Volume 74 — Ohio State Reports, New Series

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Hamilton county.</p> <p>On the eighteenth day of June, 1902, one Josephine Pace filed a petition in the court of common pleas of Hamilton county against The Cincinnati Traction Company, alleging in substance that the defendant is a corporation organized and doing business under the laws of the state of Ohio; and that it owned and used a street railroad leading from Cincinnati to the village of College Hill, on which cars were operated by means of electricity; and that on the seventeenth day of May, 1902, while the plaintiff was a passenger on one of the cars of the defendant, “the said defendant, by its agents or servants, so carelessly, negligently and unskillfully and improperly managed and conducted said car that the same was caused to run roughly; and unevenly and was jolted so that this plaintiff, through no fault or negligence on her part, was violently jolted and thrown from the said car and on to the street or roadway alongside said railroad,” whereby she was severely injured.</p> <p>On the twenty-sixth day of July, 1902, the defendant answered the said petition, admitting thát it was a corporation as alleged, and that it used a certain street' railroad leading from Cincinnati to College Hill, with cars operated by means of electricity; but denied that it owned the said street railroad, and denied each and every allegation contained in the petition, except as expressly admitted in said answer.</p> <p>Thereafter, on the eleventh day of August, 1904, one Charles E. Tenney, a notary public, before whom notice had been given to take depositions, issued a subpoena duces tecum to the plaintiff in error, J. H. Schoepf, to appear before him and give testimony in the case then pending, wherein Josephine Pace was plaintiff and The Cincinnati Traction Company was defendant, and containing the following clause: “and to bring with you any reports you may have control over, or in your possession, made by the motorman or conductor of a College Hill-Main car of The Cincinnati Traction Company, concerning any accident occurring May 17, 1902, because of which this suit was brought.”</p> <p>The plaintiff in error appeared before the said notary public on the sixteenth day of August, 1902, pursuant to the subpoena, and on examination tes-, tiffed that he was the claim agent of The Cincinnati Traction Company; that there was a standing order or rule which required every conductor or motorman in the employ of said company to report all accidents involving injuries to pedestrians, or passengers, damage to wagons or vehicles of any kind and the mechanical trouble of the cars, from which there could be any possible claim, or possible injury claimed, or damage to anybody’s person or property; that these reports were made on blank forms and were to be sent to the witness; that the purpose of these reports was to enable the company to prepare itself to defend in case a suit should be begun against the company on account of alleged negligence resulting in such accident, and also to advise the company as to the extent of its liability and as to the cause of the trouble; and that it might have the information which was contained in those reports on file for the purpose of defending any such suit; and for advising, or rather submitting to, counsel for their opinion in regard to the cause of action which might be alleged against the company, and for use in any such suit. The witness also testified that such reports in regard to the alleged injury to this plaintiff and the accident resulting therein had been filed with him and were in his possession and under his control until the present suit of Josephine Pace against the company was begun; and that two or three days after that suit was begun he forwarded the same to the company’s counsel. When asked if he could obtain them by requesting them of counsel, he answered, “Yes, of course.” When asked, “Will you do so?” he answered, “No, for the reason that they are privileged papers.” Also on the examination of said witness before said notary, he was asked:</p> <p>“Q. 3. On the seventeenth day of May, 1902, a woman fell or was thrown off a car belonging to The Cincinnati Traction Company, at or near the corner of Oak and Belmont streets, College Hill; who was the conductor in charge of this car ? ’ ’</p> <p>Also the following question:</p> <p>“Q. 5. Bo you know the name of this conductor?”</p> <p>Also the following question:</p> <p>“Q. 6. Do you know the name of the motorman of this car?”</p> <p>Also the following question:</p> <p>“Q. 7. Were there any other persons on this car besides the plaintiff, conductor and motorman?” Also the following question:</p> <p>“Q. 8. Were there any persons that you know of, besides the plaintiff, conductor and motorman present at the time of the accident and who witnessed it?”</p> <p>To each of the aforesaid questions the counsel for the defendant company objected, and the witness refused to answer the same upon the advice of counsel, for the reason that the same were immaterial, irrelevant and incompetent, and for the reason that these questions call for hearsay testimony.</p> <p>He was also asked the following question;</p> <p>“Q. Who was the division superintendent in May, 1902, of the division to which the College Hill-Main line belonged?”</p> <p>The witness refused to answer each and all of these questions under advice of counsel, and for the reasons aforesaid. Thereupon the said notary public ordered the plaintiff in error to be conunitted to jail until he should answer the said questions and produce the said reports.</p> <p>Plaintiff in error began these proceedings by an application in the court of common pleas of Hamilton county for a writ of habeas corpus. On the hearing in the court of common pleas, the court found the facts as stated above, and as matter of law adjudged that the commitment for refusal to answer the questions as to who was the division superintendent in May, 1902, and to produce the said reports, should be sustained. The motion for new trial was overruled, and the court rendered judgment that Schoepf be remanded to the custody of the sheriff until he should name the division superintendent of the College Hill-Main line in May, 1902, and should produce the said reports.</p> <p>The plaintiff in error filed his petition in error in the circuit court, together with the bill of exceptions and transcript of the proceedings in the court of common pleas; and in the circuit court the sheriff filed a cross-petition in error complaining of the judgment of the common pleas court that the witness was justified in his refusal to answer the five questions above stated. The circuit court held that these five questions should be answered, and ordered that Schoepf be remanded to the custody of the sheriff until lie should answer the question as to who was the division superintendent of the College Hill-Main line in May, 1902, and also the five questions above set forth, and also should produce the said reports. This judgment of the circuit court is here assigned for error, plaintiff in error seeking to have both the judgment of the circuit court and the judgment of the court of common pleas reversed and held for naught.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Warren county.</p> <p>In the petition filed April 26, 1904, in the common pleas of Warren, and the amendments thereto) by William Evans, Malinda Pullen, Albert Stubbs and Maurice Oswald (who in this proceeding are defendants in error), it is averred in substance that Josiah E. Smith and others named (plaintiffs in error here), were duly appointed and acting trustees for the administration, erection and equipment of a free library in the village of Lebanon, Warren county, for the purpose and with all the powers and duties defined by section 1536-934, Eevised Statutes, being section 218 of the municipal code; that certain other defendants named are the qualified and acting members of the council of the village; that on or about April, 1903, Mr. Andrew Carnegie proposed to the village to furnish to said village ten thousand dollars to erect a free public library building, on the terms following: that if the village would agree ,by resolution of council to maintain a free public library, at a cost of not less than one thousand dollars a year, and would provide a suitable site for the building, he would furnish ten thousand dollars ,to erect such building; that on the seventeenth of July, 1903, the council passed a resolution to accept the donation on the terms proposed, and thereby agreed on behalf of the village to maintain such free public library at a cost of not less than one thousand dollars a year, and directed that a copy of such resolution be transmitted to said Carnegie; that said village, and said council, and said library trustees are now threatening to receive said sum, on the conditions named, and pledge the faith of the village to perpetually maintain a library at a cost of not less than one thousand dollars per year, contrary to the best interests of the village, and unless enjoined will accept said sum and pledge the good faith of the village and obligate the village perpetually and forever to maintain a library at the cost aforesaid, and that the council has levied a tax on all the property 'in the village for the purpose of raising revenue therefor; that at the time the council entered into said agreement the money required for said agreement was not in the treasury of said village to the credit of the fund from which it was and is to be drawn, nor had the clerk of the village certified to the council that the money required was or is in said treasury to the credit of the fund from which, it was to he drawn, and not appropriated for any other purpose. Said agreement of council is in violation of the revised statutes of the state, section 1536-205. Plaintiffs are owners of real and personal property in the village, and taxpayers. There is no solicitor, attorney or counselor of the village, and plaintiffs bring the action on behalf of the village, and for all taxpayers. Injunction was prayed,, and for full relief.</p> <p>The defendants, the members of the board of trustees, on May 7, 1904, filed an answer as follows:</p> <p>“The said defendants, John E. Smith, Josiah Morrow, George W. Sausser, Horace B. Stokes, Calvin B. Decker and W. Chester Maple, members, of the library board of trustees, as such trustees, for their answer in this cause, say that the terms of the proposal of Andrew Carnegie to the village of Lebanon are not correctly stated in the petition of the plaintiffs; that said proposal was in the following terms:</p> <p>‘New York, 20th February, 1903.</p> <p>‘W. Chester Maple, Esq., Lebanon, Ohio.</p> <p>‘Dear Sir — Responding to your communication in behalf of Lebanon: If the city agree by resolution of council to maintain a free public library at a cost of not less than one thousand dollars a year, and provide a suitable site for the building, Mr. Carnegie will be pleased to furnish ten thousand dollars to erect a free public library building for Lebanon.</p> <p>‘Respectfully yours,</p> <p>‘Jas. Bertram, Private Secretary.*</p> <p>‘“The defendants say that on July 17, 1903, the «council accepted said donation by the adoption of the following resolution:</p> <p>‘Resolved, By the council of- the village of Lebanon, State of Ohio, that the offer of Mr. Andrew Carnegie, made February 20, 1903, to furnish "ten thousand dollars, to erect a free public library building for Lebanon is hereby accepted, and</p> <p>‘Resolved, further .that the council agrees for and on behalf of said village to maintain said free public library at a cost of not less than one thousand -dollars a year and to provide a suitable site for the .same.</p> <p>‘Be it further Resolved, that we express to said Andrew Carnegie the sincere gratitude of the village for this beneficent gift, and that the clerk is directed to transmit to said donor a copy of these resolutions with a request for directions to this council for further mode of procedure.’</p> <p>“The foregoing offer and proposal of said Andrew Carnegie is the only offer and proposal which has been made by him to said village concerning said library building, and the foregoing resolution of acceptance by said council is the only action which has been taken by said council concerning the acceptance of said offer and proposal.</p> <p>“These defendants propose to accept and receive said donation of ten thousand dollars from Andrew Carnegie for the purpose of constructing a library building in accordance with the terms of his said proposal and the acceptance thereof by said council and not otherwise, and they deny that the acceptance of said proposal by said council or the receiving of said money by these defendants is contrary to the best interests of said village or the laws of the state of Ohio.</p> <p>“These defendants further say that all of the plaintiffs in this cause áre owners of lots adjoining the public square, of said town on a part of which the proposed free public library building is to be erected and that the purpose of the plaintiffs in bringing this action is to delay and hinder a public improvement called for by a large majority of the citizens of Lebanon, and to prevent the public from reclaiming the vacant parts of said public square from the private use of the plaintiffs, to the use of the public for which it was dedicated.</p> <p>““Wherefore, these defendants pray that said petition may be dismissed and that they may go hence without day and that they may recover their costs herein expended. ’ ’</p> <p>To this answer a general demurrer was filed by the plaintiffs which was sustained by the common pleas and final judgment entered for plaintiffs. This judgment was affirmed by the circuit court, and the library trustees, defendants below, bring error.</p>

