¶1James H. Mathers and James C. Mathers, both of Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellant.
¶2Wm. C. Lewis, U. S. Atty., of Oklahoma City, Okl. (Geo. E. Massey, Jr., Asst. U: S. Atty., of Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for the United States.
¶3Before PHILLIPS and BRATTON, Circuit Judges, and POLLOCK, District Judge.
¶5Bailey was convicted o£ conspiracy to violate 18 USCA § 408a.1 He was sentenced *452“to the custody of the Attorney-General of the United States, or his authorized representative, for confinement in a United States Penitentiary, during the term of his natural life.”
¶6What purports to be a motion for a directed verdict, the ruling thereon, and the charge of the court to the jury, are set forth in the transcript, but they are not contained in the bill of exceptions. Alleged errors predicated thereon are not open to review here. Shepard v. United States (C. C. A. 10) 64 F.(2d) 641, reversed on other grounds 290 U. S. 96, 54 S. Ct. 22, 78 L. Ed. 196; Addis v. United States (C. C. A. 10) 62 F.(2d) 329, 330. See, also, Kern v. United States (C. C. A. 10) 74 F.(2d) 450 (filed Dec. 3, 1934).
¶7In Addis v. United States, supra, this court said:
“Motions for a directed verdict, requests for a peremptory charge, instructions given and instructions refused in criminal and law actions are not a part of the record proper, which consists of the pleadings, process, verdict, and judgment. Buessel v. United States (C. C. A. 2) 258 F. 811, 815; Clune v. United States, 159 U. S. 590, 593, 594, 16 S. Ct. 125, 40 L. Ed. 269; United States v. Taylor, 147 U. S. 695, 698, 699, 13 S. Ct. 479, 37 L. Ed. 335; Blake v. United States (C. C. A. 1) 71 F. 286; Metropolitan R. Co. v. Columbia, 195 U. S. 322, 332, 25 S. Ct. 28, 49 L. Ed. 219; Eldorado Coal & Min. Co. v. Marietti (C. C. A. 7) 215 F. 51, 54; Suydam v. Williamson, 20 How. 427, 433, 437, 15 L. Ed. 978. A statement in the transcript of the record that certain instructions were given, or requested and refused, or that a motion for a directed verdict was made and denied, over the certificate of the clerk, avails nothing. Such matters can be brought upon the record only by a proper bill of exceptions. Stockton v. Bishop, 4 How. 155, 166, 11 L. Ed. 918; Metropolitan R. Co. v. Columbia, supra; Clune v. United States, supra. Since it does not appear from the bill of exceptions that motions for directed verdicts were duly made and denied, we are precluded from passing upon the assignments of error predicated thereon.”
¶8The sentence to the custody of the Attorney-General for confinement in a United States penitentiary was proper under 18 USCA § 753f and 18 USCA § 831.2 Aderhold v. Edwards (C. C. A. 5) 71 F.(2d) 297.
¶9The statute prescribes as punishment for the offense, “imprisonment in the penitentiary for such term of years as the court, in its discretion, shall determine.”
¶10It is our opinion that Congress did not use the phrase “term of years” in the technical sense attributable to it when applied to estate in lands. Life being of limited duration and death being certain, a sentence for life is definite and certain. It is tantamount to a sentence for a definite term of years greater than the possible life span of the person sentenced. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 448.
¶11The fixing of penalties for crimes is a legislative function. What constitutes an adequate penalty is a matter of legislative judgment and discretion, and the courts will not interfere therewith 'unless the penalty *453prescribed is clearly and manifestly cruel and unusual.3
¶12Where the sentence imposed is within the limits prescribed by the statute for the offense committed, it ordinarily will not be regarded as cruel and unusual. Jackson v. United States (C. C. A. 9) 102 F. 473, 487; Tincher v. United States (C. C. A. 4) 11 F.(2d) 18, 21; Bailey v. United States (C. C. A. 7) 284 F. 126; Jackson v. United States (C. C. A. 3) 72 F.(2d) 764. See also Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed. 793, 19 Ann. Cas. 705.
¶13Kidnaping is a heinous offense. A sentence to life imprisonment for transporting a kidnaped victim in interstate commerce, or for conspiracy so to transport a kidnaped person, is not, in our opinion, cruel and unusual punishment within the constitutional inhibition (Const. Amend. 8).
¶14 The power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to prohibit its use to facilitate wrongful and injurious acts or practices. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 323, 33 S. Ct. 281, 57 L. Ed. 523, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 906, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 905; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 491, 37 S. Ct. 192, 197, 61 L. Ed. 442, L. R. A. 1917F, 502, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168; Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345, 69 L. Ed. 699, 37 A. L. R. 1407; Clark Drilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326, L. R. A. 1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845; Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325, 36 S. Ct. 131, 60 L. Ed. 308, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 317.
¶15In Caminetti v. United States, supra, the court said:
“The authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.”
¶16To prohibit the use of the channels of interstate commerce to facilitate the crime of kidnaping is clearly within the power of Congress.
¶17The judgment is affirmed.