Volume 74 — Maryland Reports

<p>Mortgages — Sale of Mortgaged premises — Notice—Jurisdiction— Exceptions — Tender.</p> <p>Certain mortgages provided that the sale of the mortgaged premises should he made in accordance with the provisions of Article GG of the Code of Public General Laws. (Code of 1888.) Section eight of said Article requires that when a sale is made under a mortgage, the advertisement shall be inserted “in some newspaper printed in the county where the mortgaged premises lie,” and section fifteen enacts that the sale shall take place in the county where the land is situated. Section 702 of Article 4 of the Public Local Laws, which, by section 11 of the Act of 1888, ch. 98, extending the city limits, was made applicable to the territory of Baltimore County brought within the city, makes Article 6G of the Code applicable to Baltimore City. When the mortgages were executed the mortgaged property was within the outlines of Baltimore County. Subsequently, by the Act of 1888, ch. 98, the property was brought within the limits of Baltimore City. Held:</p> <p>That notice of a sale of the mortgaged premises subsequent to said Act, was properly published in the City of Baltimore, and the Circuit Court of Baltimore City had jurisdiction to confirm the sale.</p> <p>Exceptions to a mortgage sale, though verified by the affidavit of the exceptant, and not denied by an answer, will be overruled, where no evidence is produced to sustain them.</p> <p>A tender by the mortgagor, before the sale is made, of the amount due and in arrear under the mortgage, together with the expenses incurred by the mortgagee in and about the advertisement of the property, is not sufficient to prevent foreclosure, where other covenants in the mortgage have been broken by the mortgagor.</p>

Appeals from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. The'case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

The case is stated in the- opinion of the Court. The plaintiff recovered a verdict for $402.00 and judgment was entered therefor. The defendant appealed. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, Britan, Fowler, McSherry, and Briscoe, J.

<p>Appeal from the Baltimore City Court.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p> <p>The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, Fowler, McSherry, and Briscoe, J.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Exception. — At the trial the plaintiff offered the six prayers following: 1.

<p>Telephone company — Erection of Pole in the Footway— Injunction — Special demurrer — Liability of Telephone company for Damages to AbiMing owner — Ordinance of the Oity of Baltimore — Evidence—Measure of Damages — Instmction.</p> <p>A declaration alleging that the plaintiff was possessed of a valuable warehouse, and while so possessed, the defendant, a telephone company, without her authority or consent, and without making or offering to make compensation therefor, planted a large and unsightly pole in the footway in front of said warehouse, which obstructed and prevented the comfortable and reasonable and beneficial enjoyment and use of said premises, but not alleging the mode and manner of the obstruction and interference, is sufficient under section 3 of Article 75 of the Code, which provides that nothing more is needed in a declaration than a plain statement of the facts which are relied on to sustain a recovery.</p> <p>Section 119 of Article 75 of the Code, respecting the pleadings in any action in which a writ of injunction is claimed, provides that “the defendant may demur to so much of the plaintiff’s declaration as claims such writ, and such demurrer shall raise the question whether the facts stated as the ground of such claim disclose any such legal duty as that so sought to be enforced, but shall be subject to all rules governing general demurrers at law, both as to the proceedings thereon and thereafter.” Held :</p> <p>That the demurrer thus prescribed is a special demurrer, and a general demurrer, whether interposed directly to the declaration or to some subsequent pleading, will not be sufficient to raise the question.</p> <p>Section 40 of Article 3 of the Constitution provides that: “The General Assembly shall enact no law authorizing private property to be taken for public use, without just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a jury, being first paid, or tendered to the party'entitled to such compensation.” By sections 224 and 232 of Article 23 of the Code, telephone companies, incorporated under the General Corporation Law of the State, are empowered to construct their lines upon the streets and highways, irrovided their fixtures, posts and wires do not “interfere with the convenience of any land owner more than is unavoidable.” By section 224 it is provided that said companies shall be responsible for any damages that majr be occasioned by the erection, continuance, and use of such fixtures; and that in any action brought for the recovery of damages, the company may' elect to have included the damages for allowing the said fixtures permanently to continue. But no person is entitled to sue for damages until the company, after due notice, has failed or refused to remove, in reasonable time, the fixtures complained of. Held :</p> <p>That neither the rights of the owner of the reversion in the bed of the street, nor those of the abutter upon a street, are abridged by the statute, and a telephone company is responsible for any damage done to the same by the erection and maintenance of its poles, and compensation must be made therefor.</p> <p>An ordinance of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, giving a telephone company the right to plant and maintain its poles upon the footway of a street, in front of the warehouse of the plaintiff, does not énlarge the authority conferred upon the company by said statute.</p> <p>Evidence of the amount which a particular person, if he owned the property, would, in his opinion, give not to have a telephone pole placed where it was, or of the amount he would give to have it taken away, or of his willingness to pay more rent for the property with the pole removed, or of the extent of the depreciation of the rental value of the property for the purposes of his own business, is inadmissible to show the extent of the . damage sustained by the erection and continuance of the pole.</p> <p>The true measure of damages for the erection and maintenance of a telephone pole in the footway, in front of the plaintiff’s premises, is not what a particular person would be willing to charge for having the pole put up or remain, nor the amount some other person might consider the rental value was depreciated for the purposes of his business; but where the land of the plaintiff is not taken, nor the soil actually invadfed, the measure of damages is, either, the extent to which the rental or usable value of the particular property-has been diminished by the trespass or injury complained of; or the difference in the value of the property before the construction of the pole, and its value after-wards, if the depreciation in value has been caused by the erection and maintenance of the pole.</p> <p>Where the narr. counts upon a possession by the plaintiff of the warehouse, and- an interference with her use and enjoyment thereof by the erection of a telephone pole, but does not declare for an injury to the reversionary interest in the warehouse to which she was entitled, and the proof shows that the premises were in the occupancy and possession of a tenant of the plaintiff, an instruction, which did not point to the pleadings, that there was no evidence that the plaintiff had sustained damage by the erection of the pole, is properly refused, when there is evidence sufficient to sustain any action by. the plaintiff.</p>