<p>Lease of railroad company — That the lessee exonerate it from-all liability — For damage to property by fire — Not void as. against public policy, when.</p> <p>1. A stipulation in a lease made by a railroad company that the lessee is to exonerate it from all liability for damages by fire to any property or structure on the demised premises,, ■which in the operation of the railroad may be accidentally or negligently communicated to it, is not void as against public policy.</p> <p>2. Such lessee and his insurers cannot recover from the railroad company the amount of the loss by fire to a building, and its contents owned by the lessee and located partly on such premises, when in the operation of the railroad the-fire was communicated to that part of the building on the; demised premises.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Holmes county.</p> <p>At the September term, 1903, of the court of common pleas of Holmes county, to-wit: September 29, 1903, an indictment was returned by the grand jury of that county against the defendant in error, Howard F. Lawrence, charging him with the crime of rape. Said indictment alleged and charged “that on the twenty-sixth day of April, 1901, at said county of Holmes said Howard F. Lawrence being then and there a male person of the age of eighteen years and upward, did unlawfully and knowingly carnally know and abuse one Cambia B. Kasner, with her consent, she, the said Cambia B. Kasner then and there being a female person under the age of sixteen years, to-wit: of the age of fourteen years, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, ’ ’ etc. On October 17, 1903, a motion was filed by the defendant to quash said indictment, which motion was by the court overruled. Thereafter, on December 1, 1903, the defendant further excepted to said indictment by filing thereto a plea in abatement. To this plea the prosecuting attorney, on behalf of the state, interposed a general demurrer which was sustained. Defendant Howard F. Lawrence, thereupon made application for leave to amend his said plea in abatement, which request was refused by'the court, and leave to amend was denied. The defendant then challenged the sufficiency of said indictment by demurring thereto; this demurrer was also overruled, and thereupon the defendant being duly arraigned upon said indictment pleaded thereto, “not guilty.” Thereafter continuances were had in said cause from time to time, until the May term, 1904, of said court of common pleas, at which term, to-wit: on June 17, 1904, the defendant was tried and convicted of the crime of rape, in manner and form as he stood charged in and by said indictment. A motion for new trial was made and overruled, and defendant was sentenced to imprisonment in the Ohio penitentiary for a term of ten years. Thereupon error was prosecuted by the defendant Howard F. Lawrence in the circuit court of Holmes county. On the hearing of the petition in error in the circuit court, that court reversed the judgment of the court of common pleas, and discharged said defendant. The state now prosecutes error in this court, under favor of-section 7306a, Revised Statutes, and asks a reversal of the judgment of the circuit court and of the order made by that court discharging the defendant from custody.</p>

