State v. Washington’s Empirical Analysis
2007
Citation profile
14 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently December 2024
14 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Pennsylvania v. Mimms · Cady v. Dombrowski · Maryland v. Wilson · Maryland v. Pringle
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[I]nvestigative stops of automobiles and their occupants for suspected violations of law may be upheld if an officer has at least a reasonable suspicion that the motorist has violated the law or probable cause to believe the motorist has done so. State v. Westmiller, 2007 ND 52, ¶ 9 , 730 N.W.2d 134 . In Westmiller , at ¶ 10, we explained the minimum standard to justify a stop: Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch. State v. Smith, 2005 ND 21, ¶ 15 , 691 N.W.2d 203 . Reasonable suspicion for a stop exists when a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect potential unlawful activity. Johnson v. Sprynczynatyk, 2006 ND 137, ¶ 9 , 717 N.W.2d 586 ; Smith , at ¶ 15. The reasonable suspicion standard is objective and does not hinge upon the subjective beliefs or motivations of the arresting officer. State v. Leher, 2002 ND 171, ¶ 11 , 653 N.W.2d 56 . In order to determine whether an investigative stop is valid, we consider the totality of the circumstances and examine the information known to the officer at the time of the stop. Gabel [v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp.], 2006 ND 178, ¶ 11 , 720 N.W.2d 433 ; State v. Torkelsen, 2006 ND 152, ¶ 13 , 718 N.W.2d 22 . The reasonable suspicion standard does not require an officer to rule out every possible innocent excuse for the behavior in question before stopping a vehicle for investigation. State v. Decoteau, 2004 ND 139, ¶ 14 , 681 N.W.2d 803 .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The Court would agree that in order to approach the vehicle there had to be reasonable suspicion. I think there was reasonable suspicion. In order to open the door or have someone open the door, I think at that point you need probable cause for the search of the vehicle. The Court's view is that there was enough evidence known to law enforcement at the time to give them probable cause to search the vehicle. That evidence would be as pointed out by the State. A burglar alarm had sounded. The officer arrived a few minutes after the alarm call. The only vehicle that was seen at the scene is this white Oldsmobile. The time of day, 4:20 a.m. The vehicle stopped abruptly and parked, turned the lights out; enough for there to be reasonable suspicion to approach the vehicle. When the officers approached the occupants were non-responsive. They could observe Officer Little testified he observed someone laying in the backseat. Apparently the person laying on the floorboard of the front was not observed but someone was observed in the vehicle and this was not just one or two minutes, this was 10-15 minutes. The officers Officer Little testified he announced himself, whether he shouted or announced himself I think it was pretty clear that they were tapping, pounding on the vehicle, announcing themselves. When you get no response I think that was additional evidence that something is amiss here. Putting all of the pieces together at that point there was probable cause to search the veh”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Washington“We believe the officers could reasonably form the belief that the person lying in the back seat, if not in need of assistance, was attempting to avoid detection. We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances at this point, the law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest the individual lying in the back seat, not only for physical obstruction of government function under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-01 and preventing arrest or discharge of other duties under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-02, but for the burglary that had occurred at the bar. [¶ 16]”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Washington
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.