Writ of Error and Appeal from the Circuit Court for Alleghany County. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

-The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The verdict and judgment being for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, Irvin®, Bryan, McSherry, and Briscoe, J.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. This suit was instituted in the Circuit Court for Washington County, and on the application of the' defendant it was removed to the Circuit Court for Alleghany County, and thence on the application of the plaintiff it was removed to .the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, where it was tried. The jury rendered a verdict for the defendant, and judgment was entered accordingly. The plaintiff appealed.

<p>Appeal from the Baltimore City Court.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p> <p>The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, Fowler, MoSherry, and Briscoe, J.</p>

This appeal was taken from an order of the Court below overruling a demurrer of the President and Directors of Georgetown College to certain reasons assigned by James T. Perkins, trustee for the collection of State and county taxes, in his exceptions to an auditor’s account, and entering judgment on the demurrer, and ratifying certain auditor’s accounts distributing the proceeds of the sale of the real estate of John B. Magruder, made by the sheriff under an execution.

The appeal in this case was taken from an order of the Court below (Harlan, J.) directing the appellants to enter the name of the appellee as a qualified and registered voter in the registries of voters of the fifth election precinct of the eighteenth ward of Baltimore City. The case is stated in the opinion of this Court. The cause was argued before Miller, Robinson, Bryan, Fowler, and MoSherry, J.

<p>Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors — Allowance to the Trustee — Auditor’s account.</p> <p>An assignment for the benefit of creditors was made to a trustee, and the Circuit Court of Baltimore City assumed jurisdiction of the trust. A replevin suit was brought against the trustee individually to recover a portion of the goods so assigned to him in trust. The case, after going to the Court of Appeals, where a judgment unfavorable to the plaintiff was reversed, resulted finally in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for the value of the goods replevied and costs, whicli under the order of the Circuit Court the trustee paid. He also by the same authority paid the costs incurred in the Court of Appeals. In an auditor’s account distributing the trust funds the trustee was given credit for the payments so made by him. On an appeal from an order sustaining exceptions filed by creditors to the allowance of such credit, it was Held :</p> <p>That said credit was properly given in the absence of evidence of any wrong-doing on the part of the trustee.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Held: is at least three weeks previous thereto. Code, Art. 33, sec. 51. The Act was approved on Monday, April 1st, 1812. The fourth Monday was on April 22nd, 1812.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. First Exception. — Stated in the opinion of the Court. Second Exception. — The appellant offered evidence tending to show that the property of the benefit appellants, in the'opinion of the witnesses, would receive little or no enhancement in value from the proposed widening of' East Baltimore street; that the property would rent for no more on account of the proposed improvement.

Solomon Brown was the tenant of the appellants of certain premises in the City of Baltimore at a yearly rental of $2500, payable in quarterly instalments on the first day of April, July, October and January respectively. A quarter’s rent became due and payable on the 1st of January, 1888.

Appeal as upon Writ oe Error, from the Criminal Court of Baltimore. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Tire cause was ar-gued before Miller, Robinson, Irving, Fowler, McSiierry, and Briscoe, J.