<p>Exceptions by prosecuting attorney to decision of the court of common pleas of Lucas county.</p> <p>The defendant, Mathew J. Dangler, a resident of Fulton county, Ohio, was, under section 7017-3, Revised Statutes, indicted by a grand jury of Lucas county, Ohio, for non-support of his mother, Margaret Dangler, who was a resident of said Lucas county. On the trial of the cause in the court of common pleas of Lucas county, the . evidence introduced on behalf of the State established the fact, that during the whole of the time laid in the indictment, to-wit: from January 1, 1903, to January 1, 1904, said Margaret Dangler, mother of defendant, was a resident of, and was actually and continuously present in, said Lucas county. It was further proven or admitted, that the defendant, Mathew J. Dangler, during the whole of said period was- a resident of Fulton county, Ohio, and was not at any time present in said county of Lucas. At the conclusion of the state’s evidence, the trial court being of opinion that the offense charged- in said indictment against the defendant, if committed by him, was committed in Fulton county and not in the county of Lucas, and that the court of common pleas of Lucas county was therefore without jurisdiction to try said cause, on motion of counsel for defendant, directed •a verdict of acquittal and discharged the defendant. To this decision of the court the prosecuting attorney duly excepted, and now prosecutes this proceeding*, under favor of sections 7305 and 7306, Revised Statutes, to obtain the decision of this court as to the law to govern in similar cases.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Knox county.</p> <p>At the May term of the court of common pleas ©f Knox county, held in 1903, the grand jury of that county indicted the plaintiff in error on two counts, which are: •</p> <p>“The jurors of the grand jury of the state of Ohio, within and for the body of the county of Knox, impaneled, sworn and charged to inquire of crimes and offenses, committed within said county of Knox, in the name and by the authority of the state of Ohio, on their oaths find and present, that William B. Weaver, late' of said county, from the tenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand, nine hundred and three, until the eleventh day of May, one thousand^ nine hundred and three, at the county of Knox aforesaid, in the municipal corporation of Mt. Yernon, in said county of Knox and state , of Ohio; not 'being then and there a regular druggist, and hot being then and there a manufacturer of intoxicating liquors from the raw material, did unlawfully keep a place where intoxicating liquors were then and there- sold as a beverage, which said keeping of said place for the purpose as aforesaid was then and there prohibited and unlawful, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio. .</p> <p>Second. Count. And the jurors of the grand jury aforesaid, on their oaths aforesaid, and charged to inquire of crimes and offenses committed within said, county of Knox as aforesaid, in the name and by the authority of the state of Ohio, on their said oaths do further find and present that William B. Weaver, late of said county, on the tenth day of April, in the year of our Lord, one thousand; nine hundred and three, and from that day until the commencement of the proceedings herein, to-wit: on the eleventh day of May, one thousand, nine hundred ■and three, at the said county of Knox in the state of Ohio, and -in the municipal corporation of Mt: Vernon was and has been unlawfully the keeper of a place located at South Main street in said municipal corporation of Mt. Vernon in said county of Knox and state of Ohio, where intoxicating liquors were and have been then and there sold by the said William B. Weaver in violation of the acts of the general assembly of the state of Ohio, in reference to the sale of intoxicating liquors in the state of Ohio, to the common nuisance of the citizens and people of the state of Obio, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio.</p> <p>“Columbus Ewalt,</p> <p>' “Prosecuting Attorney, Knox County, Ohio.”</p> <p>To this indictment the accused on being arraigned plead not guilty. The case came on to be tried at the same term of the court.</p> <p>As a part of the case to be made for the state, the minutes of the council of the city of Mt. Vernon under date of March 11, 1903, purporting to be the record of the proceedings relating to a canvass of the poll-books and tally-sheets of a special election held in said city on the tenth day of March, 1903, under what is commonly called the Beal local option law, were offered in evidence. The record was admitted and the defendant excepted. Objections were made to other evidence offered and introduced by the state, and exceptions were saved.</p> <p>After the close of the evidence, the case was argued by counsel, and thereupon the court charged the jury, who found the defendant “guilty as he stands charged in each count in the indictment.”</p> <p>A motion for new trial was overruled and the court pronounced the following sentence: “It is therefore considered and adjudged by the court on the first count in said indictment, that the said defendant, William Weaver, pay the fine of two hundred dollars and the costs of this prosecution, and that he stand committed to the workhouse of the city of Columbus, Ohio, until the amount of said fine and costs shall be paid or secured to be paid, or until he be discharged therefrom by allowing a credit of sixty cents per day on such fine and costs for each day of confinement in such workhouse, or otherwise legally discharged.”</p> <p>“And on the second count in said indictment it is considered and adjudged by the court, that the said defendant, William B. Weaver, be imprisoned in the workhouse of the city of Columbus, Ohio, and kept at hard labor for the term of thirty days, that he pay a fine of one hundred dollars and the costs of this prosecution and stand committed to said workhouse until said fine and costs are paid or secured to be paid, or until he be discharged- therefrom by allowing a credit of sixty cents per day on such fine and costs for each day of confinement in such workhouse, or be otherwise legally discharged. ’ ’</p> <p>“And it is further considered, adjudged and found by the court that the place where such intoxicating liquors were sold by defendant in violation of the laws of Ohio, is a common nuisance, and it is hereby decreed and ordered by the court that the defendant shut up and abate the same.”</p> <p>The defendant excepted to the judgment rendered, prepared and had allowed a bill of exceptions containing the evidence and proceedings on the trial, and filed the same with a petition in error in the circuit court. That court affirmed the judgment of the court of common pleas, and error is prosecuted in this court to reverse both judgments.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Hamilton county.</p> <p>Mason and Sewell were indicted under section 6835 of the Revised Statutes, as amended October 22, 1902, for forcibly and maliciously breaking and entering an inhabited dwelling-house, the property of Paul Walker, with intent the personal property of said Walker to steal and carry away. To the indictment they pleaded not guilty. On the trial no evidence was offered by the accused. That offered by the state showed that the owner of the property with his wife had gone on a summer trip to Europe, intending to return at the close of his vacation, leaving their furniture and all their other household goods and wearing apparel in the house, the whole in care of two servants who regularly spent their days and nights in the house but were temporarily absent therefrom at the time of the breaking and entering, having gone to spend something less than an hour in shopping. The presence of the accused in the house was discovered by a neighbor who gave information to the police who promptly surrounded the house. One of the accused attempted to escape by jumping from a window of the second story, but was at once arrested. The officers having procured a key from the servants upon their return, arrested the other within the dwelling. The contents of bureau drawers' and trunks were found upon the floor and valuables had been taken. These facts being conclusively established, counsel for .the accused requested the court to direct a verdict of acquittal. This was denied, and the court instructed the jury correctly, as is admitted, unless it erred in instructing them that an inhabited dwelling-house does not change its character because of such a temporary absence upon an errand of those who regularly occupy it. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of breaking and entering an inhabited dwelling-house. A motion for a new trial was overruled and the sentence appropriate to the verdict followed. In the circuit court the judgment of the court of common pleas was reversed for error in the charge with respect to the meaning of the phrase “an inhabited dwelling-house. ’ ’</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Hamilton county.</p> <p>On the thirty-first day of May, 1887, the Board of Education of the School District of Cincinnati adopted a rule, which reads as follows: '“None but the children, wards and apprentices of actual residents of Cincinnati or free-holders whose homesteads are in part in Cincinnati shall, under any circumstances, be admitted free to the common schools of the city; and in cases of wards and apprentices Record evidence of the right of admission shall be furnished whenever required. Children, wards and apprentices of non-residents may be admitted by the trustees (school committee) of any district upon payment, in advance, to the clerk of the board of the following tuition fees, viz.: High schools, $70.00 per annum; intermediate department, $40.00 per annum; district department, $24.00 per annum; deaf mute school, $24.00 per annum, payable quarterly, semi-annually or yearly. ’ ’</p> <p>Thereafter, on the sixteenth day of April, 1900, one George R. Griffiths was chosen clerk of the board of education of the Cincinnati school district for the term of three years and until his successor should be chosen and qualified, and he immediately entered upon the discharge of the duties of said office. On the twenty-first of May, 1900, the said clerk gave bond to the state of Ohio in the sum of five thousand dollars, conditioned upon the faithful performance of all the official duties required of him as clerk of said board, and the defendants became and were sureties thereon; and upon the death of the said George R. Griffiths, which occurred on the first day of October, 1900, it was found that a large sum, to-wit, the sum of $4,668.75, tuition fees for attendance in the public schools in the city of Cincinnati, had come to his hands and had been converted by said clerk' to his own use. ■ Thereupon suit was begun in the court of common pleas of Hamilton county to recover from the defendants, as the sureties' of the said clerk, the amount claimed to be due from the clerk. The defendants demurred to the petition upon the ground that the same does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them. These demurrers were sustained in the court of common pleas and judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants. The judgment of the court of common pleas was affirmed by the circuit court and this proceeding in error is prosecuted to reverse the judgments of the circuit court and the court of common pleas.</p>

