74 N.J. Super. 138 - Parrot v. Chiselko’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Having in mind our duty to ascribe to the language of the statute its plain and unambiguous meaning and to give full effect to its every word, even though by so doing we deprive a claimant of its benefits, we find to be inescapable the conclusion that American’s letter of April 16, 1959 was not a disclaimer contemplated by N. J. S. A. 39:6-65(b). Plainly, the statutory wording, ‘that an insurer had disclaimed on a policy of insurance so as to remove or withdraw liability insurance,’ (emphasis added) imports that if the ‘disclaimer’ were not made, a valid policy of insurance would subsist. One cannot withdraw or remove a thing which never existed. Cf. Wormack v. Howard, 33 N. J. 139, 162 A. 2d 846 (1960). Thus the undisputed fact that American’s policy did not become effective until two days after the accident inalterably deprives the letter of April 16 of any force whatever as a disclaimer within the purview of the statute.” “In arriving at this conclusion we are conscious of the fact that she [the plaintiff] is one of a class of persons for which the act was designed to provide redress. And we are not unmindful that she refrained from filing a notice within the 90-day period because she relied on Chiselko’s implied representation that he held collectible insurance, and understandably misinterpreted the written information Chiselko laid before her. “However, there is nothing in the act, express or implied, which charges the Fund with the misrepresentation of one claiming to ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Board v. Holland · McNeill v. Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund

2. ““In the Broderick case plaintiff was involved in an accident on February 22, 1961. On February 27 his attorney sent a claim letter to the driver (and owner) of the car which struck him. On March 7, 1961 the driver replied informing plaintiff that his insurance policy was not in force at the time of the accident because of his failure to pay premiums, and a copy of the policy was enclosed which purported to cover the vehicle from December 8, 1960. On May 29, 1961 the insurer, in reply to plaintiff’s attorney’s letter of May 26, advised that the policy had been cancelled as of January 31, 1961. Within ten days the indemnification corporation was sent a notice of intention to' file claim, but the notice was rejected as untimely. The court in ruling on plaintiff’s contention that his notice came within the statute said: “ ‘This information (the insurer’s letter to plaintiff of May 29) did not constitute a “disclaimer or denial of coverage” within the meaning of subdivision (c) of section 608 since the quoted words presup pose at least a contrary assertion that a policy is in effect under which coverage is claimed. No such assertion was here made.’ 221 N. Y. S. 2d, at p. 124. “The court also noted that the result argued for by plaintiff would permit an injured person, after the other party admitted that he held no insurance, to contact a former insurer and thus extend the filing period.” 180 A. 2d at 713-14 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Board v. Holland · McNeill v. Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund

3. ““ ‘The liberality of construction accorded to the statute accents the scope and purposes of the enactment as social legislation, but affords no substitute for proof or evidence necessary for compliance with its terms or conditions. See Szczesny v. Vasquez, 71 N. J. Super. 347, 358-359, 177 A. 2d 47 (App. Div. 1962). The admonition that due regard must be given to the protection of the Fund, gives recognition to the fact that it is derived from levies legislatively imposed on registrants of motor vehicles, insured and uninsured, and insurers authorized to write automobile liability insurance in this State.’ ” (Emphasis added in 230 Md. at p. 178 .)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Maddy v. Jones · Hawks v. Gottschall