<p>Malicious prosecution — Probable cause — Evidence.</p> <p>In an action for malicious prosecution in having procured the plaintiff to be arrested and indicted on the charge that he had, in violation of section 111 of Article 27, of the Code, secreted certain mortgaged chattels, with intent to defraud the mortgagee, it was shown that the plaintiff had obtained a loan from the defendant, and to secure the same had given a mortgage on his household furniture, which he had insured for the. benefit of the mortgagee, the defendant’s principal, and delivered the policy to the defendant. In the policy there was a condition that it should be void if the goods were removed from the place named in it, the residence of the plaintiff. Subsequently he had the mortgaged furniture removed to a warehouse where it was stored in the name of his wife, and subject to her order, and he and his wife moved to a boarding house, without notifying the defendant of such removal of the goods, or of his own change of residence. Knowing these facts, and having been informed that the plaintiff was about to remove to New York to live, the defendant, before the warrant was actually sworn to and obtained, stated the case to the magistrate, who was also an attorney at law, and by his advice the plaintiff was arrested. Held:</p> <p>That the evidence was legally sufficient to show probable cause for the institution of the prosecution.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p> <p>The cause was argued before Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, Fowler, MoSiierry, and Briscoe, J.</p>

Appeal as upon Whit oe Error, from the Criminal Court of Baltimore. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Irving, Bryan, Fowler, McSherry, and Briscoe, J.

Campbell brought an action at law against Haines. In the first, count of the declaration the plaintiff proceeded for false imprisonment. The second, third, and fourth counts were for slander. The defendant demurred to each and every count; the demurrers were overruled, and thereupon the plea of not guilty was filed, and issue joined. Upon the trial the verdict was for the plaintiff, and after judgment the defendant appealed.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was ° submitted on brief for the appellant, to Alyey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, Fowler, McSiierry, and Briscoe, J. One’s domicile is “where he has his true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Jacobs on Domicile, sec. 65; Phillimore on Domicile, 11. “A person’s residence is the place of his domicile, or the place…

Richard L. Ficklin, and others, infants under the age of twenty-one years, suing hy next friend, brought an action in the Superior Court of Baltimore City against the Fidelity Mutual Life Association. The cause of action was a policy of insurance on the life of the father of the plaintiffs, which was issued hy the defendant.

The case is stated iu the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, 0. J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, Fowler, McSherry, and Briscoe, J., for the appellee, and submitted on brief for the appellant. The appellee had no authority to sell the house. The will by its terms imposed a trust on Louis C. Fischer to divide the residue of the estate; it did not confer a mere (discretionary) power to divide.

'The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, Eowler, McSiiERRY,and Briscoe,- J. There is nothing whatever in our legislation or in the decisions of our Courts, to countenance the idea that it is the duty of an administrator to violate his own integrity and do injury to others, for the purpose of augmenting the assets of the estate under his charge. He is not appointed for purposes of plunder.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. First, Second, and Third Exceptions, sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court. Fourth Exception.— The plaintiff offered the four following prayers: 1.

The-case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Exception. — At the trial the plaintiff offered seven prayers, (which are omitted), and the defendant offered the two following prayers : 1.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, Eoavler, McSherry, and Briscoe, J. The plaintiffs do not seek to open here any questions that could he heard only on appeal. If the notices were sufficient, they are now shut out from such questions by the failure to appeal.

<p>Railroad and Telegraph Companies — Construction of Agreement between Corporations — Renewal of Charter under Act of 1868, ch. 471 — Construction of sec. 76 of said Act — Surrender of Old Charter — Transfer of Rroperty to the New Corporation — Act of 1878, ch, 93 — Retroactive legislation.</p> <p>On the 5th of February, 1847, a telegraph company was incorporated by the Legislature of Maryland, by the name of the WT.' Co. to endure for thirty years. In the year 1853, this corporation made an agreement with the B. & O. R. R. Co. By the first section of this agreement the W. T. Co. acquired a license, so long as it should exist as a telegraph company, to erect and maintain a line of telegraph upon and within the limits. The ninth and eleventh sections of the agreement are as follows : “(9) In the event of the dissolution of the said telegraph company, or a suspension of operations on their part, either involuntary or in consequence of legal process of any kind, then the said railroad company shall be at liberty, and are authorized to take charge of the said telegraph line for their own purposes, with the appurtenances, until the said telegraph company shall resume active ox^erations; and it is expressly understood that no interest which the said telegraph company may have in said line shall be assignable, so as to affect or impair in any manner the rights of the said railroad company under these articles of agreement.” “(11) And it is agreed that the ownership of the said telegraph company herein before recognized, of the posts and wires of the telegraph, is to be taken as subject to the performance by the sa.id telegraph company and its assigns of all stipulations herein contained affecting said telegraph company. ’ ’ The corporate existence of the W. T. Co. was to expire by its own limitation on the 4th day of February, 1877. On the 8th day of January of that year said company was incorporated anew under the provisions of the Act of 1868, ch. 471, under the name of “The W. T. Co. of Baltimore City.” Section 76 of that Act provides that the new corporation shall be subject to all the provisions of the Act, and entitled to all the powers and privileges conferred by it, so far as applicable; and that the former charter shall be deemed to be surrendered “and all the property and assets belonging to the said former corporation, of whatsoever nature and description, and all the debts and liabilities of said former corporation, of whatever nature and description, shall * * * be devolved upon the said new corporation, which shall for this purpose be regarded as substituted by operation of law in the room and stead of the former corporation.” By the Act of 1878, ch. 93, the W. T. Co. was revived, and its corporate existence was continued for an additional period of thirty years. Held :</p> <p>1st. That with the surrender of its charter the old corporation ceased to exist.</p> <p>2nd. That although the property and assets of the old corporation were devolved upon the new corporation, the, separate corporate existence of the two bodies politic was distinctly marked by the declaration of the statute that the former should be deemed to be surrendered.</p> <p>3rd. That as by the first section of the agreement of 1853, the right of the telegraph company to erect and maintain a line of telegraph was to continue as long as it should exist as a telegraph company, such right did not continue after its corporate existence was extinguished by the proceedings mentioned.</p> <p>4th. That after the surrender of the charter of the telegraph company, by the necessary effect of the terms of the ninth and eleventh sections of said agreement the B. & O. R. R. Co. became entitled to the property of said company, mentioned in those sections.</p> <p>5th. That although all the property of the old corporation was vested in the new one, the propertjr affected by the agreement ceased to belong to the old corporation, because by its own contract it had been conveyed to the B. & 0. R. R. Co.</p> <p>6th. That before the Act of 1878, ch. 93, reviving the W. T. Co. and continuing its corporate existence, was passed, the right of the B. & 0. R. R. Co. to this telegraph property had vested by virtue of a valid contract, and the Legislature had no power to divest this right by a retroactive statute.</p> <p>7th. That as the W. T. Co. of Baltimore City, had no title to said property its stockholders could not maintain a bill in equity based on the action of certain parties which they alleged had injured them in their rights as such stockholders.</p>