Warner C. Devenney (defendant in error) commenced an action against Samuel S. Devenney (plaintiff in error) by the filing of a petition in'the court of common pleas of Licking, a copy of which follows: Plaintiff says that he is one of the legatees under the will of John P. Devenney, deceased, and that the defendant, Samuel Devenney, is the executor of said last will and testament, and the trustee provided for by section fourth of said will.

The plaintiff in error assigned his wages to the defendant in error. A copy of the assignment is as follows: “$75.00 Toledo, Ohio, April 22, 1904. To the Paymaster, L. 8. & M. 8.

<p>Action against railway company by. locomotive fireman — For personal injury from defect in water gauge glass of locomotive — Burden of proof upon the plaintiff — To create presumption of negligence — Section 8865-21, Revised Statutes —Law of negligence — Law of evidence. •</p> <p>1. On the trial of an action against a railroad company brought by á locomotive fireman for a personal injury received by him in consequence of a defect in the water gauge- glass attached to the locomotive upon which he was employed, an instruction, that to overcome the effect of the prima facie evidence of negligence arising from proof of such defect, “the defendant company is required to satisfy the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that it was not negligent,” is erroneous.</p> <p>2. In such action the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the particular negligence alleged, is at all times upon the plaintiff, and while proof of facts sufficient under the statute, (section 3365-21), to create a prima facie presumption of negligence against the defendant casts upon it the burden of producing evidence of equal weight or countervailing force, in order to control or destroy such presumption, yet proof of such facts does not impose upon the defendant the burden of establishing affirmatively, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it was not negligent.</p> <p>3. The rule is that he who affirms must prove, and when the whole of the evidence upon the issue involved leaves the case in equipoise, the party affirming must fail.</p>

