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74 Conn. 198

50 A 394

Murphy v. Murphy

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Decided November 21, 1901

Supreme Court of Connecticut · decided 1901-11-21

Action to recover the amount of a promissory note for $600, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New London County and tried to the court, Noyes, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $175 damages, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““We think the facts fairly justify treating the note secured by the mortgage as a collateral security for an existing indebtedness of $175. Such a security gave the plaintiff not only the right to appropriate the laud pledged for the satisfaction of the principal indebtedness, but, also the right to whatever advantage there might be in the ability to sue the defendant upon the note given as security as well as upon the principal debt. In re Waddell-Entz Co., 67 Conn. 324 , 334 [ 35 Atl. 257 ].””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Hitner v. Diamond State Steel Co.

Relies on In re Waddell-Entz Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

No error · Decided 1901-11-21

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently January 1999

5 state decisions

401901191019201930194019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Hamersley, J.

¶1 The substance of the defendant’s claim is that the court erred in holding, upon the facts found, that the plaintiff was entitled to sue upon the note. If any reasonable inference from these facts will support the action, the judgment should be sustained. We think the facts fairly justify treating the note secured by the mortgage as a collateral security for an existing indebtedness of $175. Such a security gave the plaintiff not only the right to appropriate the land pledged for the satisfaction of the principal indebtedness, but also the right to whatever advantage there might be in the ability to sue the defendant upon the note given as security, as well as upon the principal debt. In re Waddell-Entz Co., 67 Conn. 324, 334.

¶2 If the purpose of the defendant in putting the lien upon his land was fraudulent, as he now claims, so as to invalidate-the mortgage deed, that fraud, in which the plaintiff did not' participate, does not deprive him of his right to sue upon the note; and upon such suit he is entitled to recover at least the amount due upon his principal indebtedness. The defendant cannot complain if the amount recovered was too small.

¶3 Upon the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence the note *201 upon which suit was brought, and the defendant objected, on the ground of variance between it and the note described in the complaint: the note offered in evidence containing a promise to pay taxes, while the complaint contained no reference to taxes. The court overruled the objection and the defendant duly excepted.

¶4 The plaintiff did not seek to recover damages for a failure to pay taxes ; the note offered in evidence supported the allegations of the complaint, and the variance between it and the description in the complaint was immaterial. The objection was properly overruled.

¶5 The plaintiff testified upon his examination-in-chief that the note was due and held by him. The defendant’s counsel upon cross-examination sought to prove by the plaintiff the fact of payment and other matters of defense. The court excluded questions asked for this purpose, on the ground that they related to the defendant’s case. The defendant duly excepted to these rulings. Subsequently the plaintiff was called as a witness by the defendant, and was fully inquii-ed of as to the matters referred to.

¶6 The order of testimony, and the cross-examination of a plaintiff’s witness for the purpose of establishing the defendant’s case, are largely within the discretion of a trial court. The defendant was not injured by the exercise of that discretion as stated in the finding.

¶7 There is no error in the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.

¶8 In this opinion the other judges concurred.

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