Appeals from the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, Fowler, MoSherry, and Briscoe, J.

<p>Appeal from the Baltimore City Court.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Seventh Exceptions are staffed in the opinion of the Court. The Fifth and Sixth Exceptions were abandoned. The Eighth. Exception. — At the trial the plaintiffs offered the three following prayers: 1.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was submitted on brief, to Alvey, 0. J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, Eowler, McSherry, and Brisooe, J. The powers conferred on the Commissioners are extensive, but are confined within well defined limits; and power to pass ordinances, or otherwise ££to regulate the erection of new buildings in the town of Easton ” is not among them. They are given very extensive powers of taxation.

» The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, Irvins, Bryan, Fowler, McSherry, and Briscoe, J. The appellant being seized of the land through which the stream passes, has the right to use so much of the water thereof as may he necessary to supply his natural wants — to quench thirst, for household Jjjyposes, and water fq^ his cattle.

. The appellee filed a petition in the Court below, alleging that the appellants, citizens of Cecil County, being copartners, were indebted to it in a sum exceeding $250;, that they were insolvent, and that, within four months prior to the filing of the petition, they, with intent to create a preference, and to hinder, delay and defraud the petitioner and their other creditors, conveyed all or a part of their property, by way of mortgages, to certain persons, therein named,…

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff, for $2,000, and judgment was entered thereon. The defendant appealed. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, Fowler, and McSherry, J.

<p>Extinguishment of Easement by Union of the Dominant and Servient Estates — Right of Way.</p> <p>A tract of land containing twenty-four acres bounding on the north side of a county road, was devised in trust, with power to sell. Four acres of this tract was sold by the trustees to G. In the deed to him a private right of way sixty-six feet in width was reserved, running north from the county road along the western line of G’s lot and no further; and it was expressly covenanted that upon the request of the trustees, or those claiming under them, or of G., or those claiming under him, the right of way, extending as above mentioned, should be opened one-half in width, or thirty-three feet, on G’s lot, and the other half on the lot held by the trustees; and, when opened, that it should be “for the use and benefit of the lots bounding thereon, and of said respective parties” to the deed. G. afterwards acquired title to all the land lying immediately west of that first conveyed to him, so that the whole of said right of way became located within the lines of his own land. Subsequently the residue of said whole tract lying west of the portions so acquired by G. became vested in L. by purchase. No part of L’s land was contiguous to said right of way. Held:</p> <p>1st. That L. by such purchase did not become entitled to the use of said right of way, as reserved in the deed from the trustees to G., and could not maintain a bill in equity to compel G. to remove a fence which he had erected across it.</p> <p>• 2nd. That G. having become the owner of the dominant and servient estates, and there being no one else entitled to either, they were merged, and the mere easement was extinguished.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Harford County, in Equity.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p> <p>The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, Fowler, and McSherry, J.</p>

Appeal as upon Writ oe Error, from the Circuit Court for Harford County. On the 14th of February, 1891, the State’s Attorney for Harford County, by direction of Governor Jackson filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Harford County, praying that a decree of forfeiture of its charter might be passed by the Court against the appellant. An order to show cause was passed by the Court.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued for the appellant before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Rqbinson, Irving, Bryan, and MoiSiierry, J., and submitted on brief for the appellee. Under the pleadings it was error to exclude the agreement, and it was admissible without proof of its execution. The plea of payment alone admitted the execution of the agreement sued on.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, 'Bryan, and McSherry, J. The issue of the injunction was erroneous, because the nature of the alleged injury apprehended did not warrant such an extraordinary remedy. The acts threatened amounted at most merely to a trespass, for which the complainant had a plain, full and adequate remedy at law.