<p>One railway company crossing tracks and right of way of another railway company — Competent for companies to agree, when —Interlocking system — Section 2!¡1e, Revised Statutes — One railway company to maintain signal man — Through his neglect fireman of crossing company injured — Liability of first company for damages — Law of negligence — Contracts,</p> <p>1. When, one railway company desires to cross the tracks and right of way of another railway company at a common grade, it is competent for such companies to agree, as between themselves, upon the terms of crossing, including the compensation for the right to so cross, the payment of the expense of constructing and maintaining the crossing, the installing and maintaining of an interlocking system, as well as to which of the two companies shall employ, control and pay the necessary flag man or tower man to operate the interlocking system. Such a contract is not prohibited by section 247e, Revised Statutes.</p> <p>2. The T railway company, desiring to cross the tracks and right of way of the P company at a common grade, entered into a written agreement with the latter company, whereby the right to’ so cx;oss was obtained for an agreed consideration and the performance by the T company of certain covenants contained in the written agreement; — one to the effect that it would furnish the materials for and construct and put in all crossing frogs and other fixtures necessary to make the crossing with the existing tracks, and forever maintain the same at its own cost and expense; and, of the further covenant that it would “immediately upon the execution of this agreement, erect and thereafter maintain and operate at its own expense, at the place of said crossing, an interlocking system, which shall be satisfactory to the signal engineer of the first party (the P company), and under the operation of which trains of either party may be permitted, under the laws of the state, to pass over said crossing without coming to a stop * * * .” In compliance with these provisions, the T company constructed the crossing, established and thereafter maintained at the place of crossing an interlocking system, which included a tower from which to operate the signals for trains on both, roads, and also a derailing device. It employed, paid and controlled the tower man to operate said interlocking system, having the sole right to command and discharge him. While the said system was being so operated, a freight train on the road of the P company was approaching said crossing, and the crew in charge of the train received through the tower man, signals that the crossing was clear and that said train was entitled to cross without stopping, and said signals were continued until the train was so near the crossing that it could not be ■stopped before reaching the same, when the tower man suddenly changed the signals and opened the derail, thereby derailing and wrecking the engine and a number of cars composing said train, in which wreck the fireman on said ■engine was severely injured. Held: That on such facts the T company is liable in damages to the fireman for the injuries sustained by reason of the negligent acts of the tower man. Railway v. Schneider, 45 Ohio St., 678, distinguished.'</p>

<p>Operation of oil wells — Conducted adjacent to stream — Salt water floioing into stream — Injunction of lower riparian owner will not lie, when.</p> <p>Although from the operation of oil wells conducted with care on lands adjacent to a flowing stream, salt water in sufficient quantities to make the water of the stream unsuitable for the generation of steam may by gravity be carried into the stream, such operation will not be enjoined at the suit of a lower riparian owner who has been accustomed to use the waters of the stream, for the generation of steam, if it appears that the plaintiff may obtain water suitable for the purpose from another convenient source, or that the water • of the stream may at a reasonable and ascertainable expense be made suitable therefor.</p>

<p>Foreign corporation doing business in this state — Requirements and exemptions — Sections 148c and 148d, Revised Statutes— Foreign corporation furnishing refrigerator cars for transportation — Not entitled to comply with section 148c, when— Not exempt from process of attachment, when.</p> <p>1. A foreign corporation whose business is furnishing refrigerator cars and ice therefor, for transportation purposes partly within this state and partly without and across this state, is a “transportation or other corporation engaged in Ohio in interstate commerce business,” within the meaning of section 148o, Revised Statutes.</p> <p>2. Such corporation is not subject to the provisions of section 148c, Revised Statutes, nbr entitled to comply with its requirements; and a voluntary compliance with that section by such corporation, will not bring the corporation within the proviso of section 148d, Revised Statutes, so as to exempt it‘from process of attachment upon the ground that it is a foreign corporation or non-resident of this state.</p>

