required for public purposes, were reserved and excepted from the assignm”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Yeast v. Pru

3. ““By this act the government has expressed its precise will with respect to the claim of the city of San Francisco to her lands, as it was then recognized by the circuit court of the United States. In the execution of its treaty obligations with respect to property claimed under Mexican laws, the government may adopt such modes of procedure as it m.ay deem expedient. It may act by legislation directly upon the claims preferred, or it may provide a special board for their determination, or it may require their submission to the ordinary tribunals. It is the sole judge of the propriety of the mode, and, having the plenary power of confirmation, it may annex any conditions to the confirmation of a claim resting upon an imperfect right which it may choose. It may declare the action of the special board final; it may make it subject to appeal; it may require the appeal to go through one or more courts; and it may arrest the action of the board or courts at any stage.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Apis v. United States