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74 Fla. 1

Cason v. Florida Power Co.

Supreme Court of Florida

Decided June 7, 1917

Supreme Court of Florida · decided 1917-06-07

<p>I. The inalienable rights that all men have of acquiring, possessing and protecting property under the constitution, is subject to the implied limitation imposed by the- principles of government deduced from the organic law, that human rights and obligations are reciprocal |am'ong individuals, and that by due course of law private rights yield to the requirements of the public welfare.</p> <p>2. All property is owned and used subject to the laws of the land. Under our system of government property may be used as its owner desires within the limitations imposed by law for the protection. of the public and private rights of others.</p> <p>3. Those who own real estate may use- it as desired so long |as the rights of others are not thereby invaded. And there is no such invasion when the use is authorized by law and is reasonable with reference to the rights of others.</p> <p>4. Legality and reasonableness -in the-use of property, as such use affects the public and private rights of others, mark the limitations of the owner’s rights.</p> <p>5. The reasonableness of the use of property by its owner, must of necessity be determined from the facts and circumstances of particular cases as they arise, by the application of appropriate provisions or principles of law |and the dictates of mutual or reciprocal justice.</p> <p>6. Property owned by one party may be so situated and conditioned with reference to the property of another as that the rights of ownership and the uses 'of such properties are interdependent or correlative. In such cases each owner should so reasonably use his property as not to injure the property rights of others.</p> <p>7. The property rights relative to the passage of waters that naturally percolate through the land of 'one owner to and through the land of another owner are correlative; and each land owner is restricted to a reasonable use of his property as it affects subsurface waters passing to or from the land of another.</p> <p>8. Where a riparian owner by erecting and maintaining a dam across a stream raises the level 'of the stream so that the flow of percolating wlaters from the adjoining lands of another owner are obstructed, and because of the dam the waters from the stream percolate through the land of the riparin owner into such adjoining land causing its subsurface waters to rise and remain so near the surface as to injure the land and the improvements and crops thereon, such use by the riparian owner of the land and waters may be unreasonable with reference to the rights of the adjoining land owner, and the party erecting |and maintaining the dam may be liable in damages for such injuries to the adjoining property as are proximately caused by the dam; and the questions of unreasonable use and resulting damages should be submitted to the jury upon appropriate instructions, when there is any substantial evidence to sustain the issue.</p> <p>9. Where there is some substantial evidence tending to prove the issue for the plaintiff, a verdict should not be directed ■ for the defendant.</p>

Relies on Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co. · Meeker v. City of East Orange · Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Judgment reversed · Decided 1917-06-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 22 later decisions — most recently August 2005

20 state decisions

601917192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Ellis, J.,

¶1Concurring. — The trial judge directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. The declaration alleged that the plaintiff’s land was located near a river; that the defendant built a dam in the river below plaintiff’s land which obstructed the flow of the waters to such an extent that the water level in the river opposite the plaintiff’s land Avas raised, Avhiclx prevented the natural subterranean drainage of the plaintiff’s land and the Avaters from the river percolating and seeping through the ground have saturated the plaintiff’s land so that it is unfit for cultivation or for any useful .purpose, and the same has been rendered a total loss to the plaintiff: A demurrer -to the declaration was overruled. There was a plea of not guilty and that the injury resulted from natural causes beyond defendant’s control; that the plaintiff’s injury was due to his oavu neglect and that no damage was sustained by reason of the defendant’s acts. A “second amended additional plea” averred that the dam was constructed under lawful authority granted to defendant by the United States government; that the defendant is and at the time the water was raised in the river was the owner of the land overflowed and covered by the Avaters of the river, and that the defendant is using the same in a laAvful and reasonable manner. There was a *10motion to strike this plea which was denied, wlieréupon thfe plaintiff joined issue upon the pleas and went to trial. This action of the court is made the basis of the, second assignment of error.

¶2The plea differed from a former plea which was held to be bad on demurrer only in the averment that the defendant was the owner of the land overflowed and covered by the' waters of the river. Now the plea presented the following points urged in avoidance of the liability for the injury which the plaintiff alleged had occurred; First, the dam was built under authority from the Federal Government; second, the lands overflowed and covered by the (impounded) waters of the river belonged to the defendant, and, third, that the defendant was “using the same (waters) only in a lawful and reasonable manner.”

¶3The third statement is clearly a conclusion of law, and by no means follows as a consequence of the first statement. Because it cannot be contended- that the Federal Government by permitting one to construct a dam in a navigable waterway thereby absolves the favored one from all liability for injury resulting from the saturation and overflow of another’s land lying adjacent. The defendant may defend his position upon the doctrine of “reasonable user,” but such defense must consist of averments of fact showing a reasonable user, and not conclusions of law. What in any case is a reasonable use is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact to be submitted to the jury under proper instruction from the court. Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N. H. 569; Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N. J. L. 623, 74 Atl. Rep. 379, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465.

¶4The second statement constitutes no defense whatever if the doctrine of “reasonable user” obtains in this State instead of the English rule of absolute ownership. The question presented by this case has not been settled by *11any adjudication in this court. The case of Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 South. Rep. 780, dealt with a well defined subterranean stream and the maxim “sic utere tuo ut non alienum laedas” was held to apply.’ The declaration in this case is so framed that the defendant is charged, first, with obstructing the natural subterranean drainage of the plaintiff’s land, and, second, with causing the pent up waters of the river to percolate or seep into and through the plaintiff’s land, in either case causing the land to become saturated with water and unfit for cultivation. The plaintiff was not a riparian owner, his land was not bounded upon the stream, he therefore could not call in question the defendant’s right to overflow the whole surface of its land Up to its line, provided the water did not flow upon or soak into the plaintiff’s land, but the declaration alleged that is what happened; the plea, therefore, was no defense.

¶5As to that phase of the declaration which complains in substamce that the plaintiff’s land drained into and through the defendant’s land adjoining and thence to the river, and that the defendant by damming the waters of the river obstructed the percolation of the surface waters, the plea is utterly inapplicable and constitutes no defense, because it admits in the second statement the very thing which constitutes the plaintiff’s cause of action, viz, the stopping or obstructing the flow of subsurface waters on the plaintiff’s land, which percolated in subsurface streams and veins through the defendant’s land to the river, by overflowing or covering its land with water to such a height as to prevent the natural drainage of the plaintiff’s land by percolation. Under the doctrine of correlative rights to the control of subsurface waters and the doctrine of reasonable user, the defendant had no right to set back the percolating waters upon the plaintiff’s land, (See *12Meeker v. City of East Orange, supra; Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., supra.) unless the use to which the defendant was putting his own land was reasonable; while a cause of action is clearly stated in so far as the declaration alleges that the pent up waters of the river on the defendant’s land soaked into and upon the plaintiff’s land injuring it as alleged. Under this view of the case the declaration was duplicitous. No objection however was made to it upon this ground.

¶6Now as I view the evidence there is enough to support a verdict for the plaintiff upon either theory of the case made by the declaration, while the “second amended additional plea” presented no defense, and tendered only immaterial issues and should have been stricken upon the plaintiff’s motion. See Hubbard v. Anderson, 50 Fla. 219, 39 South. Rep. 107. There was evidence to support the plea and none to contradict it. Assuming as the court did that the plea was good, he directed a verdict. I think this was error. The jury should have been permitted under proper instructions from the court to determine whether the undersurface streams or veins in plaintiff’s land had been obstructed by an unreasonable use by defendant of its land so as to injure the plaintiff, or whether the waters pent up on the defendant’s land soaked into the plaintiff’s land injuring it as alleged.

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