An action was comttienced, August 29, 1903, by Amanda Hoiles, (plaintiff in error) in the court of common pleas of Columbiana against Lodge Riddle as administrator of Robert Watson, deceased, to recover a money judgment in the sum of $3,310.00 and interest, against him as such administrator, and William C. Watson, who claims to be an heir of the deceased, and Jacob Freshley, who claims to hold title to certain lands by purchase from the estate.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Lorain county.</p> <p>The plaintiff in error, a resident taxpayer of the city of Elyria, brought suit in the court of common pleas to enjoin the city from paying to the Barber Asphalt Paving Company the balance due it on .a contract for paving one of the avenues of said ■city.</p> <p>As grounds for the relief he avers that the ■ordinance for the improvement was defective in that it did not provide the kind of material to be used in the making of the improvement; that the certificate of the auditor that the money necessary for the improvement was in the treasury to the credit of the proper fund and unappropriated for any other purpose was not filed with the council before the passage of the resolution and ordinance authorizing said improvement nor before the contract for said improvement was entered into by the city; that there was no money in the treasury to the credit of said fund nor had any bonds or notes been sold at the time of entering into the contract.</p> <p>Plaintiff further averred that if it should appear that at any time the auditor had certified to the •council that there was money in the treasury to the ■credit of said fund for the purpose of constructing .said improvement such certificate was false and untrue and was fraudulently made by the procurement of the paving company to acquire an undue advantage over and with the intent to defraud the •city out of the money named in the contract.</p> <p>The city answered denying the facts stated as .grounds for the relief prayed for.</p> <p>The Asphalt Company also denied these facts and .averred that in response to an invitation from the ■city for bids it filed with said city a bid for making the improvement, that its bid was accepted, that prior to entering into the contract the auditor of the city filed with the council of the city a certificate, certifying that the money required by the contract was in. the treasury of the city to the credit of the improvement fund for said avenue and not appropriated to any other purpose, and that said certificate ,was immediately recorded as required hy law, and that before the making of said contract the city procured from its city solicitor an opinion that it had a right to enter into said contract and that the paving company, relying upon the fact of the filing and recording of said certificate and of said opinion of the city solicitor and believing that all of the acts of the city were had and done in áccordance with law, entered into said contract in good faith and thereáfter furnished the materials and labor and constructed said improvement in all respects in accordance with its contract and to the satisfaction and acceptance of said city and fin so doing expended a large amount of money of which there remained unpaid and due it under said contract the sum of $22,000, and that it would be inequitable and unjust in the city to refuse payment according to the terms of its contract and that if it was not permitted to do so the city would have the improvement without .paying for it, and thus a great wrong and injury would be done the paving company; that the work was done with knowledge of all the facts by the plaintiff and that he did not bring the suit until the work had been done and that he and the city were estopped to deny the obligation on the part of the. city.</p> <p>The plaintiff denied the averments of the answers.</p> <p>The court of common pleas found that the contract price of the improvement was, in round numbers, $58,000; the part to be paid by the city $30,000, and that $36,000 of the contract price had been paid and that $22,000 remained due and that plaintiff was entitled to an order restraining the payment of so much of the balance due as is tlie part to be paid by the city in proportion to the contract price, to-wit, the sum of $11,000 and enjoined the payment of that amount.</p> <p>The case was appealed to the circuit court. That court made the following findings of fact:</p> <p>“I. That on the ninth day of August, 1904, the city solicitor of said city was requested by plaintiff to bring this action; but said solicitor failed, neglected and refused so to do.</p> <p>“II. That on and from time to time after the twenty-second day of March, 1904, all proceedings required by law were duly had by said city for the making of the improvements described in the petition, save that (a) the council of said city never determined what hied of material should be used for paving said street otherwise than to determine by resolution, duly passed and approved, that it should be asphalt, brick or other material as might thereafter be determined, and to direct by ordinance that the board of public service of said city contract with the lowest and best bidder for said improvement; and in accordance therewith said board thereafter determined to use asphalt; (b) the certificate of the auditor of said city, that the money necessary for said improvement was in the treasury to the credit of the proper fund and unappropriated for any other purpose was filed with the clerk of the council and also in the office of the board of public service of said city on the same day that, and immediately before, said contract was let, and not before that time, and that on the day of said filing of said certificate and letting of said contract, all proceedings of council with respect to said improvement had already been had, and said council was not in session on the day of the filing of said certificate.</p> <p>“III. At the time said certificate was filed there was no cash in the proper fund and unappropriated in said treasury for said improvement, but bonds of said city wherewith to provide such cash had been duly authorized. Said bonds had not been sold nor were there any notes of said city then sold and in process of delivery, and said facts were all well hnown to all the defendants; who, however, in good faith, and pursuant to the advice of the solicitor of said city, proceeded with said improvement, believing that their proceedings were lawful.</p> <p>“IV. Plaintiff, when said contract was let, was present and protested against said action, but thereafter paid a portion of the assessment levied on his property to pay the cost of said improvement, and he forebore to bring this action until said contract was fully executed and the improvement completed.</p> <p>“V. $36,000 has been paid and $22,000 is unpaid on said contract;” and concluded as matter of law that the plaintiff by his laches was estopped to deny the due authorization of the use of asphalt as the material for said improvement and that all of the other proceedings of the city were regular and lawful and dismissed the plaintiff’s petition at his cost.</p> <p>Error is prosecuted to this court.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Wyandot county.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

On the ninth day of September, 1901, The Beaumont Glass Company, a corporation and defendant in error, filed its petition in the court of common pleas of Belmont county, addressed to one of the judges of said court, of which the following is a copy, omitting caption and signature: “The Beaumont Glass Company, a corporation, duly incorporated and organized under the laws of the state of West Virginia, respectfully represents that it is the owner of lots numbers 202 and 203 in…

The defendants in error, as taxpayers,of the city •of Tiffin, brought suit in the court of common pleas to enjoin the city from' issuing certain bonds described in their petition. In that court a demurrer to their petition was sustained and the petition dismissed. On petition in error the circuit court affirmed the judgment as to eleven of the causes of action but reversed it as to the twelfth. As to the twelfth cause of action the circuit court overruled the demurrer.

<p>Error to tbe Circuit Court of Cuyahoga couuty.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

George Gladieux (defendant in error) commenced an action in the common pleas of Lucas against August Uihlein and The Joseph Schlitz Brewing Company, seeking to enforce an alleged lien against lot 577 in the Birmingham Addition to the City of Toledo, by reason of an alleged judgment rendered by a justice of the peace in favor of Gladieux against one Lucy Rogers.

<p>Division of township — Section 1877, Revised Statutes — Township erected or boundary changed — New township 'not entitled to portion of original township’s money, when.</p> <p>In case of the division of a township and the establishment of a new township, the new township, under section 1377, Revised Statutes, is entitled not only to its portion of the money in the treasury of the original township, at the time the nev township is established, but also to money thereafter in the treasury, to the extent the same was collected from the territory established into the new township.</p>

On the twentieth day of March, 1905, the defendants in error presented to the county commissioners of Darke county, Ohio, and caused the same to be filed with the auditor of said county, a petition asking for the improvement of a certain public road lying and being within said county, pursuant to an act of the general assembly of the state of Ohio passed April 4, 1900, entitled “An act for the improvement of public roads.” (94 O. L., 96.) On March 30, 1905, said…