<p>Officer of Registration — Residence of' Voter — Proof of Residence— Constitutional laio.</p> <p>Section-1 of Article 1 of the Constitution provides that a voter shall be a citizen of the United States of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, apd shall have been a. resident of the State for one year, and of the county in which he offers to vote, for six months, next preceding the election, and must be duly registered. Section 14 of the Act of 1890, ch. 573, provides that all persons whose names were on the registration lists at the date of the passage of the Act, but who had previously removed from the State, and had taken up a domicile, beyond the limits of the State, shall be presumed to have thereby intended to abandon their legal residence in the State, unless within thirty days after the passage of the Act, they shall go in person before the clerk of the Circuit Court for the county from which they shall have so removed, and make and acknowledge an affidavit that when they so removed they did not intend to change their legal residence within the {State, but that they intend to return to the State, and take up their actual domicile therein, on or before six months next preceding the Tuesday after the first Monday ’ of November, 1890. Held:</p> <p>That the officer of registration is justified in striking from the registration list the name of a voter who fails to make the affidavit prescribed by the statute, although he left the State prior to its passage.</p> <p>The Act does not add to the qualifications of a voter as prescribed by the Constitution, but simply xrrovides a rule of evidence for the proof of a legal residence; and this the Legislature had the right to do.</p> <p>A person who left the State before the Act went into effect, is not entitled to prove his residence by the rules of evidence in force when he left the State, but is required to prove it by those in force when the officer of registration sits to revise the registry lists.</p> <p>A person who leaves the State, and takes up a domicile elsewhere, is not exempted, because of his being an employe of the Federal Government, from the operation of the rule of evidence prescribed by the Act of 1890, as it applies to all persons who depart from the State and acquire a residence beyond its limits.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Bryan, McSherry, and Briscoe, J. The provisions of section 14 and 19, of the Act of 1890, chap. 573, are unconstitutional.

A*ppeal from the Circuit Court for Charles County. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Bryan, McSherry, and Briscoe, J.

<p>Orphans’ Court — Administration—Incomplete distribution— Sales for purposes of Final distribution.</p> <p>A married woman, owning leasehold and other property, died intestate in September, 1880, leaving a husband and several children. The husband took out letters of administration on her estate, and on June 27th, 1882, had passed in the Orphans1 Court his first and only account, in which he claimed and received credit as follows: “Allowed this accountant for the balance of said estate retained by him as the surviving husband and tenant for life, with remainder to 7ds children, viz., a lot of ground and improvements, (describing them) valued at $1600, and sundry household furniture, at $276.70.” Held :</p> <p>1st. That no presumption arose as to whether or not the children of the husband were the same as the children of the deceased wife, or that she had no other children than those by her surviving husband; and there being no proof in regard to this, and the names of the children not being given, the entry or credit in the account was declaratory of no right of the true distributees of the wife’s estate upon the death of the husband, nor did it indicate to those who might desire to deal in respect to the property, who were the owners of it.</p> <p>2nd. That said entry was therefore entirely without legal effect, so far as the children of the deceased wife were concerned, and the distribution of the estate was incomplete.</p> <p>3rd. That until there was’a complete distribution to those entitled, the Orphans’ Court had jurisdiction to order a sale of the property for purposes of final distribution among them, and to that end had power to grant letters of administration tie bonis non, upon said estate, after the death of the husband.</p>

Court, No. 2, of P>altimore City. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Rryan, and McSherry, J. The following authorities were referred to : German Aged People’s Home vs. Hammerbacker, et al., 64 Md., 595; Dougherty and Peilly vs. Moore, at al., 71 Md., 250; Rittlervs. Smith, Adm’x, 70 Md., 265; Whitridgevs.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Bryan, and McSherry, J. The following authorities were referred to : Smith vs. Doe, ex dem. Dennis, 33 Md., 449; Neal, et al. vs. Charlton, 52 Md., 498; Wilson vs. McCarty, 55 Md., 280; Scott vs. Fox, 14 Md., 388; Alexander vs. Stewart, 8 Gill & J., 244; Cutlibertson vs. Irving, 4 Hurl. & Nor., 756, 757, 6 Hurl. & Nor., 135; 1 Smith’s Leading Cases, {Ed. 1888,) 202; Doe, dem.

