¶1(concurring).
¶2Although I concur with the outcome reached by the majority, I disagree with the analysis of the claim of prosecutorial misconduct that is based on the cross-examination of Fields about his prior theft from an employer. I conclude that the notice and pretrial hearing requirements set forth in State v. Fallin were intended to be prerequisites to the admissibility of evidence of other bad acts under Minn. R. Evid. 608(b). 540 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 1995).
¶3In Fallin, we said that a prosecutor “generally may not cross-examine a defendant … about prior misconduct” unless the prosecutor has given notice, provided evidentiary support, and established that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. Id.We further held that the district court “erred in permitting this cross-examination” where these procedures had not been followed. Id.The words “may not cross-examine” and “the trial court erred in permitting this cross-examination” make it clear that the evidence is not admissible. And those words also lead me to conclude that a prosecutor who pursues cross-examination in violation of Fallin has committed misconduct.
¶4But, in Fallin we also held that the district court’s decision to permit the cross-examination was harmless error. Id.I would likewise hold that the brief cross-examination of Fields on the subject of his prior theft, in which he admitted to theft in general terms, was harmless error.