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Montgomery ■county.</p> <p>On the fourteenth day of August, 1901, the -defendant in error, hy his next friend Prank Ritter, ■commenced an action against the plaintiff in error, to recover damages for malicious prosecution, in which petition it is averred that G-aiser, on or about the twenty-first day of January, A. D. 1901, falsely, maliciously and without reasonable or probable •cause therefor, filed an affidavit before Lee Markey, .a justice of the peace in and for Dayton township, in Montgomery county, against the plaintiff, charging that on or about the second day of January, 1901, in said county, the plaintiff, Hurleman, did •unlawfully, knowingly and maliciously and feloniously and verbally demand of him, said Jacob ■G-aiser, the sum of $4,000, with menaces to do injury -to the person of him, the said Jacob G-aiser, to-wit, to assault, strike and beat him with a club and rope, .and to kill him the said G-aiser, with intent thereby to then and there, by means of such menaces, to nnlawfully, wilfully, maliciously and feloniously ■extort from him, G-aiser, said sum of money; and that he, G-aiser, caused a warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff to be issued and his arrest thereon secured; that plaintiff was required to enter into recognizance for his appearance to answer said charge; that on the twenty-fifth of January the •case was heard by the justice, and the plaintiff was held to answer to the court of common pleas of that county and he was required to give recognizance for his appearance there, which he gave; that on the thirty-first' day' of January, 1901, Gaiser appeared before the grand jury, and there wilfully, maliciously, and without probable cause, testified in said cause, and furnished to the grand jury certain false information against the plaintiff, and thereby procured the indictment of plaintiff on said charge; that on the second of March, 1901, said indictment was quashed and dismissed, and the plaintiff discharged, and said cause is.wholly ended and determined; that he was compelled to employ counsel to defend him, etc., and prayed damages in the sum of $5,000.</p> <p>Gaiser answered, alleging: .(1) That upon the transcript sent up from the docket of Lee Markey, justice of the peace, of the proceedings had before him against the plaintiff, and upon the testimony the grand jury found and returned two separate indictments against the plaintiff and others jointly, one of which was still pending when this action was commenced; that said bills were found upon the same matters and facts, identical in time and place ■of occurrence. The answer denies that the prosecution is ended. (2) The defendant denies all malice and pleads probable cause for the arrest and prosecution ; that he detailed all the facts to a competent lawyer and sought his advice and acted upon it in instituting the prosecution. The reply denies the pendency of the prosecution when the action was commenced.</p> <p>On the issues, the case was tried to a jury. At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant, Gaiser, moved the court to direct a verdict in his favor on the ground, “that the proof of the plaintiff did not show that the proseention for which damages was claimed was fully determined and ended.” The motion was overruled and the defendant excepted. The defendant then introduced his evidence against which the plaintiff introduced evidence in rebuttal. The defendant excepted to the charge of the court. A verdict was returned for the plaintiff assessing damages. The motion for new trial was overruled and judgment rendered on the verdict. On error, the circuit court affirmed the judgment. The case is here on error to reverse both judgments.</p> <p>The material facts are stated in the.opinion.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Cuyahoga county.</p> <p>Cox brought suit in the court of common pleas against the Storage Company to recover for a breach of its alleged contract to procure insurance on goods stored by him with it and destroyed by fire while uninsured. He alleged that on October 4, 1902, the parties entered into a contract whereby the Company, which as its name indicates was a warehouseman, agreed to store in its warehouse his household goods of the value of $850.00 and to have the same insured in the sum of $500.00 while they should be in its possession; that he delivered the goods to the Company in pursuance to said contract; that it failed to procure any insurance whatever on them, and that on about January 10, 1903, a fire occurred to said warehouse and the goods were wholly destroyed.</p> <p>The Company answered admitting its corporate character; the reception of the goods for storage and their destruction by fire; and denying all the other averments of the petition.</p> <p>On the trial of the issues to a jury the plaintiff’ introduced evidence tending to show that having ordered that vans of the Company he sent for his goods, and the vans not having arrived, he hastened to the warehouse of the Company and inquired of a young man on duty in the office and apparently in charge of it where the manager was. He was told that the manager was up stairs and would he sent for. Shortly an employe of the Company named H. E. Smith, who was a stranger to Cox appeared in response to the summons and said that he was the manager. Cox then explained his insistence that the vans should he sent promptly for his goods because he had procured tickets for New York and the time for the departure of his train was near at hand and that before going he desired to see his goods properly in place in the warehouse and to effect their insurance. In response to the latter suggestion Smith said: “Let us take care of that for you.” After some conversation as to the character and rates of the proposed insurance Cox accepted the suggestion thus made to him and Smith said: “We cannot hand you the policy now hut will send it to you.” Smith then made a written memorandum of the amount of the policy desired and of the New York address of Cox and added that as he had a hank account in Cleveland, he could send a check for the premium when he received the policy. A few days later a letter written on the head of the Company and bearing its name in the proper place for its signature, attested, “per H. E. S.” was sent to Cox at his New York address stating that insurance for $500.00 had been effected hut that the policy was not forwarded because of doubt as to the precise amount of insurance which he desired. The testimony offered by the Company was that Smith was not manager for it but in his absence acted in his stead; that it was not engaged in the business of insuring goods left in its care; that it had given Smith no authority to bind it by contracts of this character and that he did not report to it any insurance which he effected upon goods deposited with it. The value of the goods was proved by Smith as alleged. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant’s motion for a new trial was overruled. On petition in error the circuit court affirmed the judgment of the court of common pleas.</p>

This action was begun in the court of common pleas of Ottawa county by the plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below, -to quiet title to certain lands, which are now a part of said Ottawa county; and also to restrain the defendant from interfering in any manner with the right of plaintiffs in the premises and from preventing the plaintiffs from going upon the premises and removing one-half of the gypsum, or plaster, therefrom, and for other relief.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Logan county.</p> <p>Facts necessary to an understanding of the points decided are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Word “watercourse” synonymous with word “drain,” when — ■ County' commissioners without authority to convert stream into ditch, when.</p> <p>Tlie word “watercourse” as used in the county ditch law, title 6, ch. 1, Revised Statutes, is synonymous with the word “drain,” and the county commissioners are without authority to convert a living stream of water into a ditch hy proceedings for the locating and constructing of a ditch.</p>

The facts presented by the record in this case are as follows. On the third Tuesday of January, 1896, the following described real estate situate in Putnam county, Ohio, to wit: The south half of the southeast quarter of section fifteen (15) Town two (2) north, Range six (6) east, was forfeited to the state of Ohio for nonpayment of the taxes and penalty then due thereon.

