People v. Muniz’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “This is not a situation such as that in People ex rel. Gold v. Jackson (supra), where the foreign jurisdiction’s crime could be committed in several different, alternative ways, some of which would constitute felonies if committed in New York and others of which would constitute only misdemeanors see, [People v. Gonzalez, 61 N.Y.2d 586, 590-591 , 475 N.Y.S.2d 358 , 463 N.E.2d 1210 (1984)]. Indeed, the facts in this case are indistinguishable in principle from those in Olah . Schematically, in both Olah and this case, the foreign crime was rendered a felony because of a particular aggravating circumstance — value in Olah and intent here' — which included, but was broader in coverage than, the analogous aggravating element of the New York felony.... In this case, the foreign crime’s aggravating circumstance, criminal intent, encompasses the intent to commit a “crime” as required by New York law, but it also applies to less culpable levels of intent, notably, the intent to commit what would be a mere violation if committed in New York. In such circumstances, as we held in Olah , it is improper to look to the factual allegations in the accusatory instrument as a means of clarifying the nature of the defendant’s claimed predicate crime, since “ ‘the controversy did not turn upon [them]’ ” (People v. Olah, supra, at 100, 89 N.E.2d 329 , quoting Donahue v. New York Life Ins. Co., 259 N.Y. 98, 102 , 181 N.E. 62 ).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 281 F. Supp. 2d 515 - Somerville v. Conway

2. “As a general rule, this inquiry is limited to a comparison of the crimes’ elements as they are respectively defined in the foreign and New York penal statutes. The allegations contained in the accusatory instrument underlying the foreign conviction may ordinarily not be considered, because such instruments frequently contain nonessential recitals (People v. Olah, 300 N.Y. 96, 98 , 89 N.E.2d 329 ; see, e.g., People v. Spann, 56 N.Y.2d 469 , 452 N.Y.S.2d 869 , 438 N.E.2d 402 ). Since recitals that go beyond the statutorily required elements are not necessary to the determination of guilt, there can be no assurance that such allegations played any actual part in the foreign conviction (see, People ex rel. Goldman v. Denno, 9 N.Y.2d 138, 142, 211 N.Y.S.2d 403 , 172 N.E.2d 663 ). Accordingly, resort to such recitals to ascertain the nature of the crime of which the defendant was convicted has generally been deemed improper (see, People v. Gonzalez, 61 N.Y.2d 586 , 475 N.Y.S.2d 358 , 463 N.E.2d 1210 ).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 2004 Pa. Super. 226 - Commonwealth v. Coleman

3. “The fallacy in this analysis is its failure to distinguish between the specific criminal acts required by a penal statute and the various ways in which the statutory crime may be committed. The former concerns the crime’s statutory elements and is relevant to the Penal Law § 70.06(1)(b)(i) inquiry; the latter concerns the underlying facts and, under Olah (supra), is not relevant to that inquiry. Moreover, under the dissenter’s formulation, the cases in which the indictment could be considered would be expanded dramatically. Since most penal statutes establish crimes that may be factually committed “in a number of ways,” conduct that violates a particular statute may always be recast in terms that make it appear to be a discrete criminal act by simply substituting a factual description of the conduct for a statutory element, as the dissenter has done.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 281 F. Supp. 2d 515 - Somerville v. Conway