This appeal was taken from the order of the Court below (Dennis, J.,) refusing the application of the plaintiff for a preliminary injunction. The case is stated in the opinion of this Court.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Bryan, and McSherry, J. While there is no sufficient evidence that the parties agreed to any particular rate of compensation, yet? having shown that it was perfectly well understood and agreed that thé appellant should manage the property, and should he paid therefor, it follows that he is entitled to receive whatever sum the Court finds upon the evidence his services are fairly…

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Exception. — At the trial the plaintiffs offered the two prayers following: 1.

<p>Deed — Effect of Omission of word “Heirs” in a Deed— How omission may be Cured — Nature of Estate conveyed — Covenant.</p> <p>Prior to the Act of 1856, ch. 154, except in cases of trusts, the word “heirs” was essential in a deed, to make it create an estate in fee. But the omission of the word “heirs” might he cured by reference to some other instrument which did contain that word.</p> <p>A covenant only operates to assure the estate granted and described, and not to enlarge it.</p> <p>S., being the assignee of the leasehold estate in a lot of ground, subsequently acquired the fee therein. Afterwards, on the 2nd day of March, 1842, S. made a deed of said lot, by full description, to L. “his executors, administrators, and assigns,” with a covenant of special warranty; said deed stating that it was the same piece or parcel of ground which had been assigned and transferred to S. by a certain deed, the description of which as then giveu, showed that it was the deed by which she had acquired the leasehold estate. The deed from S. to L. purported to convey to L. all the “estate, right, title, property, interest, claim, and demand whatsoever, at law or in equity, of the said S. of, in, and to said (lot) to have and to hold the said (lot) and premises hereinbefore described, and hereby granted and assigned, * * * * unto the said L., his executors, administrators, or assigns, in as full, large, ample, and beneficial a manner, to all intents and purposes, as she the said S., her executors, administrators, or assigns, might, should, or ought to have held and enjoyed the same by virtue of the indenture above referred to, or by any other ways or means whatsoever.” Held:</p> <p>1st. That this case did not fall within any of the exceptions to the general common law rule that in deeds the word “heirs” is necessary in order to transfer the fee.</p> <p>2nd. That as S. at the date of her deed to L. unquestionably hada fee simple estate, if, in said deed reference had been made to the deed by which she acquired the fee, and that had been mentioned as describing the property she was conveying to L., such reference would have cured the omission of the word “heirs,” and L. would have taken the fee.</p> <p>3rd. That in the absence of such reference the construction of the deed must be in accordance with the rule obtaining until the year 1856, when the Legislature of this State abrogated it, that the word “heirs” is essential in a deed to make it create an estate in fee, except in certain cases of trusts.</p> <p>4th. That the limiting words, “executors, administrators, or assigns,” used in the deed to L. being those appropriate for limiting a leasehold estate, but that paper not being a properly com structed lease, it must be held to convey the largest estate which S. could give consistently with the language used, and that was an estate during the grantee’s life.</p> <p>5th. That the covenant of special warranty, contained in the deed, could not operate to enlarge the estate thereby granted.</p>

Cross-Appeals from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Held: the Legislature having made no further effort to appoint; and this is the time, according, to the great current of authority which is designated by the expression, “and until his successor shall qualify. ” Mayor, &c., of Rahtoay vs. Croioell, 11 Vroom, 211 ; Chelmsford Company vs. Bemarest, 7 Cray, 1; City Council of Montgomery vs.…

This suit was brought on the 26th of April, 1890, by the appellee against the appellants, upon an official bond, dated the 27th of January, 1888, given to the appellee by Stevenson Archer, as Treasurer of the State of Maryland, as principal, and the other obligors as his sureties, and conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties as Treasurer under his re-appointment by the Legislature made on the 13th of January, 1888. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Miller, Robinson,, Irving, Bryan, McSherry, and Briscoe, J. The alleged slanderous words in the first and second counts are not actionable per se. All the authorities agree that to impute the crime of perjury it must be done in terms definitive of that offence. Newell on Defamation, 123. The innuendo may not enlarge the meaning of the alleged actionable words.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for Talbot County, (Wickes, J.) passed in a case stated, for the purpose of obtaining a judicial construction of the will of Henrietta M. Hollyday, deceased, and of the codicils thereto. The case is stated in the opinion of this Court.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Miller, Robinson, Irvins, Bryan, McSherry, and Briscoe, J. It is now well settled that all property, including money remaining specifically after the-death of the original executor or administrator, is unadministered property, and the appointment of an administrator de bonis non is indispensably necessary to give title to the distributees, even though all the debts are paid, and if the first…

