Bernstein v. Bankert’s Empirical Analysis
733 F.3d 190 · 2012
Citation profile
18 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (§ 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980) · 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (§ 106 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980) · 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (§ 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980) · 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (§ 113 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980) · 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (§ 122 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980)
Relies on Powell v. McCormack · Federal Deposit Insurance v. Meyer · State of New Hampshire v. State of Maine · Guaranty Trust Co. v. York · Stone v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“are longer term, more permanent responses.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“[U]nder these circumstances, the statute under which the claim is brought does not determine the limitations period. Indeed, it cannot do so, because the statute under which the claim was brought did not have a limitations period. That is the root of the problem. What Peniel shows is that the underlying nature of the claim is what matters, a principle which is well-established in Indiana law. Specifically, the Peniel court found that a property damage claim brought under the ETA ... was governed by the statute of limitations for property damages. That makes sense, given the nature of the claim. But not every ETA claim is one for property damages. In this case, for example, the Trustees have no proprietary interest in [the contaminated site]. The [defendants] do. There is no plausible legal theory under which we might find that the Trustees are suing the [defendants] — who are the only parties with a proprietary interest in [the contaminad ed site] — for damages to the real property at [the contaminated site]. Neither the “nature or substance” of this ETA claim shows that it is an action for property damages, and the property damages- limitations period therefore does not apply.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.