Johnson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “I would ask that there be an application paragraph of the law of parties in the case and I think I would ask that it read: If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the date this offense occurred in this county and state while in the course of committing theft of personal property did intentionally and knowingly place Kensley Robinson in fear of imminent bodily injury or death by exhibiting a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, with intent to obtain it from him. It basically tracks, you know, tracks that language in that Chris Dennis did then and there acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, if any, aid Roderick McGee to commit the offense, if any, by his own actions in the commission of said offense, if any. Basically kind of adding the application paragraph. In response to Dennis’s request, the court stated: THE COURT: Talking about the application paragraph as to the law of parties. Where is that in here? MR. SKEEN: [District Attorney] Judge, the law of parties is further on down in the charge. It starts down at the bottom of page six. It actually just comes — it is sort of down in the boiler plate part. Starts at the bottom of page six, and if he is asking for some type of application to the facts, I submit to the court that it is not required under the law. The court is clearly charging the jury on the law of the parties and that is all that is required. It contains the full law of parties as set out in the Pena”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Dennis v. State · Marvis v. State

2. “"All persons are parties to an offense who are guilty of acting together in the commission of the offense. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both. A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Mere presence alone will not constitute one a party to an offense."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Vasquez v. State · Walker v. State

3. “In footnote 2 of Black v. State, supra, the Govan v. State, 682 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)] test for harm was harmonized with our opinion in Alman-za. Judge Teague argued in dissent that so long as evidence raises the issue of guilt of the accused under the law of parties, it should be reversible error not to apply that law to the facts, irrespective of whether the evidence might also “clearly support” his conviction as a primary actor: “In the face of a timely and specific objection, such as the one interposed in this case, a showing of ‘some harm’ has been demonstrated because there is a logical possibility, supported by evidence, that the jury convicted [defendant] upon a theory of vicarious culpability without being expressly informed of the facts it must find before doing so. The rule in Govan precludes a finding of harm in such context.” 723 S.W.2d at 683 . Speaking for the majority in rejecting this “logical possibility” conception of “some harm” under Almanza , Judge Campbell opined that, on the contrary, it would be illogical to presume that, confronted by evidence an accused was the primary actor in commission of an offense, a jury would choose nevertheless to proceed upon a theory of parties simply because that theory also had some support in the evidence. Instead the Court advocated the kind of “examination of the entire record” called for in Almanza, supra, whereby: “ ... the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tate v. State