United States v. Ko’s Empirical Analysis
739 F.3d 558 · 2014
Citation profile
4 federal appellate ·
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3621 · 18 U.S.C. § 3624 · 18 U.S.C. § 3731 · 18 U.S.C. § 4041 · 18 U.S.C. § 4082 · 18 U.S.C. § 751
Relies on Watt v. Alaska · United States v. Wilson · Muscarello v. United States · Dolan v. United States Postal Service · United States v. Husted
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Home confinement is analogous to custody in a halfway house. Like a prisoner in a halfway house, Mr. Ko was not free to come and go as he pleased—his confinement required him to remain in his home from 7:00 p.m. each night until he was permitted to go to work the following morning.... Mr. Ko argues that by “[b]eing allowed to live in the comfort of [his] own home and to be away for work or other approved activities,” he was not subject to a “quantum of restraint” necessary for “custody.” However comfortable Mr. Ko may have found the arrangement, the BOP did not intend it to be anything less than an extension of his imprisonment. In Mr. Ko’s case, imprisonment entailed constant monitoring, a monitoring bracelet, and spatial and temporal bounds. In that way, the restrictions on his life in home confinement were sufficiently limiting so as to constitute custody under § 751.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“In Sack ... [w]e concluded that, although a halfway house entails fewer restrictions than prison, “the restrictions of life at a halfway house are sufficiently limiting so as to constitute custody for the purposes of § 751.” Sack, 379 F.3d at 1179 n. 1. In so holding, this court referenced only one restriction—the inability “to come and go at will.” Id. (quoting United States v, Swanson, 253 F.3d 1220 , 1224 (10th Cir.2001)). Likewise, this court in United States v. De-pew, concluded that a federal prisoner, who was in transit between two state facilities on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, was in § 751 custody. 977 F.2d 1412 , 1414 (10th Cir.1992). We held that § 751 custody “does not require direct physical restraint.” Id. In fact, § 751 custody “may be minimal and, indeed, may be constructive.” Id.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative, or from any institution or facility in which he is confined by direction of the Attorney General, or from any custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or magistrate judge, or from the custody of an officer or employee of the United States pursuant to lawful arrest, shall, if the custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, or conviction of any offense, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years....”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.