<p> Adverse possession. </p> <p>The exclusive and uninterrupted enjoyment and receipt of a ground rent for nearly forty years, together with the holding during all that period a deed of the reversion, suffice to give a good title — one upon which recovery could he had in ejectment.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Irving, Bryan, Eowler, and McSherry, J. The following authorities were referred to : Fanziger vs. Hoyt, 120 N. Y., 190, affirming same case in 46 Hun, 270 ; Green vs. Rochester Co., 1 Thonvp. & Cook, 5 ; Chapman, Adm’r vs. Smoot and Wife, 66 Md., 8, 13 ; ■Hoopes vs. Strasburger, 37 Md., 390, 400, 401, 403; Trisler vs. Williamson, 4 H & McH.,- 219, 221.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Irvin®, . Bryan, Fowler, and McSherry, J. The following authorities were referred to : Cruttioell vs. Lye, 17 Ves., 335; Menendez vs. Holt, 128 TJ. 8., 522; Smith vs. Gibbs, 44 N. H., 343; Boon vs. Moss, 70 N. Y., 473; Morgan vs. Perhairms, 36 Ohio, 522; Bell vs. Ellis, 33 Gal., 624; Howe vs. Searing, 19 How.

<p>Plea of Former recovery — Estoppel—Demurrer—Action for Breach of Contract — Damages.</p> <p>A plea which, in effect, asserts that if the plaintiff claimed, but did not recover, certain damages in a former suit against another defendant, he is estopped from maintaining an action against the defendant filing the plea, for the same damages claimed in the former suit, is bad on demurrer.</p> <p>A. contracted with B. to erect certain houses upon certain lots of ground, for each of which B. agreed to pay a bonus, in stipulated amounts as the work progressed. Before any ■ expense was incurred by A. upon five of the houses, he was notified by B. that an ordinance had been passed for the opening of a certain street, and that in consequence of the passage of said ordinance he would not expect A. to fulfill his contract in regard to the erection of said five houses on said five lots, which, if completed would stand in the bed of said street, and would necessarily be condemned and torn down in the opening of said street, and instructed him not to build the houses on said five lots. Notwithstanding this notice and instruction, A. did certain work upon three of said houses which, under the provisions of said contract, would have entitled him to receive the first instalment of said bonus for each of them. In an action by A. against B. to recover the stipulated bonus on each of said five houses, and for other losses and injuries alleged to have been caused by the violation of said contract, it was Held-:</p> <p>That the plaintiff vas not entitled to recover said bonus, as the case then stood, but might recover on account of other damages incurred on the faith of the contract.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. First Exception. — Stated in the opinion of the Court. Second Exception. — The plaintiff’s counsel asked the plaintiff as a witness: “'What building was there when you first knew the property?” the counsel stating that they offered' to prove that it was an old distillery building in connection with the same offer as in the preceding exception.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs for $5,000, and judgment was entered thereon, after a motion for a new trial was overruled.

Appeals as upon Writ oe Error, from the Circuit Court for Howard County. There were three indictments, hut they were practically the same; and the questions presented being identical, they were treated as arising in one case. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The causes were argued before Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, MoSherry, and Briscoe, J.

The Court below (Dennis, J.) decreed that the defendant, Augustus J. Albert, Jr., account for and pay to the pdaintiffs, Prank Albert and Jacob Albert, executors of Augustus J. Albert, Sr., deceased, the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, mentioned in the proceedings, to he distributed by said executors as part of the estate of said Augustus J. Albert, Sr., deceased, under his will; and that all questions as to interest upon said sum of money, earned, accrued or payable since…

<p>Foreign Insurance Companies — Retaliatory legislation — Construction of sec. 2, of ch. 593 of the NewYorlc statutes of 1873, and sec. 138 of Art. 23 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland — Construction of Statutes.</p> <p>The F. and C. Co., of New York, incorporated under the laws of the State of New York, transacted business in the State of Maryland for several years prior to the year 1891. The A. C. I. and S. Co., of Baltimore City, was organized and incorporated in 1890. Its line of business was similar to that of the F. and C. Co., of New York, and it became the rival of the latter company, in insurance business. Having applied for'license to transact the business of insuring steam-boilers in New York City, the Insurance Superintendent of the State of New York, in the exercise of the discretion which the statute of that State in express terms confided to him,' refused to grant such license, notwithstanding said company was ready and willing to comply with all the requirements of the State of New York preliminary to the issuance of license. In December, 1890, the F. and C. Co., of New York, tendering the usually demanded license moneys, asked for its annual license to transact business in Maryland; but was informed that in consequence of a protest from the A. C. I. and S. Co., of Baltimore City, license to transact business in Maryland would not be granted. The second section of chapter 593, of the New York statutes of 1873, provides as follows: “The said Superintendent shall have power to refuse admission to any company, corporation, or association applying to be permitted to transact the business of insurance in this State from any other State or country wherever the capital stock shall be impaired, and also whenever in his judgment such refusal to admit shall best promote the interests of the people of this State.” And section 138, of Article 23, of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, contains the following proviso: “Provided, that when, by the laws of any other State, any deposit of money or securities is required, or taxes, fines, or penalties, or other obligations or prohibitions are imposed upon insurance companies incorporated or organized under the laws of this State, and transacting business in such other State, or upon the agents of such insurance companies, greater then those required or imposed by the laws of this State, so long as such laws continue in force, the same taxes, fines, penalties, and deposits, obligations, and prohibitions shall be imposed upon all agents or insurance companies of such State doing business in this State, instead of those prescribed by the laws of this State.” Upon application by the F. and C. Co., of New York, for a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of a license to it by the State Insurance Commissioner, it was Held :</p> <p>1st. That when the New York statute imposes an -‘obligation or a. prohibition” not found in the Maryland statute, that obligation and prohibition must be treated as if found in so many words in the Maryland statute, and is to be enforced accordingly.</p> <p>2nd. That in such case, and for such emergency the Maryland statute makes the New York law Maryland law to control the action of the Maryland Commissioner of Insurance, and the latter was justified in refusing license to the petitioner.</p> <p>3rd. That the exclusion of the Maryland company from New York State by the refusal on the part of the New York Superintendent to allow it a license, was a “prohibition” within the ' meaning of the Maryland statute, which justified the Commissioner in this State in putting in force the retaliatory feature of the Maryland law.</p> <p>4th. That the Maryland statute was intended to be one of strict reciprocity.</p> <p>5th. That such legislation is legitimate and constitutional, and its enforcement in a fair and just way, cannot operate prejudicially to the people by preventing competition.</p> <p>Statutes are to be read according to the natural and obvious import of their language ; and no construction ought to be made against the express letter of the statute, for nothing can so express the meaning of the makers as their own direct words.</p>

