Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 732 F.2d 1048 - Wright v. United States

Wright v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

732 F.2d 1048 · 1984

Citation profile

68
cited by 68 later decisions
14
states following
December 2023
most recently cited

29 federal appellate · 2 district · 21 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 68 later decisions — most recently December 2023 · most notably United States v. Wallach (1991), 14 Cal. 4th 580 - People v. Eubanks (1996)

29 federal appellate · 2 district · 21 state decisions — followed in 14 states

29019841990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990) · 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 3500 · 18 U.S.C. § 371 · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · McNabb v. United States · Hill v. United States · Santoni v. United States · United States v. Addonizio

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “‘interest ... in bringing a defendant to justice with respect to the crime with which he is charged.’”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[T]he degree of prosecutorial misconduct ... and the degree of prejudice to the defendant necessary to justify action by a reviewing court steadily increase as the case goes forward, with the least being required on a motion to disqualify, somewhat more on a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment, still more on a motion in the district court after conviction but before appeal, [and] somewhat more on a direct appeal....”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Second, even if we interpret the facts most adversely to Wright's prosecutors, they were not utilizing the criminal process to advance their own pecuniary interests, such as the prosecutor's interest in Ganger `that the size of his fee would be determined by what could be exacted from defendant' in the divorce case, [ Ganger, supra, 379 F.2d] at 713. . . . Mrs. Puccio's interest, unlike Mrs. Ganger's, was not a pecuniary interest in utilizing the criminal process to further her position in civil litigation but a public one in the condemnation of a man whom she thought, whether for good reasons or for bad, to have violated the public trust. [Citation.] In short, this case, with the facts taken at their worst against the Government, does not present the spectacle of a prosecutor's using the `awful instruments of the criminal law' [citation] for purpose of private gain and, although we consider the choice of Puccio as prosecutor to have been ill advised, we do not regard it as having deprived Wright of due process of law.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.