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← 74 F.3d 1545 - Hamilton v. Schriro

Hamilton v. Schriro’s Empirical Analysis

74 F.3d 1545 · 1996

Citation profile

117
cited by 117 later decisions
3
states following
August 2015
most recently cited

50 federal appellate · 22 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 117 later decisions — most recently August 2015 · most notably Jolly v. Coughlin (1996), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catholic University of America (1996)

50 federal appellate · 22 district · 4 state decisions

530199620002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1973B (§ 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000B

Relies on Bell v. Wolfish · Singleton v. Wulff · Turner v. Safley · Cantwell v. State of Connecticut · Wisconsin v. Yoder

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 117 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
    8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “[T]he committee expects that the courts will continue the tradition of giving due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[PJrison officials testified that prison security requires them to prevent inmates from concealing contraband in their long hair and identifying with a particular gang. The prison officials also testified that preventing male inmates from growing their hair longer than collar length is the least restrictive way to achieve that goal because no viable alternatives exist. It is more than merely “eminently reasonable” for a maximum security prison to prohibit inmates from having long hair in which they could conceal contraband and weapons. It is compelling. Further, it is important for prison administrators to prevent inmates from identifying with particular gangs through their hair style. The safety and security concerns expressed by prison officials were based on their collective experience of administering correctional facilities. These are valid and weighty concerns. Moreover, there is no viable less restrictive means of addressing these concerns. Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred in its interpretation and application of the least restrictive means prong of the compelling interest test in RFRA. The district court failed to give due deference to the prison officials’ testimony that long hair presented a risk to prison safety and security and that no viable less restrictive means of achieving that goal existed.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.