Akers v. Baldwin’s Empirical Analysis
1987
Citation profile
6 federal appellate · 14 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 22 later decisions — most recently April 2018
6 federal appellate · 14 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (Abandoned Mine Reclamation Act of 1990) · 30 U.S.C. § 1257
Relies on Stewart v. Chernicky · Hilen v. Hays · 129 W. Va. 832 - West Virginia - Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong · Scott v. Laws · Payne v. City of Covington
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(2) In any instrument heretofore or hereafter executed purporting to sever the surface and mineral estates or to grant a mineral estate or to grant a right to extract minerals, which fails to state or describe in express and specific terms the method of coal extraction to be employed, or where said instrument contains language subordinating the surface estate to the mineral estate, it shall be held, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, that the intention of the parties to the instrument was that the coal be extracted only by the method or methods of commercial coal extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument was executed, and that the mineral estate be dominant to the surface estate for the purposes of coal extraction by only the method or methods of commercial coal extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument was executed.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“The somewhat apocryphal term ‘broad form deed’ is loosely defined as a conveyance which severs the mineral estate from the surface estate and which has a long and tedious description of granted rights as opposed to those mineral deeds which grant only necessary and convenient mining rights, or no mining rights at all. It is a particular, if not unique, form of deed which normally conveys all of the minerals under the surface. It. may, however, list only certain specific substances. Additionally, such a deed conveys — specifically to the grantee— surface rights the grantee deems necessary or convenient for the full and free exercise and enjoyment of the minerals conveyed. Some deeds, if not most, contain an express waiver of liability for damages arising from the grantee’s use of the surface in obtaining the minerals. Lastly, most such deeds reserve to the grantor only such surface rights as may be consistent with the mineral rights conveyed.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“Undoubtedly, under the plain terms of the deed, the Marian Coal Co. has the right and could, by showing the necessity or convenience thereof, use and occupy the whole surface of the land in question even to excluding the plaintiff and taking his house and garden, but such taking would have to be after satisfaction or adjudged compensation for such improvements, which is but another way of saying that the mineral estate under the deed is dominant, superior and exclusive in every circumstance or condition where the owner thereof shall deed it necessary or convenient to make such use of the surface as the deed allows.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.