¶1 Tbe fact that plaintiffs were conductors of a public school and had advertised extensively the terms and regulations of their school, taken in connection with the fact that defendant had' sent his son to this school for one session, and had also sent him to a second session, was some evidence the defendant had notice of the terms and regulations of the school, and had assented thereto. This evidence ought to have gone to the jury. There is error. "We do think' the cases in which it is held that a common carrier, in order to 'limit his liability according to the common law, must fix the bailor with direct notice, are applicable to a case like that under consideration. Upon this point some of the members of the court hold a different opinion, but the majority think it proper to give a new trial, to the end that the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, may be set out as part of the evidence.
¶2 But the defendant says, the plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the error, because they have judgment for all they are entitled to, upon a quantum, meruit. To this the plaintiffs reply: We insist that had defendant paid in advance he would not be entitled to recover back for the time that his son was not permitted to have board and tuition during the residue of the session, and by the rejection of the evidence we were precluded from making this point. It is an interesting question, whether a parent is chargeable for board and tuition for the entire session, his son not being taken away by the act of the parent or by the act of God, but being expelled by the conductors of the school, there being no express agreement to that effect or any agreement by implication, save only the payment of board and tuition “ in advance but this was excluded by the rejection of the evidedee tending to show thetermB'andr regulations of the school. There will be a venire d-e novo.
¶3 Per Curiam. Y*nir« dé nmw.