Appeal as upon Writ oe Error, from the Criminal Court of Baltimore. The case is stated in tlie opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Irving, Bryan, Fowler, and McSherry, J.

Appeal as upon Writ op Error, from the Circuit. Court for Prince George's County. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was submitted to Alvey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, Bryan, Fowler, McSherry, and Briscoe, J.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The .cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, McSherry, and Briscoe, J. The counsel whose services secured the setting aside of the fraudulent deed, and the bringing into the trust estate the property and money now being accounted for, are entitled to he paid out of the trust estate, the value of their services. Insolvent Estate of Conrad Leiman, 82 Md., 225; Trustees vs. Greenough, 105 Ü.

The auditor stated an account in which he allowed as prior liens, those attachments which were sued out before the filing of the petition, praying the adjudication •of Forster and Clark as insolvent debtors, and also the' attachment of Gottschalk & Co., which was sued out on the same day the petition was filed, and distributed the balance in hand among the general creditors.

<p>Gift enterprises — Section 185 of Article 27 of the Code— Lotteries — Unlawful regulation of Trade.</p> <p>The Act of 1886, ch. 480 (sec. 185 of Art. 27 of the Code of Public General Laws,) provides that: “No person or body corporate shall be permitted, either directly or indirectly, by agent or otherwise, to barter, sell, trade, or to offer for barter, sale, or trade, by any publication, or in any way, any wares, goods, or merchandise of any description, in package or bulk, holding out as an inducement for any such barter, sale, or trade, or the offer of the same, any scheme or device by way of gift enterprises of any kind or character whatsoever.” Held :</p> <p>That this Act, by_ reason of its general terms, including as it does all gift enterprises, those involving the element of chance, as .well as those that do not, is invalid, so far as it relates to gift enterprises not involving chance.</p> <p>In so far as the object of an Act is to protect the morals and advance the welfare of the people, by prohibiting every scheme and device bearing any semblance to lottery or gambling, it ' undoubtedly will be a valid exercise of power. But an Act which declares that no person shall give away ‘ anything to a purchaser of goods, wares, or merchandise as an inducement to make the purchase, is a regulation of trade which is not only unwise but unlawful.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was tried before the Court without the intervention of a j ury. First, Second and Third Exceptions not passed upon by the Court. Fourth Exception. — At the trial the plaintiff offered the two following prayers : 1.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, O. J., Miller, Irving, Bryan, Fowler, and McSherry, J. The total failure in the consideration for the note, and its obtention by misrepresentation and fraud, being undisputed facts in this case, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of proof that “he was a bona fide holder for value, and without notice, in the usual course of business, and under circumstances that create…

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was submitted to Alvey, C. J., Miller, Bryan, Fowler, McSherry, and Briscoe, J. Reference was had to the following authorities: Freeman on Executions, sec. 290; Kean vs. Newell, 1 Mo., 754; Eads, Adm’rvs.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Yellott, Store, Miller, Robinson, Irying, and Bryan, J. The following authorities were cited: Oecil, Adm’r vs. Bose, etal., IT Md., 102; Smith vs. Wilson, Adm’r, IT Md., 460; Cecil vs. Olarke, et al., IT Md., 520; Lemon vs. Hall, 20 Md., 168; Muncaster, Exec’r vs. Muncaster and Wife, 28 Md., 286; Rockwell vs. Young, 60 Md., 566.