Bailey v. Ness’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “second line of cases which the Pennsylvania state courts have relied upon consistently in their more recent decisions, however, [which] adopts the position that a judgment by a state court is considered final for res judicata or collateral estoppel purposes “unless or until it is reversed.” Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 61 Pa.Cmwlth. 325, 337 , 433 A.2d 620, 626 (1981) (citation omitted). See also Rheem v. The Naugatuck Wheel Co., 33 Pa. 356 (1859); Woodward v. Carson, 86 Pa. 176 (1878); In re Elkin, 289 Pa. 327 , 137 A. 459 (1927); Wallace’s Estate, 316 Pa. 148 , 174 A. 397 (1934); Helmig v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co., 389 Pa. 21 , 131 A.2d 622 , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 , 78 S.Ct. 46 , 2 L.Ed.2d 44 , reh. denied, 355 U.S. 885 , 78 S.Ct. 146 , 2 L.Ed.2d 115 (1957). To compound further the uncertainty in the state law, several federal courts have relied on this second line of cases when applying Pennsylvania law to cases with res judicata or collateral estoppel issues. See Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Pucci, 523 F.Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D.Pa.1981); Nash v. Reedel, 86 F.R.D. 13, 15 (E.D.Pa.1980); and In re Meade Land and Development Co., Inc., 1 B.R. 279, 283 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1979).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Schwartz v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America (In Re Kridlow)

2. “first line of cases [which] involves several early decisions holding that a state court judgment is not considered a final judgment for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel while an appeal is pending. See Souter v. Baymore, 7 Pa. 415 (1847); Smalls Appeal, 15 A. 807 , 23 W.N.C. 25 (1888); Columbia National Bank v. Dunn, 207 Pa. 548 , 56 A. 1087 (1904); and Bryar v. Campbell, 177 U.S. 649 , 20 S.Ct. 794 , 44 L.Ed. 926 (1900) (interpreting Pennsylvania law). Moreover, two recent federal court decisions have relied upon this interpretation of a final judgment. United States v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 495 F.Supp. 840, 842 (W.D.Pa.1980) and In re Levitt, 18 B.R. 595 , 598 n. 11 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Schwartz v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America (In Re Kridlow)

3. “A dismissal of a party’s suit, even without prejudice, simply does not protect the party from a statute of limitations problem should the state court proceedings take a long time. The possibility warrants a safeguarding of a party’s interest in being able to bring suit. Consequently, we believe that under such circumstances it is improper to dismiss a party’s claims; a proper course would be to stay the federal court proceedings until the state court proceedings have run their course or have run out of time in which to be brought.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. General Glass Industries Corp. v. Monsour Medical Foundation