Dunlap v. Commissioner’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Here, the option in issue, option number 1, expired on July 11, 1973. The cost of that option could not thereafter be refunded or credited in any way against the purchase price if one of the remaining options were later exercised. Thus, we do not have the classic situation where the character of the $35,000 payment cannot be determined in 1973, which necessitates postponement of recognition of gain or loss. See Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 195 (1938), aff'd. 99 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938), cert. denied 307 U.S. 630 [ 59 S.Ct. 833 , 83 L.Ed. 1513 ] (1939); Koch v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 71 (1976). Accordingly, we hold that Hawkeye is entitled to deduct the loss on the $35,000 option which lapsed in 1973. [Dunlap v. Commissioner, supra at 1430-31 (footnote omitted).]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Dunlap v. Commissioner · Paul D. Dunlap and Shirley A. Dunlap, Hawkeye Bancorporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

2. “(a) Treatment of gain or loss. Gain or loss attributable to the sale or exchange of, or loss attributable to failure to exercise, a privilege or option to buy or sell property shall be considered gain or loss from the sale or exchange of property which has the same character as the property to which the option or privilege relates has in the hands of the taxpayer (or would have in the hands of the taxpayer if acquired by him). (b) Special rule for loss attributable to failure to exercise option. For purposes of subsection (a), if loss is attributable to failure to exercise a privilege or option, the privilege or option shall be deemed to have been sold or exchanged on the day it expired.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Dunlap v. Commissioner · Paul D. Dunlap and Shirley A. Dunlap, Hawkeye Bancorporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

3. “Far closer to the facts before us is our more recent opinion, Monon Railroad v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 345 . (1970). The petitioner in this case was a railroad corporation. On March 31, 1958, petitioner issued to its class A stockholders, in exchange for their stock, shares of class B stock plus 6-percent income debentures bearing preissue “interest” from January 1, 1957. Respondent disallowed petitioner’s deduction of the preissue interest on the dual grounds that the debentures were really “equity” and that even if they were debt, there was no debt before March 31, 1958, so that interest for the prior 15 months would be nondeductible. We held that the debentures were debt and allowed the preissue interest deduction. In so doing, we relied heavily on Commissioner v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 338 U.S. 883 (1949), affg. per curiam 174 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1949), affg. 9 T.C. 1018 (1947). We construed the Supreme Court’s per curiam affirmance of the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in that case as inferentially overruling the contrary holding of Commissioner v. Drovers Journal Pub. Co., 135 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1943), reversing a Memorandum Opinion of this Court. We see no logical distinction between our case and Monon Railroad. In fact, justifying treatment of preissue “interest” as interest in our case is easier, for in Monon Railroad, preissue interest relating to periods before even a conditional obligation existed was held deductible, whereas in our c”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Midkiff v. Commissioner