<p>Bank insolvent — Through fraudulent acts of cashier — Situation known to some directors — Receiver takes possession of hank —Customer makes deposit on last day hank open — Permitted to recover full amount — As preferred creditor — Imputed knowledge of hank officers — Law of agency — Respective rights of creditors.</p> <p>The board of directors of a hanking corporation, consisting of five persons, appointed P, one of the members, as its cashier, who, by its authority, was placed in control of its property and was made the active manager of its business. The president, also a director, resided in the country, was old and infirm, and gave no attention to the bank’s affairs. The treasurer, likewise a director, resided in another county engaged in business of his own. Within the last year of the existence of the bank, there was no meeting of the board of directors, and during that time, if not before, the bank became “hopelessly and irretrievably insolvent” through the fraudulent acts of the cashier and its vice president, likewise a director, who themselves being insolvent, used the funds of the bank for their own purposes, and the purposes of other corporations with which they were connected. These fraudulent acts were not communicated to the other directors. An examination of the condition of said bank at any time within thirty days before it was closed, would have disclosed its insolvency, but no such examination was made by the board of directors, or by anyone in its behalf. On the last day the bank was open for business, and but a few minutes before the close of banking hours, B, a customer, being entirely ignorant of said insolvent condition, made a general deposit consisting of some cash and certain checks drawn in his favor on other banks. The agent of the bank then in charge received the deposit, and entered the same on the pass book of the depositor to his credit, but did not enter the credit on the books of the bank. The cash part of the deposit was commingled with other funds of the bank, thereby increasing the same. On the second day thereafter, a receiver took possession of the property and funds of the bank including said deposit of cash and checks, and caused said cash deposit to be entered on the books of the bank to B’s credit, and several days thereafter collected and received the amount called for by said checks. Before the checks were collected, and on the same day the receiver took possession, B demanded of him the cash and checks so deposited, or their proceeds and his demand was refused. Two days before the deposit was made, in the night season, and knowing the bank to be hopelessly insolvent, the said cashier and vice president clandestinely absconded, leaving in charge one who had been acting as bookkeeper and assistant cashier, and another bookkeeper, who also knew that the bank was short of funds, and that according to its books, it was insolvent when the deposit was made. Held: .(1) That under these circumstances, the knowledge of the cashier as to its hopeless insolvency should be imputed to the bank. (2) The deposit having been fraudulently received, no title thereto vested in the bank, and on making timely demand upon the receiver for its return, the depositor is entitled to recover of him its full amount in preference over the claim of general creditors.</p>

<p>Petition in error filed in the supreme .court — For the reversal 6† the circuit court — Voluntarily dismissed without prejudice— Not a tar to another petition in error, when.</p> <p>A petition in error filed in the supreme court for the reversal of a judgment of the circuit court, and by leave of the court voluntarily dismissed without prejudice because of the plaintiff’s failure to file within sixty days a printed copy of the record to he reviewed, is not a bar to the prosecution of another petition in error for the reversal of the same judgment.</p>

<p>Mandamus.</p> <p>A petition was, filed in this court by Mr. Wade H. Ellis, attorney general, April 25, 1906, setting forth that the defendant, George G. Mnlhern, is the sheriff of Cuyahoga county; that William F. Eirick, was, on November 3, 1903, elected county commissioner for Cuyahoga county for a term of three years; that he assumed the office September 19, 1904, and that his term will expire September 16, 1907. That it is the duty of the defendant, as such sheriff, by virtue of the statutes of the state, to give notice by proclamation of the time and place of holding an election to elect a county commissioner to succeed said Eirick; that the defendant declines, refuses to and declares that he will not give such notice; that relator has no adequate remedy by the ordinary course of law, and prays a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to give notice by proclamation for such election.</p> <p>The defendant answered taking issue only with the allegation as to the expiration of Eirick’s term, and alleging that the term will not terminate until the first day of December, 1908. It therefore is not the duty of the defendant to give notice by proclamation of the time and place of holding an election for commissioner upon the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, 1906, and he still refuses so to do and will not give such notice.</p> <p>To that answer a general demurrer is filed.</p>

of Cincinnati. Plaintiff, Anna Holzenkamp, recovered a judgment against the defendant, The Cincinnati Traction Company, for personal injuries received by her by the falling of the trolley poles or one of the trolley poles of one of defendant’s cars as she was about to step upon it on a street in the city of Cincinnati.

Ebbob to the Circuit Court of Franklin county. The original action, out of which the present proceeding in error arises, was commenced by the defendant in error Carlisle Barrere against plaintiffs in error The Eldridge & Higgins Company et al., in the court of common pleas of Franklin county, Ohio, on March 30, 1903. Judgment having gone against them in the court of common pleas, plaintiffs in error on December 31, 1903, appealed said cause to the circuit court.

On the twelfth day of March, 1904, Mary A. Fitzpatrick, one of the defendants in .error, filed her petition against the plaintiff in error and others, in the court of common pleas of Erie county, in which she set up a decree for alimony in her favor and against her husband, James Fitzpatrick, in the sum of $1,000, which decree was made by the court of common pleas at the January term for the year 1893, and on the twenty-third of February of that year.

<p>Tax inquisitors — Law authorising their employment by county commissioners — Act of April 10, 1888 — Act of April 83, 1885 —Sections 1343-1 to 1843-4 and 1848a and 1848b, Revised Statutes — Invalidity of acts because of special nature — Section 86 of article 8 of the constitution — Uniformity of laws— Constitutional law.</p> <p>1. Since it is not within the judicial function to give to a statute an operation which the legislature does not intend, the Act of April 10, 1888 (Revised Statutes, sections 1343-1 to 1343-4 inclusive), to authorize the employment of tax inquisitors, cannot by interpretation be extended to the four counties in which the Act of April 23, 1885 (Revised Statutes, sections 1343a and 13436), was intended to be operative, the legislative intention to provide for their concurrent operation being expressed in the later act.</p> <p>2. The acts relate to a subject of a general nature and, there being substantial differences in their provisions, they are repugnant to section 26, article 2 of the constitution which requires that “all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state.”</p>

<p>Conduct of elections — Certificate of nomination — Sections 2966-18 to 2966-28, Revised Statutes — One acting as secretary of rival conventions may he compelled hy mandamus — To execute certificates of nomination made hy each, convention — Duties ■ of election hoard — Jurisdiction of court as to questions of nomination.</p> <p>1. Within the meaning of section 2966-18, Revised Statutes, the ■chairman and secretary of a nominating convention are the “proper officers” to execute certificates of nominations made by such convention.</p> <p>2. A person who acts as secretary of two rival conventions may be compelled by mandamus to execute certificates of nomination made by each convention, in order that rival candidates may present their claims for determination by the election board named in section 2966-23, Revised Statutes.</p> <p>3. Upon an application of this character the court will consider only questions relating to the relator’s right to such certificate of nomination, leaving all questions involved in the validity of the claims of rival candidates to be the nominee to be determined by said election board.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of Franklin county.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of Licking county.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of Columbiana county.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of Knox county.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of- Lucas county.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of Lucas county.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of Seneca county.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of Hancock county.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of Hamilton county.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of Hamilton county.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of Payette county.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of Holmes county.</p>

<p>Error to Circuit Court of Lucas county.</p>