74 So. 3d 984 - Brown v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). In Cage v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court found that a jury charge that defined ‘reasonable doubt’ by using the phrases ‘grave uncertainty,’ ‘actual substantial doubt,’ and ‘moral certainty’ could have led a reasonable juror to interpret the instructions to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. Subsequently, the Court ‘made it clear that the proper inquiry is not whether the instruction “could have” been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it.’ Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 , 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72-73 , and n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 482 and n. 4, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991), emphasis in original). Thus, the constitutional question presented here is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow the conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship reasonable doubt standard. Victor v. Nebraska; Ex parte Kirby, 643 So.2d 587 (Ala.), cert, denied, [513] U.S. [1023], 115 S.Ct. 591 , 130 L.Ed.2d 504 (1994); Cox v. State, 660 So.2d 233”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stanley v. State

2. ““In [Ex parte ] Walker, 928 So.2d [259,] 265 [ (Ala.2005) ], the Supreme Court set forth the following standard for evaluating the reasons for the delay: “ ‘Barker[ v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),] recognizes three categories of reasons for delay: (1) deliberate delay, (2) negligent delay, and (3) justified delay. 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . Courts assign different weight to different reasons for delay. Deliberate delay is “weighted heavily” against the State. 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 . Deliberate delay includes an “attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense” or “‘to gain some tactical advantage over (defendants) or to harass them.’ ” 407 U.S. at 531 & n. 32, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). Negligent delay is weighted less heavily against the State than is deliberate delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ; Ex parte Carrell, 565 So.2d [104,] 108 [(Ala.1990) ]. Justified delay — which includes such occurrences as missing witnesses or delay for which the defendant is primarily responsible — is not weighted against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ; Zumbado v. State, 615 So.2d 1223, 1234 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (“ ‘Delays occasioned by the defendant or on his behalf are excluded from the length of delay and are heavily counted against the defendant in applying the balancing test of Barker.’ ”) (quoting McCa”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Scheuing v. State

3. “" ' " '[T]he rule on which the weight of authority is in agreement is that it is improper for the prosecuting attorney ... to express his personal opinion or belief in guilt of accused [so] as to permit an inference by the jury that such opinion or belief is based on reasons or information outside the evidence, but that it is not improper for him to argue or to express his opinion that accused is guilty, where he states, or it is apparent, that such opinion is based solely on the evidence.' 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1104, p. 194-95 (1961). See Crenshaw v. State , 153 Ala. 5 , 7, 45 So. 631 , 632 (1908) (prosecutor argued to the effect that the evidence showed a clear case); Cranmore v. State , 41 Ala.App. 276 , 279, 129 So.2d 121 , 123 (1961) (prosecutor's statement, 'I never did ask you to convict a man I believe to be innocent' found to be 'a mere expression of opinion by the solicitor that the defendant was guilty, and ... not a cause for reversal'); Handley v. State , 214 Ala. 172 , 175, 106 So. 692 , 695 (1925) (argument, 'She is a murderer; she is a murderer. She is not some one who has committed some of the lower offenses of homicide' did 'not transcend the bounds of legitimate argument'); Gardner v. State , 17 Ala.App. 589 , 590-91, 87 So. 885 , 886, cert. denied, 205 Ala. 60 , 87 So. 888 (1920) (prosecutor's argument that the defendant 'is a pickpocket' in prosecution for grand larceny 'was the expression of an opinion' by the prosecutor, 'and from the state's conten”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. State