Cadle Co. v. Moore’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “§ 1334(c)(2) explains the conditions under which a district court must abstain from hearing a bankruptcy case: Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Apache Corp. v. Castex Offshore, Inc. (In re Castex Energy Partners, LP) · Henderson v. Bank of America, N.A. (In re Simmons)

2. “Article III of the Constitution places certain constraints on the statutory powers of bankruptcy courts. The Supreme Court recently clarified these Article III constraints in Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594 , 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011). The Court held that notwithstanding the bankruptcy court’s statutory authority under § 157(b)(2)(C) to adjudicate an estate’s counterclaim against a creditor, the bankruptcy court had no constitutional authority to enter final judgment on a state-law counterclaim because it would “not [be] resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.” Id. at 2620; see also In re Frazin, 732 F.3d [313] at 317-320 [ (5th Cir.2013) ]. Cadle contends that under Stem, the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter final judgment because the avoidance action originated from and is based entirely upon state law and is thus wholly independent of the bankruptcy proceeding. We disagree. The bankruptcy court had authority to enter final judgment because Cadle’s state-law claims “would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process.” Id. at 2618. In Stem, the trustee asserted counterclaims to augment the estate apart from the bankruptcy proceeding. Here, Cadle is a creditor who has filed a proof of claim for debts owed by the debtor, and resolving the state-law claims is necessary to adjudicating its proof of claim. Such claims by creditors against debtors are the very reason the claims allowance process exists. Cf. In ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Henderson v. Bank of America, N.A. (In re Simmons)

3. “(i) the claim has no independent basis for federal jurisdiction other than § 1334(b) ; (ii) the claim is a non-core proceeding ...; (iii) an action has been commenced in state court; and (iv) the action could be adjudicated timely in state court.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Apache Corp. v. Castex Offshore, Inc. (In re Castex Energy Partners, LP)